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The juvenile justice system in the United States is the subject 
of a number of controversies among sociologists, lawyers, laymen, 
and practitioners within the system. One of the major controversies 
is the court 1 s jurisdiction and handling of a variety of different 
types of offenders. Most juvenile courts today have the responsibil-
ity for handling dependent and neglected children, young persons being 
referred to the adult criminal court, juvenile delinquent offenders, 
and 11 juvenile status offenders. 11 Many have adoption and foster care 
responsibilities as well. Of particular concern to this study is the 
status offender. The Council of State Governments, in its publica-
tion Status Offenders: A Working Definition (1975:3), defines the 
status offender as 11 a juvenile whose offense would not be criminal 
if committed by an adult. 11 Though the juvenile court has jurisdic-
tion over a wide variety of individuals, many of whom have committed 
no criminal act, status offender jurisdiction is a somewhat different 
issue. The difference arises from the fact that the status offender 
has been adjudicated as a law violator (albeit a violator of the 
juvenile code rather than the criminal code), is sometimes treated as 
a delinquent (either included within the delinquency definition or as 
an ancillary under a different name), and is in some cases subject to 
the same sanctions as a delinquent by the court. 
The purpose of this study is to examine supervision practices 
within the juvenile justice system in regard to various offenders 
from a sociology of law perspective. This simply means that this 
study will attempt to investigate the actions of the juvenile court 
(a legal institution), from the perspective of sociological theory. 
Unlike many studies of delinquents or status offenders, the object 
here is not the offenders themselves, their backgrounds, attitudes, 
or their interactions, but, instead, the workings and practices of 
the system itself toward these young people. In this sense, then, 
this study is not an investigation into 11 delinquency 11 or 11 status of-
fenders,11 as much as it is a study of law. 
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Most people recognize that the juvenile court has jurisdiction 
over many persons, including status offenders. However, many do not 
realize that in many, if not most jurisdictions, the status offender 
is considered a delinquent (regardless of the designated term). Many 
persons assume that the status offender is treated much differently, 
specifically more leniently, than the youth who has violated the 
criminal law. Research on this subject has been sparse, to say the 
least, and as such, there is not much evidence from which to general-
ize regarding the court's handling of status offenders. 
The design of this research consists of examining, first of all, 
the relevant literature concerning the juvenile court, including the 
juvenile status offense. As a part of this, it is necessary to dis-
cuss the origin and rise of the juvenile court in America and its 
precedents in England, because the juvenile justice system, in its 
philosophical base, legal history, and contemporary practice is cru-
cial to an understanding of the juvenile court. Various views and 
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research findings are examined to show the contemporary and histori-
cal judgments regarding the handling of different offenders. Also, 
two major sociological theories are presented, consensus (functional) 
theory and conflict theory, which attempt to explain both the origin 
and workings of the juvenile court, along with the court's practices 
toward the offenders. One of these approaches, conflict theory, is 
viewed as more explanatory for this particular research project, and 
the handling of offenders is analyzed and the data examined in light 
of this theory. The study consists, essentially, of describing the 
sample under study, and comparing the supervision and disposition 
practices of the Tulsa County Juvenile Court toward these youth. 
Variables for the comparisons among offenders include the disposition 
of cases, along with controls by age, sex, and race, and the vari-
able of length of supervision by the court, again with the same con-
trol variables. Also, correlations between age and length of 
supervision are to be examined. Finally, an attempt is made to de-
velop a "Criminal Maturity Index" as a measure of offender serious-
ness and as a means of predicting length of supervision. 
It is hoped that, as a result of this study, knowledge concern-
ing the workings of the juvenile court will be expanded. Specifically, 
this research can provide greater awareness of supervision practices 
toward different offenders, especially status offenders, and generally, 
this study can expand the knowledge base in the sociology of law. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Origins of the Juvenile Court 
Various authors indicate that the American juvenile court can 
trace its roots back to English practices regarding the relationship 
between children and the law. It is certainly true that in our juve-
nile court and juvenile legal tradition, many practices closely re-
sembly those of historical England. 
There is a general belief that the English common-law treated 
children as though they were adults in regard to criminal violations. 
In fact, historical evidence indicates that various amounts of differ-
ential treatment for juveniles has a long tradition in Britain. Ac-
cording to Johnson (1975), children in England historically had a dual 
role before the law. First, children were generally considered to be 
infants until the age of 21 with regard to most matters. Second, they 
were generally subject to the same criminal laws as adults, with some 
qualifications. Children under the age of seven were considered to be 
impossible of forming mens rea, or criminal intent. Those aged 7-14 
could not form criminal intent except in certain circumstances, while 
those over age 14 were generally considered to be responsible for 
their actions. Tappan (1949) writes that ancient Saxon law did not 
hold children accountable for adult capital crimes. According to 
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him: 
the child under twelve could not be guilty 'in will' of 
crime and that from twelve to fourteen he might or might 
not be guilty according to his capacity. After the age 
of fourteen he could not be presumed innocent because 
of age (1949:167). 
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Nonetheless, most scholars view certain developments in the Eng-
lish justice system as indicative of a certain amount of rigidity in 
the treatment of children. Three important and related practices 
arose in England which are important in understanding the contemporary 
American juvenile justice system: the principle of equity, the Court 
of Chancery, and the doctrine of parens patriae. According to Coch-
ran's Law Dictionary (1973), equity is a type of justice which develops 
separately from the common law, while chancery is a court which exer-
cises equitable jurisdiction. Th~ doctrine of parens patriae, in 
which the king assumes the role of "father of his country," is a re-
lated concept and wi 11 be dealt with in de ta i 1 shortly. 
Both Tappan (1949) and Johnson (1975) view the Court of Chancery 
development as a response to the lack of flexibility in the English 
legal system for dealing with children. The chancellor, under his 
"prerogative of grace" could aid those who might suffer hardship 
under the application of the law (Tappan, 1959; Johnson, 1975). 
Tappan indicates that there originally developed a Council of Chan-
cery in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, then, in the fi f-
teenth century: 
a distinct court and jurisdiction of chancery emerged, 
more flexible and administrative in its character than 
the common-law courts, providing a more affirmative, 
remedial assistance in equity (1949:169). 
The concepts of chancery, equity, and parens patriae are his-
torically interrelated. Through the principle of equity, the Court 
of Chancery acted as parens patriae, an agent of the king, 11 in exer-
cising his power of guardianship over the persons and property of 
minors, who were considered wards of the state and as such entitled 
to special protection11 (Caldwell, 1961 :394). 
The parens patriae principle was 11 rather limited in the common-
law tradition 11 (Kittrie, 1971 :9). The king, in this role, was sup-
posed to protect the interests of those who were not in a position 
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to do so for themselves and the Court of Chancery was designed to 
assist the kind in his parenting role. Originally, the court was 
supposed to handle cases of dependent, but not criminal, children 
(Coffey, 1974), but its jurisdiction was extended to cover a variety 
of individuals, including juvenile criminal offenders. According to 
Kittrie (1971), this expansion of chancery jurisdiction was simply 
an outgrowth of historical practice whereby the king assumed protec-
tion of 11 incompetent 11 subjects. Tappan (1949) points out that the 
primary function of the Court of Chancery traditionally was to pro-
tect the property rights of wealthy children. Nevertheless, the doc-
trine of parens patriae, exercised through the Court of Chancery, 
brought juvenile law violators into a more flexible system of justice 
(Ca 1dwe11 , 1961 ) . 
English legal practice continued to provide differential treat-
ment for juveniles as time passed. Though in principle juveniles 
were subject to the same penalties as adults, in practice they were 
treated more leniently. Actually, the attitude toward children and 
the law in historical England bears a remarkable resemblance to mor.e 
contemporary views. As John Brydall wrote in 1675: 
An infant, until he be of the age of 15, which in law 
is accounted the age of discretion cannot commit lar-
ceny, or other felony; for the principle end of punish-
ment is, that others by his example may fear to offend: 
But such punishment can be no example to Infants, that 
are not of the age of discretion (Compendious Collec-
tion of the Laws of England, Touchin Matters Criminal, 
1675: 57, cited in Sanders, 1945:44 . 
Likewise, misconceptions regarding children and capital punish-
ment also abound. Sanders (1945), drawing upon various historical 
sources, provides evidence that juveniles, while convicted of capi-
tal crimes, were seldom given the punishment of death. He writes, 
for example, that there is no indication of any capital punishment 
sentence carried out against children in England from 1680-1731, 
As the Committee of the Society for the Reformation of 
Juvenile Offenders in London expressed it in a report 
issued in 1818, 'To execute against childr~n the severe 
code of criminal jurisprudence at present prevailing in 
this country is impossible: the legislature is incap-
able of enforcing it; religion, humanity, public feel-
ing, revolt at the idea' (1945:43). 
Also, there was a long-time practice in England known as the 
"City Custom of Apprentices." Sanctioned by Parliament, this prac-
tice was a traditional precedent to the juvenile court. It func-
tioned in much the same manner, procedurally, as the contemporary 
juvenile court (Sanders, 1945). It was not until 1908 that Eng-
land established the Children's Court. But, as the preceeding evi-
dence indicates, and as Sanders points out, there is historical 
verification for the idea that children should not be held account-
able under the law in as rigid a manner as adults. For example, be-
ginning in 1820, there was a strong movement in England to provide 
separate penalties for children under the criminal code. The legal 
basis for a children's court was broadened through the "Wellesley 
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Case, 11 Wellesley v. the Duke of Beaufort, 2 Russel 1, which gave the 
state, through the Court of Chancery, the right to remove a child 
from 11 unsuitable 11 parents. Between 1820 and 1850, Parliament con-
sidered many bills to allow the criminal court more discretion in 
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·juvenile violations, and, in 1840, passed the Infant Felons Act, 
which gave the High Court of Chancery jurisdiction over younger of-
fenders and the right to remove children from their parents (Sanders, 
1945). So, 
From the above illustrations and examples and quota-
tions from old law books, it is quite clear that for 
several centuries delinquent children have not been 
treated with the same harshness and severity as adult 
criminals (1945:52). 
The development of the juvenile court in the United States was 
in many ways influenced by happenings in England, but at the same 
time, it developed to some extent independently of that influence. 
There exist in the literature two competing views of the rise of 
the juvenile court system in America. The conventional approach as-
sumes that the court arose as a response to the severe conditions 
imposed upon children during the nineteenth century. This view sees 
the juvenile court as a 11 radical innovation" in justics, virtually 
without precedent. Traditionally, this has been the more popular 
view, and takes the form of a value-consensus orientation (Faust and 
Brantingham, 1974). 
The orthodox perspective, then, views juvenile justice 
legislation as arising out of the 'highest motives and 
most enlightened impulses,' based upon an essentially 
positivistic philosophy, blanketed with humanistic 
values ( l 97 4: 40) . 
During the nineteenth century, there was a developing concern 
for the welfare of children. The conventional view regarding the 
origin of the court is based upon the idea that, as a result of the 
plight of children, many persons concerned with penology and prison 
reform concerted their efforts toward a revision of the juvenile 
justice system. According to Coffey (1974), children were the ob-
. ject of concern due to their 11 victimization 11 by the social changes 
of industrialization and urbanization. 11 This concern was past due 
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and certainly justified, but was perhaps sentimentalized out of guilt 
that children's rights had been callously ignored for far too 1ong 11 
(Coffey, 1974:38). 
According to this approach, the juvenile court "represents the 
most important and ambitious effort yet undertaken by our law to 
give practical expression to the rehabilitative ideal" (Allen, 1964 
1964:414). As a result of this 11 radical innovation, 11 a new concept 
of adolescent misbehavior emerged. The young offender was to be 
treated in a "non-punitive" manner (Allen, 1964:414), by a system 
that was essentially 11 non-criminal 11 in nature (Lerman, 1971 ). The 
juvenile court process was designed for the treatment of the young-
ster rather than for the protection of society (Kittrie, 1971), and 
this treatment was designed to provide care for the child much as he 
should receive from his parents (Coffey, 1974). Negative social 
changes (primarily industrialization and urbanization) forced a con-
cerned juvenile court to preempt other influences. 
What the past left to the home and to the church, 
whether we will or not, we are compelled more and more 
to leave to the law and the courts. The circumstances 
of city life and the modern feeling that law is a prod-
uct of conscious and determinate human will have put a 
larger burden upon the law and so upon the agencies which 
administer the law that either has been prepared to bear 
(Pound, 1964:495). 
Because of the negative impact of these social forces, as per-
ceived by the originators of the juvenile court, it was their duty 
to rescue the child. According to Lerman (1971 :36), the juvenile 
court was designed to "deal with the child and his needs, rather 
. than with his offence the juvenile court was designed to save 
children--not punish them." At the same time, law had to adapt to 
this era. According to Pound (1964): 
At the time when the juvenile court arose, American 
lawyers were finding it necessary to struggle with 
problems of adjusting the law, which had developed in 
the formative era of our institutions, to new needs 
of a time of growing economic unification of what 
had been a land of economically self-sufficient neigh-
borhoods, and of new burdens upon government and new 
tasks for an era of multiplying metropolitan cities 
(1964:492). 
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Another, less idealistic view of the origin of the juvenile 
court also exists in the literature. This view, primarily a conflict 
perspective, sees the juvenile court, first of all, as not clearly so 
innovative as the more conventional view holds. According to Faust 
and Brantingham (1974), the juvenile court was not necessarily a new 
idea; it was, to some extent, simply a legal codification of actual 
practices. They see three conditions as playing a significant role 
in the development of the court. They were: (1) a concern over the 
treatment of children, (2) a perceived threat to middle-class values 
by city life, and (3) the rise of feminism. According to Empey (1973), 
the juvenile justice system developed out of nineteenth century re-
form which attempted to remove children from the criminal court. He 
sees three major factors involved in the origin of the court: (1) 
the concept of parens patriae from the English Chancery Court, which 
allowed the state to intervene into children's lives, (2) social 
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reform designed to offset the effects of urbanization, industrializa-
tion, and cultural heterogeneity. Often these reforms, he says, 
were simply attempts to impose middle-class morals onto lower-class 
youngsters, and (3) the influences of social pathology in sociology 
and Freudianism in psychology, which viewed antisocial conduct as 
perhaps the result of unconscious motives, and which viewed this be-
havior from a "medical" model, whereby reformers wanted to "restore 
the emotional health" of youngsters through treatment. 
However, the most persuasive argument for this approach has 
been provided by Platt (1969, 1977). In his analysis of the "child-
saving movement, 11 Platt attempts to explain the social conditions 
surrounding the rise of the juvenile court, the motives and social 
characteristics of the "child-savers," and the interests which the 
juvenile court reformers served. 
According to Platt (1969), the child-saving movement was respons-
ible for our conception of delinquency and our juvenile justice sys-
tern. Borrowing images rooted in medicine, Social Darwinism, and 
Positivistic Criminology, the child-savers attempted to defend tra-
ditional, rural, middle-class values against the influences of urban-
ization. Their main concern was the controlling of youthful 
misbehavior; they were "prohibitionists" in that they were interested 
in saving children from 11 movies, pornography, cigarettes, alcohol, 
and anything else which might possibly rob them of their innocence" 
(1969:127). In their rescue efforts, the child savers were 
particularly concerned with extending governmental con-
trol over a whole range of youthful activities that 
previously had been handled on an informal basis. The 
main aim of the child-savers was to impose sanctions 
on conduct unbecoming youth and to disqualify youth 
from enjoying adult privileges (1969:127). 
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The child-savers were predominantly middle-class and, as such, 
they had vested interests in the maintenance of traditional institu-
tions and values. In this respect, the juvenile court movement 
was not really anything "radical and innovative." In fact, the move-
ment reflected a concern for such traditions as "parental authority, 
education at home, and the virtues of rural life" (Platt, 1969:127). 
Platt indicates that this concern manifested itself through an ele-
vation of "the nuclear family and, more especially, the role of women 
as stalwarts of the family" (1969:127}. 
In his analysis, Platt (1969) points to the role played by the 
rising feminist movement. Women were regarded as particularly suited 
for juvenile corrections, due to their "natural 11 child-rearing func-
tions. And, as a result of dramatic social changes (again, resulting 
primarily from industrialization and urbanization), the time was ripe 
for women to defend their interests. As Platt says: 
Middle-class women at the turn of the century experi-
enced a complex and far-reaching status revolution. 
Their traditional functions were dramatically threatened 
by the weakening of domestic roles and the specialized 
rearrangement of family life. One of the main forces 
behind the child-saving movement was a concern for the 
structure of family life and the proper socialization of 
young persons (1969:126). 
Child saving, according to Platt, had almost universal appeal to 
women. It was an opportunity for both feminists and anti-feminists 
alike to advance their causes. Though their motives were different, 
both groups of women realized the child-saving movement's potential. 
Child-saving was a predominantly feminist movement, and 
it was regarded even by antifeminists as female domain. 
The social circumstances behind this appreciation of 
maternalism were women's emancipation and the accompany-
ing changes in the character of traditional family life. 
Educated middle-class women now had more leisure time 
but a limited choice of careers. Child-saving was a rep-
utable task for women who were allowed to extend their 
housekeeping functions into the community without denying 
antifeminist stereotypes of woman's nature and place 
(Platt, 1969:125). 
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The origin of the juvenile court, through the child-saving move-
. ment, then, particularly appealed to women, especially middle-class 
women. It provided feminists with an active, outside-the-home role 
in society, while retaining a "traditional" child-care role. So, the 
child-saving movement allowed for the integration of a variety of so-
cial elements: preservation of tradition, feminism, and anti-feminism. 
Likewise, the new career opportunities for women afforded by the de-
veloping juvenile justice system also reflected these elements. 
Although child-saving had important symbolic functions for 
preserving the social prestige of a declining elite, it 
also had a considerable practical significance for legiti-
mizing new career openings for women. The new role of 
social worker combined elements of an old and partly fic-
ticious role--defenders of family life--and elements of 
a new role--social servant. Social work was thus both an 
affirmation of cherished American values and an instru-
mentality for women's emancipation (Platt, 1969:128). 
Through the child-saving movement, then, the juvenile justice 
system emerged. The movement "created" new categories of delinquency, 
the status offenses, and developed a new legal institution, the ju-
venile court, along with a new correctional institution, the reforma-
tory, to handle this misbehavior (Platt, 1969). In so doing, the 
child-savers brought previously legal (though predominantly lower-
class) behavior under the jurisdiction of the court. Not only were 
the child-savers concerned with rescuing delinquents, but, accord-
ing to Platt, they were firm believers in early intervention into 
the child's life. 
The unique character of the child-saving movement was its 
concern for predelinquent offenders--'children who occupy 
the debatable ground between criminality and innocence'--
and its claim that it could transform potential criminals 
into respectable citizens by training them in 'habits of 
industry, self-control, and obedience to law' (Platt, 
1969:132; citing: Illinois, Board of State Commissioners 
of Public Charities, Sixth Biennial Report, Springfield: 
H. W. Rokker, 1880:104). 
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Whichever perspective one holds, either the conventional or the 
conflict, it is obvious that the origin of the court was not an 
isolated instance. Both approaches see the court's origin in the 
various social conditions of the nineteenth century. Not only did 
the juvenile court emerge at this time, but, as Allen (1964) indi-
cates, there was a broad effort on many fronts in American society 
to improve the welfare of children. This effort included the rise 
of public education, the development of services for dependent and 
neglected children, the advent of child labor laws, and other at-
tempts to counteract industrial abuses of children. Likewise, Cald-
well writes of the fact that the juvenile court was only one example 
of attempted reform: 
many varied influences helped to produce the climate in 
which it [the juvenile court] had its origin. In fact, 
its establishment may well be considered a logical and 
exceedingly important development in a much broader 
movement for the expansion of the specialized treatment 
given to children in an increasingly complex society • 
. . . (1961 :395). 
Others have indicated the variety of changing conditions related 
to the rise of the court. Johnson (1975) points out that the move-
ment toward a juvenile court followed a time of humanitarian reform 
in penology which also included an attempt to replace corporal and 
capital punishment with incarceration. The proponents of the juve-
nile court drew upon a number of social and legal principles in 
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designing the system, including the doctrine of parens patriae, the 
ideas of both the penal reform movement and deterministic criminology, 
and the practice of special institutions for juveniles (Kittrie, 
1971 :112). 
The most obvious precipitants of the juvenile court were, as 
mentioned earlier, industrialization and urbanization. Closely re-
lated to these was the perceived threat of immigration. It is evi-
dent from the literature that the concerns of those involved in the 
juvenile court movement were traditional, rural, middle-class con-
cerns. It is not surprising, then, that the system which they devised 
reflects those concerns. The city was viewed as a negative influence 
on children which threatened the destruction of those values (con-
cerns) (Platt, 1969). Of particular interest were the immigrants, 
who were, according to Platt (1969:123), "regarded as 'unsocialized' 
and the city's impersonality compounded their isolation and degrada-
tion." To deal with the problem of these children, the juvenile 
court reformers "invented" new forms of misbehavior: 
The juvenile court movement went far beyond a concern for 
the special treatment of adolescent offenders. It 
brought within the gambit of governmental control a set 
of youthful activities that had been previously ignored 
or dealt with on an informal basis. It was not by acci-
dent that the behavior selected for penalizing by the 
child•savers--sexual license, drinking, roaming the 
streets, begging, frequenting dance halls and movies, 
fighting, and being seen in public late at night--was 
most directly relevant to the children of lower-class 
migrant and irrmigrant families (Platt, 1969:129-130). 
It was through the juvenile court movement that attempts were 
made to deal with these behaviors and counteract their causes: ur-
banization and industrialization. Based upon the English doctrine 
of parens patriae, the court could exercise wide discretion over the 
behaviors that today are labeled "status offenses." Again, these 
misbehaviors were primarily violations of middle-class notions of 
respectability (Platt, 1969). One of the main forces designed to 
deal with these offenses was the reformatory. 
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Like the definition of delinquency, the concept of the reforma-
tory reflected the traditi anal, middle-cl ass interests of the juve-
nile court reformers. The general trend of thought was that children 
could be helped, but only if they could somehow be insulated from 
the influences of the city. According to the reformers, penal meth-
ods of thetime could not be successful because they did not inculcate 
rural values. As Mary Carpenter said about traditional penology in 
1874: 
All the arrangements are artificial .... Instead of the 
cultivation of the land, which would prepare the youth to 
seek a sphere far from the dangers of large cities, the 
boys and young men were being taught trades which will con-
fine them to the great centers of an overcrowded population 
(cited in Platt, 1969:133-134). 
Therefore, it was the duty of the new penology to provide an alterna-
tive. Reflecting their interests, the juvenile court reformers at-
tempted to develop a reformatory system which they thought would 
counteract the negative impact of the city. The reformatory system 
was designed from a rural family model: 
The trend from congregate housing in the city to group 
living in the country represented a significant change 
in the organization of penal institutions for young of-
fenders ... the family or cottage plan. . . • The new 
penology emphasized the corruptness and artificiality of 
the city; from progressive education, it inherited a 
concern for naturalism, purity, and innocence. It is 
not surprising, therefore, that the cottage plan also 
entailed a movement to a rural location. The aim of 
penal reformers was not merely to use the countryside 
for teaching agriculture skills. The confrontation be-
tween corrupt delinquents and unspoiled nature was in-
tended to have a spiritual and regenerative effect. The 
romantic attachment to rural values was quite divorced 
from social and agricultural realities. It was based o~ 
a sentimental and nostalgic repudiation of city life. Ad-
vocates of the reformatory system generally ignored the 
economic attractiveness of city work and the redundancy 
of farming skills (Platt, 1969:135). 
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The culmination of this reform movement was the establishment of 
the first juvenile court in April, 1899, as a result of the Juvenile 
Court Act of Illinois. With the establishment of the Illinois court, 
all children who went before the court,--neglected, delinquent, and 
"incorrigible," were placed under the same jurisdiction (Coffee, 1974). 
According to Kittrie, the original statute setting up the juvenile 
court gave the court jurisdiction only over those who had committed 
violations of specific laws, but was amended shortly thereafter to in-
elude those thought to be "on the brink of delinquency." The inclusion 
of status offenders within the jurisdiction of the court was completed 
in 1905, when "the Illinois definition of delinquency was extended to 
encompass not only those charged with a violation of the adult laws, 
but also the incorrigibles, those exposed to undesirable associates, 
[etc] ...• " (Kittri.e, 1971:.111-112). 
Martin (1971) believes that the origins of the juvenile court 
were not in the philosophy of the Classical school of criminology, 
which assumes free-will and hedonism. Though Classical criminology 
"was responsible for shaping American criminal law from the Revolution 
onward," the juvenile court developed essentially from the philosophi-
cal foundations of the Positive school of criminology (1977:8). He 
says that Americans slightly modified the Positivistic doctrines of 
"the deterministic view of behavior, the medical model of diagnosis 
and treatment, and the concept of intervention to prevent deviance" 
18 
because they were viewed as too 11 pessimistic, 11 and formed the 11 so-
called American school of criminology. 11 But, even though altered 
slightly, these concepts became the basis of juvenile justice in 
America and 11 were all integrated into the bases of juvenile court 
philosophy" (1977:8). 
According to Tappan (1949), the first juvenile court was one of 
equity jurisdiction, and was an attempt to be protective of children 
through a non-criminal approach. When it originated, no new court 
was established; the statute simply gave a new jurisdiction to exist-
ing courts. But, 11 it did create the status of delinquency as something 
less than a crime, to be treated correctively and not by punishment as 
such" (1949:172). 
Similarly, Caldwell provides five major points concerning the 
first juvenile court law: 
(1) The first court was not to be a new or independent 
tribunal but merely a special jurisdiction in the cir-
cuit court. 
(2) The juvenile court was to be a special court and not 
an administrative agency. 
(3) The law did not stipulate that juvenile delinquents 
should be 'treated' and not punished. It merely pro-
vided that the child should receive approximately the 
same care, custody, and discipline that his parents should 
give him. 
(4) A juvenile delinquent was simply defined as 'any child 
under the age of 16 years who violates any law of this 
state or any city or village ordinace. 1 
(5) In all trials under the law any interested party might 
demand, or the judge might order, a jury of six to try 
the case (1961:396). 
Reflecting the influence of the juvenile reform movement, the 
first court attempted to provide a distinction between adult and 
19 
juvenile criminality. According to Coffey (1974:37), the distin-
guishing characteristic between the new juvenile court and the tradi-
tional criminal courts is the difference between "adult responsibil-
ity and juvenile accountability." Obviously, the juvenile court 
reformers wanted a different system: 11 From the outset there was a 
onspicuous effort to simultaneously minimize the authoritarian atmos-
phere and emphasize various degrees of accountability for law viola-
tion11 (1974:37). 
According to Caldwell (1961), the first juvenile court made two 
significant changes in dealing with delinquents. First, the court 
raised the age of accountability for crime from 7 to 16, and second, 
created a court of equity jurisdiction, allowing for the same discre-
tion in dealing with delinquents that had been used previously in re-
gard to neglected and dependent children. Pound (1964) feels that the 
social characteristics of those who drafted the first juvenile court 
law is a significant reason for its particular concerns and innova-
tions. Noting that the Illinois law was in reality the work of a bar 
association committee, he says the first juvenile court law was 
the enduring work of a body of socially minded lawyers, 
cooperating with social workers. The lawyers made a 
court, but the pressure of organized social workers has 
been an agency of the first importance in guiding the 
development of what was thus begun and putting it and 
keeping it in the path of efficient attainment of its 
ends (1964:494). 
So, it can be seen that the first juvenile court, arising from 
the work of juvenile court reformers, obtained jurisdiction over the 
juvenile offender. It is significant that the court, originally de-
signed to deal only with those who violated criminal laws in a less 
punitive manner, began early to intervene into the lives of those 
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children who engaged in previously non-criminal behavior: the status 
offenders. With the influence of the child-saving movement playing 
an important role, younsters whose misconduct was labeled "incorrigi-
ble," etc. became of interest to the juvenile justice system. Though 
these behaviors had at times been considered delinquent or criminal 
(Tappan, 1949), the general prohibitions against such activities were 
not very enforceable. With the new juvenile court, a far greater num-
ber of youngsters came under court jurisdiction. 
Contemporary Juvenile Court 
The modern juvenile court, based upon the preceeding historical 
and social foundations, continues in much the same tradition. As men-
tioned, the primary difference in the bases of the criminal and juve-
nile courts is thenotion of accountability: the juvenile is generally 
considered to be less accountable for his actions than is the adult. 
Another difference, according to Kittrie (1971), is between criminal 
law and juvenile law. In criminal law, the court deals with an offen-
der after he has committed an act, whereas in juvenile law, the court 
is often an attempt to prevent a criminal act while at the same time 
attempting to deal with certain 11 antisocial 11 behaviors. The legal ba-
sis for juvenile misconduct is somewhat different from that of adult 
misbehavior. As Reiss (1970:79) explains it: "Society chooses what 
rules to enforce, in what situations, on what people. Thus, Negroes 
may get censored for what whites may do; women censored for what men 
may do. 11 And, it could be added, juveniles get censored for 
what adults may do. 
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The juvenile court is an extremely varied institution. Its phil-
osophy, jurisdiction, functions, and purposes reflect the influence 
of many different elements. Therefore, it could be expected to con-
tain some inconsistencies, which it does. But, the court is founded 
. upon a particular philosophy of law, as summarized by Caldwell (1961): 
(1) THE SUPERIOR RIGHTS OF THE STATE. The state is the 
1 higher or ultimate parent• of all the children within 
its borders. . . . This is an adaption of the ancient 
doctrine of parens patriae, by which all English chil-
dren were made wards of the crown. 
(2) INDIVIDUALIZATION OF JUSTICE. A basic principle in 
the philosophy of the juvenile court is the recognition 
that people are different and that each must be considered 
in the light of his own background and personality .... 
(3) THE STATUS OF DELINQUENCY. The state should try to pro-
tect the child from the harmful brand of criminality. In 
order to accomplish this the law created the status of de-
linquency, which is something less than crime and is vari-
ously defined in different states ...• 
( 4) NONCRIMINAL PROCEDURE. By means of an informa 1 proced-
ure the juvenile court functions in such a way as to give 
primary consideration to the interests of the child .... 
(5) REMEDIAL, PREVENTIVE, AND NONPUNITIVE PURPOSE. The ac-
tion of the juvenile court is to save the child and to pre-
vent him from becoming a criminal. It seeks to provide him 
with about the same care and protection that his parents 
should give him ... (1961:399-400). 
The philosophy of the juvenile court, then, reflects a different 
view of misbehavior than does the criminal court. Likewise, the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court differs from that of the adult 
court system. Accardi ng to Hahn ( 1971 : 257) , courts can be of two 
types: 11 constitutionaiu and 11 legislative. 11 The juvenile court is a 
11 legislative or statutory court, and as such, its authority is set 
forth by the legislature in its particular state. 11 By 11 legislative 
or statutory, 11 Hahn means that the juvenile court is an equity court, 
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one with jurisdiction and procedures designed by lawmakers and not 
based in the common law. Therefore, the court exercises equity juris-
diction; Pound (1964) summarizes the juvenile court's five character-
istics of equity jurisdiction: 
(1) It is relatively informal in its procedure .... 
(2) As with all equity jurisdiction, it is remedial, mean-
ing it is an attempt to legally redress a wrong, not puni-
tive. 
(3) It acts preventively in advance of commission of any 
specific wrongdoing. 
(4) It employs administrative rather than adversary methods. 
(5) It can adapt its action to the circumstances of individ-
ual cases and so achieve a high degree of individualization, 
which is demanded by justice, if not always by security 
(1964:498-499). 
There are four basic categories of juvenile court jurisdiction, 
according to Martin (1977:9): (1) delinquent children--those who 
have committed an adult crime, (2) neglected children--wherein par-
ents do not offer the care and guidance they are obligated to provide, 
(3) dependent children-- 11 those cases in which a child's parents are 
unable to care for him, 11 and (4) status offenders--children engaged 
in behavior that is legal for adults but not for children, as when 
11 the child is beyond the control of his parents or is engaging in non-
criminal conduct thought to be harmful to himself. 11 
The philosophy of the juvenile court, along with its equity jur-
isdiction, provide the basis for· its approach to the handling of ju-
venile offenders. From both Caldwell (1961) and Pound (1964) it can 
be seen that the following factors are important foundations of the 
court: individualization of justice, informality of procedure, a 
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non-punitive approach, remediality, and prevention. Though the ac-
tions of the court do not always follow consistently from its founda-
tions (as in non-punitiveness), these are nonetheless the bases for 
the juvenile court. The particular cases which come before the court 
depend upon the statutory jurisdiction given to it. Though this jur-
isdiction varies from one locale to another, Johnson (1975:21) writes 
that the juvenile court has 11 exclusive original jurisdiction 11 over 
certain types of cases, including adoption, child-custody, parental 
rights, child abuse and neglect, certification of the child as an 
adult for criminal prosecution purposes, adults contributing to the 
delinquency of minors, among many others. 
The juvenile court, then, is a varied and multi-jurisdictional 
entity. Not only is it concerned with adolescent behavior, but it 
must also concern itself with virtually any act related to children. 
As mentioned, the court did not develop in an isolated fashion; like-
wise, the contemporary court must be viewed within the social environ-
ment which is responsible for its actions and jurisdiction. There are 
according to Caldwell (1961), a number of reasons why the juvenile 
court has its particular jurisdictional nature. In many ways, the 
modern court reflects the 11 increasing complexity of American society 11 
(1961:397). Such factors as industrialization, urbanization, mobil-
ity, rapid transportation and communications, among others, have con-
tributed to a decline in the influence of traditional institutions; 
so new forms of social control have emerged. The juvenile court is 
one of these new forms of social control. The jurisdiction of the 
court is related to these social changes in that it has been called 
upon to assume many of the traditional functions of other institutions, 
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particularly the family, the neighborhood, and the church. Likewise, 
other influences have affected the philosophy and jurisdiction of the 
court. Especially noteworthy are social workers and psychiatrists. 
These two groups have aided in giving the court its conception of 
delinquency as "symptomatic of some underlying emotional contition 11 
(1961:398) to be treated through psychiatry, psychology, or social 
work. In addition, court decisions which have emphasized the juvenile 
court's "social service functions and minimized its legal characteris-
tics" (1961:398) have tended to make the court something of a social 
work agency rather than a legal entity. 
Empey (1973) believes that the juvenile court today mirrors its 
historical origins. According to him, the modern juvenile justice 
system stresses three ideas: 
(1) the right of the state to exercise wide jurisdiction 
over the lives of young people--the dependent, the ne-
glected, the 1 incorrigible 1 --as well as the law violator, 
(2) the use of the court to maintain the moral as well as 
the legal standards of the community, and 
(3) the implementation of treatment procedures designed 
to correct the emotional and social problems of children 
(1973: 14). 
The functions of the juvenile court reflect its diversity of foun-
dation. According to Rubin (1949), there are two majOR functions of 
the contemporary court: (1) it is supposed to take the juvenile from 
the adult criminal courts, and (2) it is supposed to protect and treat 
other children in need. Aside from its obvious delinquency functions, 
Allen 0964:412) indicates that the juvenile court has to perform many 
other functions, including "welfare functions, 11 for dependent and ne-
glected children, and "criminal prosecution functions, as in cases of 
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adults alleged to have contributed to the delinquency of minors." 
This variety, whether philosophically sound or not, can present prob-
lems for the court. Many of the greatest criticisms of the modern 
juvenile court arise from its multi-functional approach to children's 
problems. According to Tappan (1949): 
The extension of the functions of the children's court has 
frequently been rationalized in terms of the greater value 
of treatment in preventing rather delayed curative measures. 
The court should attempt to detect problems of maladjust-
ment in their incipience and thus forestall the more aggra-
vated, possibly the irremediable, recalcitrance of the 
matured delinquent. This is a particularly seductive ra-
tionale because of its half-truths. There is certainly 
a need to focus community resources upon more effective 
prevention. . . . But this well-intentioned purpose cannot 
realistically avoid the question of the appropriateness of 
its particular resources to accomplish preventive goals. 
A court, by its intrinsic character and limitations, is not 
desinged to do preventive work in the sense of avoiding the 
first delinquency. Its function is to adjudicate del in-
quents, and most of its defendants are more or less serious 
offenders (1949:200). 
Most criticisms of the court arise about vague definitions of 
delinquency, wide discretionary powers, intervention into the lives 
of non-criminal adolescents, and the conflicting approaches of the 
court. Indeed, Tappan (1949) believes that many of the problems 
faced by the court are due to the dual nature of the court's philoso-
phy. According to him, the two approaches of the court, the judicial 
(legal) and the casework (administrative), lead to a certain amount of 
inconsistency. The modern court, he says, is essentially a compromise 
between these two approaches; it is a "sociolegal 11 effort (1949:7). 
The problem becomes one of intent and result: Tappan's view is that 
in the case of the juvenile court, they are often not the same. The 
juvenile court is designed to protect and benefit the youth, but 
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11 This whole view appears to overlook the significant point that what-
ever he may be called, he is in fact treated as an offender through 
court control 11 (1949:9). 
Tappan (1949) further indicates that in certain respects the 
. court is more of an administrative agency than a court of law. 
Though defenders of the court claim ancestry to the Chancery Court of 
England, he believes that, in reality, the contemporary court has so 
expanded upon equity procedures that it resembles the modern 11 adminin-
istrative11 or 11 quasi-judicial 11 agency more than a court. Nonetheless, 
there is 11 considerable rationalization by analogy to ancient chancery 11 
(1949:169). Likewise, he says the juvenile court also resembles the 
criminal court. The powers of the court are much greater than that of 
the ordinary administrative agency or that of the traditional Court of 
Chancery. In fact, historically, the American juvenile court has had 
a very close 11 functional affiliation 11 (1949:170) with the criminal 
court, according to him. Tappan further notes that while the first 
juvenile court was an equity court, 
a majority of children's courts were originally set up as 
a part of the criminal court system and, despite subse-
quent enactments, a large proportion of them still remain 
so. Thus juvenile cases are handled to a great extent to-
day by some term of an ordinary court of original criminal 
jurisdiction or of general jurisdiction covering both 
criminal and civil cases. . . . In most juvenile courts 
there is a preservation of criminal court personnel, ideol-
ogy, and, to a less marked extent, trial procedure and 
treatment methods (1949:11-12). 
Another criticism often directed toward the court is its vague 
definition of delinquency. This is of special importance for this 
work, as the juvenile status offense appears to be a manifestation 
of this vagueness. Critics have argued that the broad definition of 
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delinquency used by the juvenile court allows for unlimited intrusion 
and unlimited discretion on the part of the court. Kittrie (1971:120) 
believes that this vagueness leads to abuse in that the wide discre-
tion allowed the juvenile court, coupled with a broad definition of 
·delinquency, becomes a 11 corrupting influence. 11 According to him, 
11 Abuses_of the unlimited discretion given to juvenile courts by the 
uncertain standards of 1 delinquency 1 are recorded in several appellate 
cases 11 (1971:120). Also, the vague definition of delinquency can lead 
to discriminatory treatment for the child at the hands of the court: 
With such broad definitions, apprehension and adjudica-
tion too often depend upon the child 1 s socioeconomic 
background or upon the personal values of the police, 
the judge, or the court 1 s social service staff (1971:118). 
Likewise, Tappan (1949) notes that there may be serious negative 
consequences for both the court and the child due to broad conceptions 
of misconduct. Based upon the fact that many children are adjudicated 
because of 11 incorrigibiliti' or some other similar offense resulting 
from a petition by his parents, he says: 
Resting upon parental evaluations of their children 1 s 
behavior, this type of norm has traditionally been em-
ployed to lend overrigid or impotent parents the more 
puissant weapons of state authority (1949:210). 
It has even been suggested that some forms of delinquent behavior 
should be removed from the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and be 
handled by other agencies. One such idea is that most status offend-
ers, especially incorrigibles and truants, should be handled by the 
schools rather than by the juvenile court (Caldwell, 1961). Another 
suggestion is that the broad delinquency definitions place undue 
restrictions and expectations on adolescents. Therefore, it may be 
questionable whether many behaviors warrant their attention by the 
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court (Kittrie, 1971). Kittrie also criticizes the court for its ad-
judication procedures in regard to status offenders. He feels it 
might be more beneficial to the child if his first experience with 
defining agencies is with some other institution rather than the 
court. He is not certain if the juvenile court is the proper entry 
point for these youngsters into the system. Also, the argument can be 
made that the status offender's court and correctional experience has 
a negative influence on him (Caldwell, 1961). Tappan (1949) reiter-
ates this idea when he writes: 
Thrusting the admittedly nondel inquent child into such 
a scene the [juvenile justice system], however well meant 
the court's objective may be, is not only unjust but it 
may well propel him into otherwise avoidable delinquency 
( 1949: 200-201 ) . 
All of these criticisms seem to have some validity. It is very 
likely that the juvenile court, no matter how well-intentioned it may 
be, harms a certain number of youngsters, while at the same time help-
ing others. Lerman (1971) indicates that the court has been criticized 
on several major points: 
(1) The broad scope of delinquency statutes and juvenile 
court jurisdictions had permissted the coercive imposition 
of middle-class standards of child rearing. 
(2) A broad definition has enlarged the limits of discre-
tionary authority so that virtually any child can be deemed 
a delinquent if officials are persuaded that he needs cor-
rection. 
(3) The presence of juvenile status offenses, as part of the 
delinquency statutes, provides an easier basis for convict-
ing and incarcerating young people because it is difficult 
to defend against the vagueness of terms like 1 incorrigible 1 
and •ungovernable. 1 
(4) The mixing together of delinquents without crimes and 
real delinquents in detention centers and reform schools 
helps to provide learning experiences for the non-delinquents 
on how to become real delinquents. 
(5) The public is generally unaware of the differences be-
tween 'persons in need of supervision' and youths who rob, 
steal and assult, and thereby is not sensitized to the 
special needs of status offenders. 
(6) Statistics on delinquency are misleading because we are 
usually unable to differentiate how much of the volume re-
flects greater public and official concern regarding home, 
school and sex problems, and how much is actual criminal 
conduct by juveniles. 
(7) Juvenile status offenses do not constitute examples of 
social harm and, therefore, should not even be the subject 
of criminal-type sanctions. 
(8) Juvenile institutions that house noncriminal offenders 
constitute the state's human garbage dump for taking care of 
all kinds of problem children, especially the poor. 
(9) Most policemen and judges who make critical decisions 
about children's troubles are ill equipped to understand 
their problems or make sound judgements on their behalf. 
(10) Thecurrent correctional system does not rehabilitate 
these youths and is therefore a questionable approach 
(1971:39). 
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Viewing the juvenile court as a particular form of ideology, and 
commenting on the relationship between rates of illegal behavior and 
the legal response to that behavior, Lusk (1977:58) says, 11 The increase 
in delinquency has been paralleled only by the growth of the juvenile 
justice system itself. 11 He says the system of juvenile justice has 
been an outgrowth of humanitarian concern for the behavior of young 
people. This concern is manifested toward behavior viewed as 11 inap-
propriate for youth; especially that which is believed to lead to adult 
criminal activities 11 (1977: 59). 
According to Lusk (1977), the juvenile court, based on the concept 
of parens patriae, has only two major functions: (1) it is supposed to 
protect the child from the stigma associated with criminality and the 
adult criminal court, and (2) it is to provide services to the child, 
such as counseling and treatment, to protect him from future inv.olvement 
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in delinquency. There are, however, two ideological problems connected 
with these functions, he says. First, judges and others in the juve-
nile justice system may be committed to the concept of institutionali-
zation as a form of treatment. Second, there are pragmatic factors to 
be considered. As he says: 
We cannot dismiss the economic and political implications 
of the relationship between reduction and production in 
any solution-making enterprise. Specifically, the suc-
cessful reduction of delinquency would mean (ideally) a 
corresponding reduction in the size of the juvenile jus-
tice system itself (1977:59). 
Lusk (1977:59-60) views the development of the juvenile court as a "ma-
jar ideological innovation," in that the behavior of young people, es-
pecially antisocial behavior, began to be viewed as different from 
that of adults; this was "one of the great legal reforms of our his-
tory. 11 But, according to him, it must be realized that the juvenile 
court was far more than just a "legal innovation"; it was also an im-
portant innovation in ideology. The legal system had long recognized 
that very young children could not form criminal intent. In developing 
the juvenile court the legal system simply extended these ideas to 
cover older children. The real innovation of the juvenile court, he 
says, was simple: 
Rather than viewing juvenile misconduct morally and ~­
~as sinful and criminal, it should be viewed scien-
tifically and medically as social malfunction and 
pathology. It is for this reason that the juvenile 
justice system, while resting upon legal enactment and 
depending upon the force of law, could not be solely a 
legal accomplishment. It depended upon a rhetoric which 
was essentially amoral and alegal (1977:60). 
Lusk (1977) believes that the development of the juvenile court 
resulted from the origin of a new institution, that of social welfare. 
Modeled after medicine, social welfare provided the ideological basis 
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for the juvenile justice system itself. It was the welfare ideology, 
with its scientific bias, which replaced, to a great extent, the 
ideologies of law and morality, according to him, as the definer of 
appropriate and inappropriate behavior. An important aspect of the 
welfare ideology was that of "predelinquency, 11 the idea that one can 
predict delinquency prior to the commission of an illegal act. For 
Lusk, the concept of predelinquency was simply the final logical re-
sult of the juncture between social welfare and law: 
While the acts contained in the legal definition have 
always been sufficiently broad to cover almost any con-
ceivable situation, the concept of predelinquency severs 
what little connection that might be demanded in prac-
tice between the juvenile 1 s behavior and these broad 
categories of acts {1977:64). 
In sum, according to Lusk (1977), with the development of the con-
cept of predelinquency, certainly basic to the court 1 s jurisdiction 
over status offenses, the court could intervene into a child 1 s life 
regardless of the actions committed by the child. 
Defenders of the court, however, have emphasized its positive as-
pects. The juvenile court, they say, has a 11 proper function" beyond 
the jurisdiction over criminal offenses committed by juveniles (Rubin, 
1949). And when dealing with children who have violated the criminal 
law, the juvenile court is without doubt· less harmful to the youngster 
than the criminal court (Rubin, 1949). If the court had to deal with 
adolescents in the same technical and legal manner as it deals with 
adults, it could not function properly. The broad, vague definitions 
of delinquency allow for necessary intervention which would be impos-
sible under a more strict classification (Caldwell, 1961). The inter-
est of the court is preventative in that: 
the jurisdictional principle on which the court properly 
proceeds in the delinquency area is, not the presumed 
ability of the court to be of service to the particular 
child, but the existence of behavior on the part of the 
child that is dangerous to the community's security of 
that imminently threatens such danger (Allen, 1964:417). 
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Those who support the juvenile justice system say that its pur-
pose is not to punish the child, but, rather, to help him. It is 
therefore necessary at times to use the authority of the state to make 
otherwise unwilling children avail themselves of the system. Juvenile 
status offenses are seen as not always due to subcultural or cultural 
differences; some children do experience problems interpersonally, and 
need help. It is the juvenile court which provides such help (Lerman, 
1971). The court, as a 11 kindly and understanding parent" is supposed 
to aid the child who is in trouble (Murphy, 1974). In fact, according 
to the court's supporters, the juvenile justice system has been forced 
reluctantly to intervene into children's lives and take over many of 
the functions of more traditional institutions (Pound, 1964). 
Juvenile Status Offense 
As it has been shown, there are different forms of juvenile miscon-
duct. The most obvious distinction is that between juvenile criminal 
offenses and juvenile status offenses. In most every locality it is 
a delinquent act for a minor to violate any state or municipal legal 
regulation. But, it is also a delinquent act for a minor to engage in 
various other behaviors which are legal for adults (Caldwell, 1961). 
These vague conduct violations are termed "juvenile status offenses 11 
because "only persons of a juvenile status can be accused, convicted, 
and sentenced for committing them" (Lerman, 1971:35). As Sanders 
(1976) explains it: 
delinquency has many faces, and one is that of the juve-
nile [who] has been judged delinquent even though no crime 
has been committed for which an adult could be convicted. 
Nothing has been stolen, no one has been assaulted, no 
illegal drug has been used, but still the juvenile finds 
himself, or, more frequently, herself, incarcerated or 
placed on official probation. Such youngsters have com-
mitted so-called juvenile status offenses, transgressions 
for which no adult could be brought to court; they are 
just for kids (1976:64). 
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Similar definitions of the juvenile status offense can be found in the 
1 iterature: 
Noncriminal behaviors which ar.e legally sufficient to sus-
tain a finding of delinquency are generally referred to as 
'status offenses.' Such behaviors are entirely permissible 
if performed by adults; they are impermissible for chil-
dren (Katkin, Hyman,. and Kramer, 1976:17). 
There is a wide area of juvenile court jurisdiction over 
delinquent juveniles whose general status or particular con-
duct society may find offensive, but which nonetheless fall 
short of being criminal by adult standards (Kittrie, . 
1971: 114). 
All these definitions, and many more like them, indicate that the juve-
nile is in a unique situation: he or she is subject to a far greater 
number of legal constraints on conduct than is the rest of society. 
The juvenile status offenses are broad, vague conceptions of unaccept-
able behavior, including such actions as "habitual truancy, incorrigi-
bility, waywardness, and association with immoral persons" (Caldwell, 
1961:401). According to Tappan (1949), a lawyer and sociologist, the 
statutes relating to juvenile status offenses are probably the most 
vague of any within the criminal law. 
The status offense, then, as viewed by Kittrie (1971), is an of-
fense which can cost someone his liberty for what he is rather than 
what he does. Further, according to the Council of State Governments: 
A 'status offense,' as used in the literature and in the 
delinquency field, is any violation of law, passed by the 
state or local legislative body, in the state in which the 
census or monitoring is to take place, which would not be 
a crime if committed by an adult, and which is specifically 
applicable to youth because of their minority (1975:3). 
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The juvenile status offenses affect a great number of youngsters. 
According to the American Journal of Correction (1975), data from the 
National Council of Crime and Delinquency indicate that 23% of the 
boys and 70% of the girls in juvenile institutions during 1975 were 
guilty only of status offenses. 
The juvenile status offense has a long history in the United 
States. There are indications that the Puritans in the Plymouth Bay 
Colony treated children who were what are called today 11 incorrigible 11 
or "wayward" as criminals (Lerman, 1971:35). But, the most direct 
historical line to the contemporary legal attitude toward status of-
fenses can be seen in the "child-saving movement" as previously de-
scribed. The child-savers concerned themselves with morality 
(middle-class), and sought to rescue children from misbehavior through 
the juvenile court. The child-savers provided us with the broad def-
inition of misconduct which today falls within the concept of 11 status 
offense. 11 
According to Sanders (1976), there are two types of status offend-
ers. First, there are those engaged in 11 violation of certain ordinances 
that apply only to juveniles," including curfew, truancy, drinking, 
smoking, etc. (1976:64). Second are those he categorizes as 11 out-of-
control, 11 including runaways, incorrigibles, and sex offenders. Simi-
larly, Lerman (1971:39) characterizes status offenders as 11young people 
who are themselves liable to be victimized for having childhood troubles 
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or growing up differently. 11 He writes that there are three important 
categories of situations in which status offenders are involved. 
First, there is behavior at home. This category includes children en-
gaged in activities such as running away, incorrigibility, ungovern-
ability, and beyond parental contro1. Second, there is behavior at 
school. Included here are such behaviors as 11 growing up in idleness, 11 
truancy, and classroom disturbance. The final category is sexual ex-
perimentation, including sexual relations as minors and out-of-wedlock 
pregnancy. Considering the behaviors involved, Lerman (1971:39) says, 
11 In brief, juvenile status offenses primarily encompass the problems 
of growing up. 11 Concurrently, Rubin (1949:3) makes the suggestion that 
juvenile status offenses may be simply 11 preferred 11 conduct rather than 
11 required. 11 The dilemma provided for the juvenile court, and the rest 
of society, is expressed by Kittrie (1971): 
What power s hou 1 d society exercise over j uven i1 es who drop 
out of school, leave home, form undesirable associations, 
and appear to progress toward crime, yet are short of it? 
When may society take preventive measures, and to what ex-
tent should social intervention depend on the availability 
of adequate treatment facilities? (1971:114-115). 
A particular problem concerning status offenses is the wide dis-
cretionary powers of the juvenile court. The court has such wide-
ranging jurisdiction over so many different behaviors and individuals, 
that it is very easy for discriminatory procedures to be exercised. 
It is obvious from the literature that certain people are more likely 
than others to come under the court 1 s jurisdiction. Lerman (1971:39) 
indicates that those who are most likely to get into trouble are: 
"girls, poor youth, rural migrants to the city, underachievers and 
the less sophisticated. 11 He also expresses the view that poor people 
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are more likely to accept or seek the intervention of the court than 
others when the issue involves a challenge to their parental authority. 
The prlblem of discretion, coupled with discrimination, seems most 
evident in cases involving females. Because of the court's historical 
and contemporary concern with youthful morality, many feel that young 
girls are more likely to be sanctioned by the court for status of-
fenses than are boys. 
Although theoretically this type of statute applies 
equally to young men and women, when coup 1 ed with a 
couble standard of juvenile morality, it lends itself 
to discriminatory enforcement against the female juve-
nile (Riback, 1971 :314). · 
Indeed, one of the major sources of problems for females in the juve-
nile court seems to be sexual activity; likewise, the court generally 
attempts to enforce a particularly strict code of sexual morality on 
the girls brought before it (Murphy, 1974). According to Reiss (1960), 
the delinquency statutes regarding sexual behavior are worded in such 
general terminology that any sexual act is illegal. Sanders (1976) 
notes that the laws regarding sexual offenses are not only ambiguous, 
but other offenses, such as running away or incorrigibility, are often 
just substitute terminology for sexual activity. Females, of course, 
are the ones who are most often affected by these statutues. But, 
according to Lerman (1971): 
If the letter and spirit of American juvenile justice sta-
tutes were rigorously enforced, our delinquency rates and 
facilities would be in even deeper trouble than they are 
today. For few American youth would reach adulthood with-
out being liable to its stern proscriptions (1971:37). 
Current views indicate that the wide discretionary powers of the 
court lend themselves to the possibility of differential enforcement. 
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Nowhere within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is differential 
enforcement and the imposition of middle-class morality more evident 
than with the legal handling of female sexual delinquents. As Chesney-
L ind (1973) notes, the court 1 s enforcement of both the law and moral-
ity presents a greater risk for young girls than for young boys: 
[this] concern with the morality of youth and their obedi-
ence to familial demands still characterizes juvenile 
court policy, and this clearly poses a greater threat to 
the rights of female adolescents than males (1973:53-54). 
The prohibitions against status offense conduct, especially sexual con-
duct, are seen as being unequally applied. The accepted behavior for 
females is more strictly defined and more limited in context than that 
for females. The 11 law serves the coercive purpose of inducing conform-
ity wit- societal sex role and family structure 11 (Riback, 1971:333). 
In fact, Sherwin (1966:110) believes that sex laws generally are subject 
to attack on the grounds that they (1) attempt to control behavior that 
should be controlled by other institutions, and (2) attempt to control 
behavior that is often a question of 11 taste 11 rather than 11morality. 11 
Certainly this could be viewed as true for juvenile sexual statutes 
spec i fie ally. 
Differential sex role socialization in our society leads to dif-
ferent expectations in behavior for the sexes, primarily in the nature 
of male superiority and female inferiority (Riback, 1971). Conse-
quently, differential expectations, along with greater family control 
over the behavior of females and the double standard of sexual con-
duct, result in the fact that 11 dependency, obedience, and responsibil-
ity are encouraged in female children while self-reliance and 
achievement are most values in male children 11 (Chesney-Lind, 1973:54). 
The double standard of sexual morality is based on the concept of 
role, resulting in differential and discriminatory treatment by the 
courts (Riback, 1971). Similarly, Chesney-Lind (1973) argues that 
differential sex role expectations on the part of the juvenile court 
are the primary reason for the court's response to male and female 
delinquency: 
Since female adolescents have a much narrower range of 
acceptable behavior, even minor deviance may be seen as 
a substantial challenge to the authority of the family, 
the viability of the double standard, and to the mainte-
nance of the present system of sexual inequality. It is 
the symbolic threat posed by female delinquency to these 
values that best explains (1) why the juvenile court sys-
tem selects out aspects of female deviance which violate 
sex role expectations rather than those that violate legal 
norms; and (2) why female delinquency, especially sexual 
delinquency, is viewed as more serious than male delin-
quency and is, therefore, more severely sanctioned (1973:54). 
Likewise, Riback (1971: 332) argues that the idea of the 11 inferior-ity 
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of women 11 justifies differential sexual standards "under the guise of 
protection." 
Historically, the female's sexual behavior has been scrutinized 
by the court, and this presents the female (either adolescent or adult) 
with a greater number of problems with the court than the male: 
Since the function of sexual administration was origin-
ally in the hands of the church, sexual intercourse .•. 
was considered strictly as a means of propagation, ques-
tions of pleasure and emotional fulfillment were uncon-
templated. The omission of pleasure was reinforced so 
as to avoid sexual satisfaction at the expense of failure 
to propagate (Sherwin, 1966:111). 
According to Chesney-Lind (1977), a major criticism of the juvenile 
justice system is often overlooked--through its jurisdiction over 
status offenders, the juvenile court serves to preserve the tradi-
tional family system and the sexual double standard. As she says: 
Like 'good parents' police and court personnel tend to se-
lect for punishment girls whose behavior threatens paren-
tal authority and boys whose behavior is beyond that which 
can be excused as 'boys will be boys' (1977:376). 
Sussman (1977:179) says that status offender laws 11 are applied 
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far more frequently to males than to females, 11 and that a majority of 
the girls in the juvenile court are alleged to have committed a sta-
tus offense, compared to only 1/5 of the boys; yet, there has been a 
rise in female delinquency. While girls make up only 1/4 of all 
youngsters who appear in court, they comprise 50% of all status of-
fender proceedings. Sussman feels that this is due to the vagueness 
of the laws and the discriminatory application of the laws, especially 
in regard to sexual behavior. According to him, there exists a double 
standard associated with sexual behavior, in that the sexual behavior 
of girls is more closely scrutinized that than of boys. Therefore, 
young girls who appear in court receive unequal treatment under the 
law, not only in comparison to boys, but also in comparison to adult 
women. 
Though status offender laws have been consistently attacked on 
grounds of vagueness and ambiguity, Sussman (1977) indicates that the 
courts have consistently upheld their constitutionality based on the 
doctrine of parens patriae. And, even though both males and females 
are exposed to the hazards of ambiguous statutes, the girl is at a 
special disadvantage in that she has been consistently subjected to 
more strict standards of sexual behavior. Also, many persons, he 
says, believe that "charges of 'ungovernability' or 'incorrigibility' 
also serve as euphemistic vehicles for complains involving sexual mis-
behavior or promiscuity 11 (1977:182). He says the discrimination 
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against females in the juvenile justice system is the result of sev-
eral factors, among which are: (1) parents and police are more prone 
to disapprove of expressions of female than of male sexuality, (2) 
judges are generally more "protective" of girls than boys, and (3) 
pregnancy is a uniquely female condition. Sussman also says that there 
are indications that girls' cases tend to be disposed of differently 
than that of boys'. Among women criminals in the adult court, accord-
ing to him, there exist the "chivalry factor" which tends to result 
in greater leniency for females. In the juvenile court, however, the 
opposite appears to be true. Girls may have higher rates of probation 
as opposed to boys' cases which tend to be either discharged or sus-
pended; they may be detained more frequently and for longer periods of 
time than males. 
In a similar vein, Tappan (1949) believes that the court has, for 
the most part, shirked its role as "parent" to the status offender and 
has instead simply acted as a higher authority over the child in 
backing-up natural parent authority. The paradox here, as he sees it, 
is that while the parents are often a contributing factor in the child's 
misbehavior, the court consistently supports their demands. Likewise, 
Lerman (1971) criticizes the system for its actions in situations where 
the child might not be at fault: 
Discretionary decision making by law enforcement offi-
cials has often been justified on the grounds that it 
permits an 'individualization' of offenders, as well as 
for reasons of pragmatic efficiency. While this may be 
true in some cases, it is difficult to read the histori-
cal record and not conclude that many juvenile status 
actions could have been defined as cultural differences 
and childhood play fads, as well as childhood troubles 
with home, school and sex (1971:37). 
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Many persons have long recognized the stigma produced by the ju-
venile court on the status offender. The term 11 delinquent 11 has many 
connotations, ranging from the juvenile law violator to the conduct 
nonn violator. To categorize these two extremes together tends, ac-
cording to some, to provide the status offender with a more negative 
image than he perhaps deserves. Therefore, some jurisdictions have 
attempted to counteract this stigmatizing process by substituting new 
categories within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. The two 
most common of the new tenns are "person in need of supervision" (PINS) 
and 11 child in need of supervision" (CHINS). According to Johnson 
(1975), the movement toward using these new categories was the knowl-
edge that the public generally considers the label of delinquent as 
11 criminal ,11 regardless of the reason for adjudication. He indicates 
that there were two major purposes in this move: (1) to avoid the 
grouping together of all children under the jurisdiction of the juve-
nile court as 11 delinquent, 11 yet continue (2) to allow the court rights 
of intervention. Lerman ( 1971: 37) notes that PINS are usually incar-
cerated alongside delinquents, and that 11 it is doubtful whether the 
public (including teachers and prospective employers) distinguishes 
between those 'in need of supervision' and delinquents. 11 
In assessing the characteristics of the juvenile status offense, 
many have contended that the court has little business administering 
middle-class morality, and has better business elsewhere. As Murphy 
(1976:16) states it, juvenile status offenders are often children 
"who are not acting the way their parents or a social worker believe 
they should." Rubin (1949) makes an interesting point when he says: 
Perhaps we do not like children to smoke or drink. But 
there is no proof that children who smoke or drink are 
likely to become criminal offenders. . . . Using vile or 
obscene language is not nice. Nor is it nor should it be 
criminal or delinquent (1949:4). 
Tappan (1949) further indicates that certain juvenile offenses 
are better dealt with outside the law; some misbehaviors and situa~ 
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tions of children could be handled more satisfactorily outside the 
jurisdiction of the juvenile court. Writing in terms of adjudication, 
he shows not only his view of the status offense, but also the era of 
which he is writing: 
Is the precocious and adventurous child who has run away 
from home once, or several times, a delinquent? ... 
Is a daughter in 1 bobby sox' who stays out later than her 
mother used to do, who seems a 'little wild,' and causes 
her fearful family much anxiety, a delinquent? Is the 
boy who expresses a desire, thoroughly normal in a healthy 
maturing preadolescent, to emancipate himself emotionally 
and socially from his family and who behaves in a very in-
dependent fashion, a delinquent? ... Is the girl who has 
become pregnant through ignorance, seduction, or curiosity? 
What are the effects on the child, his family, and the com-
munity when a fraction of the children who behave this way 
are adjudicated? (1949:21). 
Martin (1977:10) refers to status offenses as "victimless crimes, 11 
and points out that a number of scholars have challenged the legality 
of juvenile status offense laws. According to him, there are three 
major schools of thought surrounding the status offense controversy: 
the first advocates the deinstitutionalization of status offenses, 
the second calls for the decriminalization of status offenses, and the 
third supports retaining the juvenile court 1 s jurisdiction over status 
offenses. 
The case for deinstitutionalizing status offenses is often 
based on labeling theory, suggesting that the court stigmatizes young 
people who go through the court as status offenders, and that by di-
verting status offenders from the court process and correctional 
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institutions, fewer children would receive a negative label. Martin 
(1977) suggests that labeling theory applies to the status offense 
controversy in the following ways: 
(1) as public identification of deviance occurs, the re-
sult is a spoiled public image; (2) that the offender 
incurs degrees of public liability when knowledge be-
comes disseminated relative to his perceived deviance; 
and (3) ultimately this social liability has the effect 
of reinforcing his deviant behavior (1977:12). 
Thus, the labeling argument hypothesizes that the juvenile court exper-
ience has negative consequences for the status offender. By his par-
ticipation in the court process and juvenile institutions, the status 
offender 11 would develop an expertise in crime, would have his suppor-
tive community contacts, disrupted, and would therefore be earmarked 
for an inevitable life of crime 11 (1977:12). Essentially, this view 
holds that status offenses should be deinstitutionalized because the 
juvenile court has been unsuccessful in dealing with them and that 
the negative consequences of labeling could be lessened through diver-
sion and community corrections. 
The case for decriminalizing status offenses, according to Martin 
(1977:13), advocates not simply removing status offenders from insti-
tutions, but also the 11 elimination of the statutes governing all sta-
tus offenses, 11 1 eaving the juvenile court without jurisdiction over 
status offense behaviors. This approach calls for the community to 
assume responsibility for status offenders, providing the appropriate 
services at the local level, in lieu of the juvenile court. Martin 
(1977:13) suggests that the bases for this school of thought are 
labeling theory, as for those supporting deinstitutionalization, and 
11 socio-legal foundations" which "center around the constitutionality 
of status offense statutes and a perceived ability of the juvenile 
court to exceed those powers delegated to it. 11 Finally, those who 
advicate removing status offenses from the jurisdiction of the court 
focus on early prevention. According to Martin (1977): 
Most advocates of decriminalization agree that status 
offenders are simply a tip-of-the-iceberg phenomenon; 
that the manifestations of such behaviors have been 
visible, yet mostly unnoticed, for a substantial pre-
ceeding time-span. The general feeling exists that it 
is the community's responsibility to deal with these 
problems when the family unit perceives a need to re-
solve their sysfunctioning. Furthermore, it is felt 
that the juvenile court is presently overburdened with 
delinquency cases so that it is unable to provide the 
services necessary to achieve such a reconciliation 
( 1977: 14) . 
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Those who advocate retaining the court's jurisdiction over status 
offenses, the traditional means of dealing with status offenders, though 
having "very little support," according to Martin (1977:14), can be 
considered a "very definite school of thought relative to the contra-
versy. 11 Probably the most influential group supporting this view is 
the National Council of Juvenile Court Judges (Martin, 1977). This 
approach is based in the historical legal concept of parens patriae, 
assuming that "children are not capable of making decisions that affect 
their own well being" (1977:14). By the court's intervention, it is 
thought that future crime by the status offender will be reduced. 
Schiering (1970:275) points out that currently the juvenile court 
is under the watchful eye of "the public, social scientists, and legis-
lators" due to its problems in dealing with "the prevention of delin-
quency, the judicial handling of delinquent children, and the 
rehabilitation of those children." Because of constitutional questions 
concerning jury trials, standards of evidence, protection, and personnel, 
he says: 
It is clear that the original conception of the juvenile 
court, therefore, can no longer be the basis of the ap-
proach to the resolution of the problems of juvenile 
delinquency; a complete reevaluation of the juvenile 
court is mandatory (1970:281). 
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According to Gough and Grilli (1972), juvenile status offenders 
nationally probably account for 30-40% of all juvenile court adjucica-
tions, but the scarcity of data make it difficult to know exactly. 
They say that the juvenile justice system has assumed that 11 unruliness 11 
is a predictor of later delinquency, but that the data tend to indicate 
li-tle support for this assumption. They further assert that: 
if the juvenile court intervenes to exert sanctions over 
behavior which does not contravene adult penal law, we 
are not only holding juveniles to a higher standard of 
moral rectitude than we enforce upon adults, we are, 
through the process of stigmatizing and labelling, cre-
ating a self-fulfilling prophecy in which the child is 
more likely to become delinquent because he has been 
labelled as such (1972:10). 
They feel that, perhaps, juvenile status activities may be 11 sensible 
adaptive behavior11 ; for example, running away if the home life is un-
bearable (1972:10). Nonetheless, most juvenile courts can deal with 
juvenile status offenders exactly as they deal with juveniles who vi-
olate the criminal law. They say that: 
one of the major problems of the American juvenile jus-
tice system is that it has tried to enjoin upon its 
children too precatory a standard. It has circumscribed 
in a strongly-sanctioned way behavior to which adults 
are not held (1972:11). 
Barrett (1969:353) says that the vagueness of the delinquency 
laws gives great discretion to the court and also, 11 perhaps worse, it 
causes great variations in the application of the juvenile laws. 11 Ac-
cording to him, the juvenile laws are deliberately vague to allow a 
wider range of options for both the court and child; some of the 
purposes of this ambiguity have been: 
so that a child could be tried in a juvenile court and 
not in an adult court; so that juveniles who break the 
law could be called 'delinquents' and not branded as 
criminals; so that children could be treated with jus-
tice and fairness by a court which understood their 
special problems and needs (1969:353). 
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According to Baron, Feeney, and Thornton (1973:14), many persons 
feel that the juvenile court jurisdiction is too broad, and that 11 the 
process of bringing youths into court is now a part of the problem 
rather than a part of the solution." Others feel that removing juris-
diction from juvenile status offenses is too extreme in that it does 
not deal with the causes of the behavior. They say that in the tradi-
tional court handling of status offenders there are high recidivism 
and escalation rates (progression to more serious acts), due to two 
factors: 11 (1) the traditional structure of the probation department 
allows too little time for the effective handling of [status offender] 
cases. (2) the inappropriateness of legal handling" (1973:15). Their 
research indicated lower recidivism and escalation rates through the 
use of diversion and family crisis counseling than through the tradi-
tional use of the court. 
According to Calof (1974), in a study for the New York Division 
for Youth, the juvenile statutes in all states include status offen-
ses, and many states have begun establishing a separate category for 
status offenders, often called 1 PINS, 11 etc.; this separation of cate-
gories seems to be based on three assumptions: 
(1) The problems of the status offender are different 
from those of the delinquent and require different treat-
ment, (2) he has not been found guilty of a crime and 
should not be incarcerated with delinquent youths, and 
(3) the label of delinquent, though its purpose may have 
been benign, is widely viewed as criminal, a labeling 
that is both unjust and detrimental when applied to 
youths who have committed no criminal acts (1974:3). 
She estimates that 40-50% of all children in state juvenile institu-
tions are status offenders and that about 70% of all girls in state 
institutions are status offenders. She also feels that there is an 
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important debate today on the issue of retaining status offense juris-
diction by the juvenile court, and that experts on both sides agree 
that the juvenile court has failed to accomplish its goals--it does 
not rehabilitate and it does not successfully deal with the underlying 
causes of juvenile misbehavior. Experts agree that "though acting on 
the doctrine of parens patriae, the court has not provided real help 
for its wards" (1974:38). 
According to Calof {1974), those who wish to remove status of-
fenses from the jurisdiction of the court cite various other arguments 
concerning the failure of the juvenile court: (l) the major reason 
is that the court is not set up to handle non-criminal behavior. They 
say that the intervention of the court is not and cannot be success-
ful in dealing with status offenders because they represent family, 
rather than legal problems, (2) the court is not the proper setting 
for dealing with family problems; in fact, the court exacerbates the 
problems by developing feelings of guilt among family members, 
(3) the commitment of status offenders to correctional institutions 
indicates the failure of the court in rehabilitation. "Not only is 
their liberty taken away, but there is no proof that PINS receive 
helpful treatment. To the contrary, institutionalization is viewed 
as dehumanizing" (1974:39), (4) 11 Abolitionists 11 also argue judicial 
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bias, as indicated by "detention practices, adjudication rate and 
designation of PINS rather than neglect" (1974:39-40). They claim 
that status offenders are more likely to be detained for longer per-
iods of time than delinquents. Also, abolitionists argue that a good 
number of status offenders are, in fact, cases of neglect, and (5) it 
is alleged that by devoting the court's time and money to status of-
fenses, they "overwhelm the juvenile justice system. The court's 
meager resources should be devoted to cases of criminal behavior and 
of neglected and abused children'' (1974:40). 
Calaf (1974) says that those persons who favor retaining the 
court's jurisdiction over status offenses disagree with the abolition-
ists on the reasons for the court's failure. They feel that simply 
pointing out the court's failures neglects the issue: the fact that 
chi1dren must be provided with services which the court can and should 
offer. They argue that removing status offenders from the court will 
simply result in their reappearance later in the criminal courts. To 
solve the court's problems, 
Advocates of retention argue that part of the solution 
lies in cold, hard cash--adequate sustained funding, 
not short-term grants--so that the court can do its 
job. These funds would provide trained personnel (pro-
bation officers, psychologists and psychiatrists) and 
dispositional resources--public and private treatment 
programs willing and able to serve these children 
(1974:41). 
According to Calaf (1974), juvenile status offense laws punish a 
status: 
Finding the child to be 'incorrigible' or 'unruly' and 
declaring him 'in need of supervision,• the court pun-
ishes him for this status, not for specific acts. Pun-
ishment of a status is unconstitutional (1974:44). 
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She also feels that incarceration of status offenders does not serve 
the purpose of the state: it provides neither treatment nor preven-
tion of future criminality. She says that the "restraint of liberty" 
has at its premise two assumptions, both of which are faulty: 
that PINS are future criminals-~an assumption that can-
not be proved; that the State is treating the child--a 
premise that is demonstrably false. The treatment pro-
vided--incarceration in correctional facilities--is al-
legedly harmful rather than corrective (1974:44). 
Also, she says that the court does not provide adequate safeguards for 
status offenders. The "standard of proof" in most every state is less 
strict than that for delinquency cases. "A result is the adjudication 
of delinquents as PINS because delinquency cannot be documented" 
(1974:44-45). She argues that adjudication as a status offender is 
very easy due to vagueness, bias, and the difficulty of refuting 
11 proof11 (1974:45). 
Calaf (1974) indicates that those who desire retaining status of-
fenses argue that the courts have upheld the constitutionality of these 
laws on appeal. Recognizing some inequities in the system, however, 
they state that these can be corrected. Some feel that the term 
"status offender" is a misnomer: 11 a child is adjudicated as 'in need 
of supervision,• only on the basis of such specific acts (conduct) as 
running away repeatedly, continuous truancy, acts that document incor-
rigibility11 (1974:45). Also, it is asserted that there are theoretical 
bases for the legality of status offense statutes. First, "differen-
tial treatment is necessary because children are incapable of adult 
reasoning on the consequences of their acts" (1974:45). Second, the 
court must protect children against themselves. If the court did not in-
tervene, there would be no proper agency which could do so (1974:45-46). 
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According to Couch (1974), there are negative consequences of 
participati-0n in the juvenile court for the status offender. He feels 
that court procedures tend to 11 criminalize 11 young people, and the 
process of adjudicaton tends to stigmatize--it changes the image of 
the youth, both of himself and according to others. As a consequence, 
he loses respect for authority and law. Couch says that the court 
assumes immaturity on the part of the child, and assumes that parents 
are rational and mature; however, "very often the child is more cap-
able of rational decision-making than the parents" (1974:19). By 
trying to deal with family problems in the juvenile justice system, 
he says that the court often causes new family problems to develop. 
But, 11 if status offenses were abolished, the family would have to be-
come more self-reliant and of necessity use the wide range of commun-
ity resources which now exist" (1974:19). 
In discussing what he terms "realities" of the juvenile court 
system, Couch (1974) provides 11 major criticisms: 
(1) The reality of parents who are unable or unwilling 
to recognize the problem child and provide for him the 
help he needs. . . . 
(2) The reality of the disinterested citizenry who are 
critical of all phases of the juvenile justice system 
from their over-stuffed armchair, in front of the boob 
tube. . . . 
(3) The reality of the public school that fails to teach, 
fails to motivate, fails to relate, and fails to keep 
its charges physically present. The reality of the 
school system that expels the 'acting-out' child, in ef~ 
feet putting that child on the street without the stabil-
ity or education to cope in the adult world .... 
(4) The reality of the police officer, eager to impose his 
own standards concerning 'unmanageable behavior' and eager 
to enforce his impression concerning the meaning of an 
overbroad law pertaining to 'disobedience of the lawful 
authority 1 • • • • 
(5) The rea1ity of short-sighted legislation which lumps 
all juvenile problems into the juvenile justice system, a 
system bursting at the seams .... 
(6) The reality of 'injustice' in juvenile court. Young-
sters are often deprived of their basic rights in the very 
court created for their protection .... 
(7) The reality of the probation officer who perceives his 
client from a psychologically-oriented casework point of 
view. Now the client is doubly labeled--he's not only 
legally deviant, but is now psychologically ill as well. 
(8) The reality of the 'prosecution-oriented' district at-
torney. The reality that juvenile matters are handled by 
the newest members of the staff, who are the lowest paid 
and could not care less about juvenile 'problems,' much 
less 'solutions.' 
(9) The reality of the defneder who has neither the time 
nor the inclination to negotiate a reasonably beneficial 
disposition for his juvenile client ... 
(10) :The rea 1 ity of the agency that fa i 1 s to provide the 
right services for the individual child. 
(11) Thereality of training schools that fail to rehabili-
tate, and lack the imagination and appropriations to form-
ulate innovative programs for staff and clients (1974:21). 
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Couch (1974) also gives several arguments for the elimination of 
status offenses. (1) Though status offense laws are not criminal 
statutes, the public views them as such, (2) The vague terminology of 
status offense laws results in differential enforcement and a lack of 
respect for the law, (3) The child's problems are worsened as a re-
sult of his labeling by the juvenile court, (4) Incarcerating status 
offenders with delinquents encourages the status offenders to become 
delinquents, (5) The court's resources are further limited by its 
preoccupation with status offenders, forcing the juvenile justice 
system to ignore more serious problems, (6) Other agencies than the 
court could better handle status offender problems, (7) The system 
does not require responsibility on the part of those involved in the 
system, (8) Status offense adjudications are a means of ignoring the 
problem of abuse and neglect by the parents, (9) The court is simply 
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not designed to provide the long-term solutions to status offender 
problems, and (10) The courts often adjudicate a youngster as a status 
offender because they might not be able to prove delinquency. 
Stiller and Elder (1974) feel that there is a legal difference 
between delinquents and status offenders; the delinquent is easily 
identifiable, his illegal behavior is described precisely in the crim-
inal code. But, those who engage in non-criminal, "uniquely juvenile" 
prohibited behavior are not as identifiable; the statutes are vague. 
These persons, the status offenders, are subject to differential treat-
ment, they say. 
In PINS proceedings, courts generally rely on the rehabili-
tative, protective, and supervisory purposes of the noncrim-
inal juvenile statutes to justify differences in the 
treatment of PINS children and juvenile delinquents. Courts 
have also used the fact that PINS children have not com-
mitted actual crimes and are therefore distinguishable from 
delinquents, to justify less stringent p_rocedural protections. 
By the same token, since PINS children, like delinquents, 
have misbehaved or committed some offense against society, 
some courts have upheld regulations permitting them to be 
treated more harshly than dependent or neglected children 
(1974:42). 
They also say that status offense .laws often require discrimination 
due to sex, in that "a PINS statute wil 1 require PINS jurisdiction 
for a girl of a certain age but will not cover a boy of the same age; 
the sex of the child being the sole basis for the difference in treat-
ment 11 ( 1974 :43). 
The National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1975j) urges the 
repeal of all status offense laws, considering them to be victimless 
crimes; they feel no positive function is served by subjecting the 
child to the court process as a result of his non-criminal actions; 
in fact, they believe that to do so harms both the child and society 
The Council believes that one of the most negative results of status 
offender jurisdiction by the juvenile court is the stigma associated 
with court processing. They also feel that much of status offense 
behavior is normal for youth, and therefore, should not be a concern 
of the court: 
Rebelliousness and resistance to authority are charac-
teristic of adolescent growth. The adolescent who re-
bels against parental or institutional authority and 
does not violate our criminal codes may only be attempt-
ing to establish his identity (1975:99). 
Instead of the court, they suggest wider use of voluntary community 
resources. 
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According the the National Council on Crime and Delinquency (1975j), 
an important consequence of the court's jurisdiction over status of-
fenders is that doing so diverts court resources which could be util-
ized for dealing with more serious offenders. Instead of the court 
being one of the first resources of young persons and their parents, 
it 11 should be the agency of last resort for antisocial--i.e., criminal--
conduct11 (1975j:99). And, 11 although a matter for community concern, 
non-criminal conduct should be referred to social agencies, not to 
courts of 1 aw" ( l 975j: 99). 
Commenting on the development of the juvenile court as an "out-
growth of the feminist movement of the nineteenth century" and as a 
"manifestation of the concern for saving children from the stigma of 
the criminal justice process ... 11 Abadinsky (1976:456) feels that 
the court has been largely unsuccessful in achieving its goals. And, 
as if to compound its shortcomings, the juvenile court 
continues to retain jurisdiction over status offenders, 
children accused of an act which would not constitute a 
crime if committed by an adult (1976:456). 
Among his criticisms of the juvenile court's handling of status of-
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fenders, Abadinsky (1976:457) cites the possibility of detention under 
"deplorable conditions," the mistreatment of and discrimination against 
young females, especially runaways who are "often subjected to a physi-
cal examination to determine whether they are virginal, an action that 
would be illegal if inflicted on an adult, 11 and the biased composition 
of these offenders: 
the children processed in juvenile court for status of-
fenses are predominantly poor, nonwhite, and Hispanic; 
white middle-class youngsters are usually successful in 
avoiding this process (1976:457). 
Criticizing the status offense laws, Gilman (1976) says that Su-
preme Court decisions limiting the discretion of the juvenile court 
have had little effect. Those who attempt to revise the court suggest 
limiting jurisdiction over status offenders, according to Gilman. "In 
most states, almost half of the juvenile court's caseload consists of 
. status offenders" (1976:49). He cites as the major reasons for 
the elimination of status offender jurisdiction the vagueness of the 
laws, the fact that they encourage discrimination, and that the court 
forces youngsters into crime. 
According to Hickey (1977), among the organizations favoring re-
moval of status offenses from the juvenile court are: The National 
Council on Crime and Delinquency, the Massachusetts Committee on Chil-
dren and Youth, the Oklahoma State Chamber of Commerce, the Washington 
State Council on Crime and Delinquency, the American Legion's National 
Americanism and Children and Youth Division, the Association of Junior 
Leagues, the National Alliance for Safer Cities, the National 
Association of Counties, and the National Council of Jewish Women, 
among others. 
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Hickey (1977) feels that the juvenile court system is "inequit-
able" as evidenced by the slight difference in length of institution-
alization between status offenders and delinquents. As he says, "the 
system is now punishing juveniles committed as truants, runaways, and 
ungovernable children as much as juvenile felons" (1977:99). He calls 
for the elimination of status offenses: (1) because the court has 
been unsuccessful in dealing with them, (2) to "limit coercion in 
dealing with noncriminal behavior," (3) to restrict stigma, (4) be-
cause "children cannot be coerced to want to go to school or to love 
their home life," and (5) because other programs can more effectively 
deal with status offenders than the court (1977:99). 
Though the majority of the literature on status offenses reflects 
a negative attitude toward their handling by the court, there are those 
who feel that the juvenile court is acting properly in retaining its 
jurisdiction. Judge Arthur (1977), in defending the court's jurisdic-
tion over status offenders, delineates four categories of status of-
fense conduct: (1) Chemical offenses: it is illegal for children 
to drink or smoke; it is not for adults. He agrees that children's 
behavior should be controlled in regard to drinking, but favors the 
repeal of juvenile non-smoking laws because they are unenforceable. 
As he says, "An unenforceable law should not be on the books to be 
laughed at by the younger generation" (1977:4). (2) Control offenses: 
young people cannot stay out after certain hours, but adults can. If 
status offenses were to be abolished, Arthur says there would be no 
legal control on children's hours. He feels that this is important, 
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because some parents will not control the hours that their children 
must be at home. (3) Education offenses: according to Judge Arthur, 
if the truancy laws were repealed, there would be no compulsory 
school attendance. The results, he says, would be disastrous: 
Obviously, there would be a much higher and earlier drop-
out rate. We will be delivering to an immature child a 
decision that will affect his whole life and, maybe more 
importantly, the future of our civilization (1975:4). 
(4) Family offenses: the most often discussed status offenses are 
these, including incorrigibility, running away, waywardness, etc. Again, 
he argues that the repeal of status offense statutes would leave no 
authority to control children if their parents can or will not (1975:4). 
Arthur (1977) argues for the retention of status offenses, and 
makes the point that generally children should not be allowed to "de-
cide any of these things for themselves" (1977:5). He believes that 
children need to be controlled. Likewise, he does not feel that the 
public would prefer allowing children absolute choice in these mat-
ters; he states, for example, "I don't think the public v.1ill look 
with favor on permitting children to decide whether they will go to 
school and what classes they will attend'' (1977:5). Also, in terms of 
family offenses, Arthur discusses the sacredness of the American fam-
ily. One of the important functions of the court, he believes, is 
the legal basis for parental authority. Not only does the law rein-
force the authority of the parents, it also "forces" the parents to 
exert their authority when they are lax. As he states: "If we re-
move the status offenses from the juvenile courts, to a great degree 
we are removing the underpinnings that the law has provided for par-
ents" (] 977: 5) . 
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Judge Arthur (1977:5) feels that status offenses are as serious 
as most other offenses under the juvenile court's jurisdiction, "as 
serious certainly as car theft and shoplifting and possibly burglary." 
He believes that status offenses are simply an indication of impend-
ing problems. Even though status offenses seem relatively harmless, 
they are, he says, "the tip of the iceberg, or maybe more appropriately, 
the tip of the volcano" (1977:5). He firmly believes that violations 
of status offense laws are a predictor of later delinquency and crime. 
Taking something of a social pathological view, he writes: 
status offenses are an indication of some serious trouble . 
. . . This is the place where we can reduce the crime 
rates of the future. . . . The status offenses reflect 
a maladjustment that's going on inside the child, strong 
enough to drive him out of his home or school or to drink 
( 1977: 5). 
In terms of labeling due to the court, Arthur agrees that the court 
does stigmatize, but less so than a police record. And, "the stigma 
may be 1 ess important than the need for treatment" ( 1977: 6). 
Countering the argument that status offenders should not be 
confined with delinquents, Arthur (1977) states that perhaps the 
thinking of those desiring the repeal of status offenses should be 
reversed. He thinks it may be damaging to the delinquents to be 
mixed with status offenders. According to him: 
many of the status offenders are in plain fact some of 
the more mentally and emotionally disturbed children. 
Perhaps we shouldn't mix the joy rider who took 
a car just to show off to some girl with a rather cyni-
cal and sometimes pessimistic counter-culture type that 
we often get in the status offenses (1977:6). 
Likewise, Judge Arthur states that providing two sets of institutions 
is simply not feasible. Financially, the system "cannot afford to 
have two sets of institutions" (1977:6). 
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Further, Arthur (1977:235) agrees that the status offense·is a 
broad and ambiguous term, but points out that so are other legal 
terms; for example, "pornography" or "breach of the peace, 11 but that 
the importance of the court in providing help to children justifies 
its retention. According to him, several purposes of status offense 
jurisdiction justify their retention within the court: what happens 
to young people in society is important to everyone. Society expects 
children to be educated, healthy, supervised, and moral. The juvenile 
court attempts to assure these through its jurisdiction. The argument 
of unequal treatment of juveniles compared to adults under the law is, 
he feels, a superficial one. As Judge Arthur (1977:235-236) states: 
"Children are unequal. They are incapable of making mature judgements, 
of looking beyond tomorrow, of selecting adequate food, shelter, or 
clothing, of supporting themselves. 11 
Arthur (1977:240-243) proposes six principles for the juvenile 
court in implementing its status offense jurisdiction: (1) The juve-
nile court laws have been criticized because they are vague and am-
biguous, but, as he says, so are many other legal terms. However, to 
help alleviate this problem, he suggests that status offense statutes 
be written so that they are "both readily understandable and subject 
to proof within the rules of evidence." (2) When dealing with status 
offenders, the court should focus on the child's needs rather than his 
offenses. By dealing with the 11whys 11 rather than the 11whats 11 of the 
child's actions, the court attempts to prevent future illegality. 
(3) The court should relate to the problems of the family rather than 
the faults of the child. It should point out that 11 it is normal for 
a child to stay home, go to school, not run the streets at night, and 
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[not to] experiment with tobacco, alcohol and sex. 11 If the child's 
behavior varies from these standards, it 11 almost always originates 
in or could be controlled by the family. 11 (4) In terms of disposi-
tion, the child's needs rather than conduct norms should be the pri-
mary consideration. If intervention is not necessary, the court 
should not do so. As he states: 
Instead of removing offenses from the juvenile court in-
discriminately regardless of the nature of the nature of 
the offender, it is a wiser policy to remove offenders 
from the court discriminately regardless of the nature of 
the offense, if they do not need to go to court (1977:242). 
And, Arthur believes that a young person should be given as much lib-
erty as possible, consistent with his judgment and maturity, based 
upon an educated 11 guess 11 by the court. (5) When a child must be in-
carcerated, this should be based upon his or her needs, rather than 
the offense. While segregation of status offenders from delinquents 
may be desirable, he feels a more logical distinction would be the re-
quirements of the youth: 
The viole.nt, the angry, the manipulators, the economi-
cally motivated, the racially reacting, the status 
seekers, should more logically be kept apart than 
simply separating the runaways from the trespassers or 
those who have refused to obey their parents from 
those who have refused to obey the law .... (1977:243). 
Finally: (6) as much as possible, the juvenile court should avoid 
stigmatizing the children under its jurisdiction. Arthur refers to 
the negative label associated with the term 11 delinquent, 11 and, in-
creasingly, with the labels PINS, CINS, etc. The solution which he 
proposes is to cease labeling anyone who comes before the court. 
"Why not refer to all children in juvenile court as simply 'children 
needing help' even if its acronym is not pronounceable, or maybe be-
cause it is not? 11 
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Martin and Snyder (1976) believe that for some parents, the juve-
nile court may be the last resort; if the court does not fulfill its 
responsibility to these parents, there may perhaps be no other option 
for them. They feel that the juvenile court has an obligation to 
intervene when it deems it necessary: 
Though the behavior of status offenders may not be crim-
inal, it is unlawful. Unless we believe that truancy 
and waywardness are good for children, we ought to con-
cern ourselves with all avenues of services that might 
change such behavior (1976:45). 
They justify findings which indicate that status offenders tend to be 
incarcerated about as long as delinquents by suggesting that status 
offenders may be 11 more difficult to hel p11 . than delinquents (1976 :45). 
Judge Gill (1976), pointing out that the ancient laws of the 
Phoenicians, Romans~ and Hebrews allowed children to be exempted from 
adult criminal liability, feels that it would not be conducive for 
children to know that the juvenile court has no control over them, 
which he thinks would happen if status offenses were removed from 
the jurisdiction of the court. Providing a modern version of the 
11 child-saving 11 philosophy, Judge Gill says that childreen need the 
juvenile court for guidance and supervision: 
Experience to date clearly demonstrates that the great 
majority of status offenders represent children who are 
having inherent problems with authority, problems which 
in turn can but rarely lend themselves to successful 
resolution save through the proper use of authority 
(1976:7). 
Contending that the child must be viewed as a part of a family unit, 
especially in tenns of the parent-child conflict assoicated with many 
status offenders, Gill concludes that the court is the best, and in-
deed, only means of handling this problem. 
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Therefore, it can be seen that the two views concerning the rise 
of the juvenile court can be extended to cover views toward the status 
offense itself. Still another issue often raised is that of status 
offense concstitutionality. This question is cloudy as the courts 
have seemingly issued conflicting decisions in virtually identical 
cases. The judicial trend has been to declare status offense laws 
constitutional, but there are a number of serious questions that have 
been raised in regard to their legality. 
Originally, status offense statutes seemed doomed to failure on 
constitutional grounds. In 1870, the Illinois Supreme Court, ruling 
in the case of O'Connell y_. Turner, declared the state status offense 
law unconstitutional. The court said: 
Such a restraint on natural liberty is tyranny and op-
pression. . . . If, without crime, without the convic-
tion of any offense, the children of the state are to 
be thus confined for the 'good of society,' then society 
had better be reduced to its orignal elements, and free 
government acknowledged a failure (O'Connell v. Turner, 
1870, cited in Murphy, 1974:17). -
But, according to Murphy (1974), the results did not last for long. By 
the beginning of the twentieth century, the child-savers had eroded 
the O'Connell decision, primarily through the establishment of the 
first juvenile court in 1899. 
According to Judge Brown (1964), there are two major issues in re-
gard to the constitutionality of juvenile court laws: (1) there are 
those questions of basic liberty, and (2) there are technical law prob-
lems. Though questions regarding liberty have received the most atten-
tion, Judge Brown feels that the constitutional validity on these 
questions has been established. And, though critics have often con-
tended that the juvenile court unconstitutionally deprives children 
of their liberty, the courts have consistently ruled in favor of the 
juvenile justice system: 
These contentions have been stricken down in most in-
stances because long before the juvenile court laws were 
adopted, the principle was considered beyond question 
that the state as parena patriae had the right to as-
sert its guardianship over children ... (1964:90). 
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But, the second issue, that of technical questions of law, such as 
conflict with the state constitution, unconstitutional classification 
of persons, and the creation of a new court, has been habitually a 
source of conflict. However, according to Judge Brown, the courts 
have consistently ruled that the juvenile court, so long as it does 
not exceed the limits of basic safeguards in the U.S. constitution, 
is not illegal. Judge Brown, echoing the consensus perspective, says: 
children are not entitled to freedom from restraints and 
training as adults are. Since the wise parent not only 
can, but does, restrain and correct his child, when it 
is necessary and when because of the failure or incapa-
city of the parent, it is necessary for the state to 
take over these parental functions, it cannot be said 
that the child is being deprived his liberty without 
due process of law, or denied the equal protection of 
the laws, or any other rights protected and guaranteed 
by the Bill of Rights (1964:103). 
In a different view, Katz and Teitelbaum (1977) say that the am-
biguity and vagueness of the juvenile court laws have been considered 
necessary in legislation to protect children, but they have also been 
attacked as a violation of due process. They feel that the court's 
supervision of relationships between parents and children is incon-
sistent with the rule of law. 
One of the most persuasive arguments against the constitutional-
ity of juvenile status offenses has been made by Riback (1971 :315). 
Commenting on what she calls 11 juveni1e morals statutes, 11 she attacks 
the legality of status offense laws on a number of grounds. Accord-
ing to her: 
(1) juvenile morals statutes are unconstitutionally 
vague; (2) they are impermissibly overbroad because they 
inhibit constitutionally protected behavior; (3) these 
statutes are overbroad because, by defining delinquency 
in terms of morality, they encourage selective enforce-
ment against female juveniles based upon a double stan-
dard of sexual morality; and (4) juvenile morals 
statutes impermissibly punish a status offender (1971:315). 
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Riback (1971) says that statutes may be determined to be unconsti-
tutional if they are written in such a way that it might be unclear 
to the citizen exactly what he is or is not required to do. The 
primary criterion for illegality due to vagueness is: 11whether it pro-
hibits or requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that persons 
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and dif-
fer as to its application 11 (1971:315). Before a statute can be chal-
lenged in the court for vagueness, it must first be determined if the 
law is subject to review. Many defenders of the present system claim 
that the juvenile court is a civil, rather than a criminal court. 
Therefore, juvenile morals statutes are not subject to challenge by 
the vagueness flaw. But Riback argues that in the case of Giaccio v. 
Pennsylvania, the court declared that there must be a provision for 
due process even in civil cases, and she sees that case as an argu-
ment in favor of the ability to challenge juvenile morals statutes on 
the vagueness flaw. Based upon the ruling in Giaccio, she says that 
juvenile morals statutes 11 should stand or fall on the basis of whether 
the statute adequately describes the prohibited form of behavior 11 
(1971 :317). 
Riback (1971) likewise notes that a great many vagrancy statutes 
have been rules unconstitutional due to the vagueness flaw. Because 
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the broad terminology used in vagrancy statutes is very similar to 
the wording in juvenile morals statutes, Riback believes the juvenile 
laws are subject to challenge: 
Those statutes have been invalidated primarily because 
words such as ' idleness, 1 'immora 1 , ' 'profligate,' 
'lews,' and 'disorderly' are so subjective as to provide 
no ascertainable standards of behavior (1971:317-318). 
In a recent vagrancy decision, Papachristou ':!..· Jacksonville, Riback 
(1971:318) notes that, 11 the Supreme Court has apparently laid to rest 
the practice of using broad, general vagrancy laws in place of nar-
rowly drawn criminal statutes. 11 Justice Douglas wrote that the sta-
tute in question was unconstitutional due to ~he vagueness flaw: it 
did not sufficiently define the prohibited conduct and it gave too 
much discretion to the police (Riback, 1971:318). 
However, when it comes to juvenile status offense laws, most 
courts have not followed the same line of reasoning. In only two 
major cases have the courts declared such a juvenile statute uncon-
stitutional in recent history, according to Riback (1971). In the 
case of Gonzalez':!..· Mailliard, a federal district court found a Cali-
fornia juvenile statute unconstitutionally vague. The court challenged 
such terms as "idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral 11 as being so vague 
that 11 any behavior could be molded to fit an allegation based on the 
'morals' of the prosecutor" (1971:318-319). In a similar case in New 
York, Gesicki ':!..· Oswald, the federal district court found that the 
statute was too vague "because the language of the statute provided 
no standards for determining what type of behavior was proscribed" 
(1971:319). 
But, aside from these two cases, the courts have consistently 
ruled in favor of the constitutionality of status offense statutes, 
even in those cases Riback (1971:320-322) calls 11 statutes discrim-
inatory on their face, 11 in which discrimination seemed obvious. The 
only decisions to find juvenile morals statutes unconstitutionally 
vague were those of Gonzalez and Gesicki. And, according to Riback: 
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Those decisions dealt with the issues and followed the 
reasoning of the vagrancy cases that have held that 
vague statutes are unconstitutional when they contain 
such words as 1 idle, dissolute, lewd, or immoral' 
(1971:324). 
Riback (1971) feels that another constitutional challenge to 
juvenile morals statutes is that of 11 overbreadth. 11 She says that juve-
nile status offense laws should be declared unconstitutional because 
they are both too vague and overbroad: 11 A statute is overbroad when 
it is without standards and therefore susceptible to sweeping and im-
proper application which can result in making innocent behavior crim-
inal11 (1971:324). The juvenile morals statutes encompass a wide range 
of behavior and, therefore, allow for a great deal of discretion on 
the part of both the judge and the law enforcement officer. This sit-
uation allows the state to impose its own standard of morality on 
juveniles. One kind of overbreadth is that 11 which discourages consti-
tutionally protected behavior, 11 and, according to Riback (1971:324, 
325), 11 statutes have been held overbroad because their terms prohibit 
acts which are constitutionally protected as well as acts which legi-
timately can be proscribed. 11 One such case was the previously men-
tioned Papachristou y_. Jacksonville_, in which the Supreme Court stated 
that the vagrancy law was unconstitutional because 11 it encroached upon 
an area of constitutionally protected behavior, namely, the right to 
wander freell' (1971:325). 
While all overbreadth decisions have been concerned with the 
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rights of adults, Riback (1971) writes that they can be generalized 
to juveniles if it can be shown: (1) that the statute infringes a 
substantive right, and (2) that juveniles have certain constitutional 
rights. Citing various cases showing that jubeniles do have certain 
"substantive rights," including.!.!!_ re Gault, she concludes: 
Courts have thus recognized that juveniles possess cer-
tain substantive constitutional rights which must be 
protected. And since juvenile morals statutes can serve 
to encompass legitimate behavior, they should be invali-
dated because many basic constitutional rights cannot 
be exercised by juveniles without at least some fear of 
l ega 1 repri sa 1 ( 1971 : 327). 
The next constitutional challenge Riback (1971:328) presents is 
that of "overbreadth and selective enforcement." In the case of Gold-
many_. Knecht, the court ruled that the vagrancy statute was unconsti-
tutional because it allowed the authorities too much discretion to 
enforce their own moral standards. And, again, in Papachristou y_. 
Jacksonville, the court ruled against possible selective enforcement. 
Riback believes that juvenile morals statutes are subject to the same 
constitutional challenge as these two cases, and she makes the follow-
ing point: 
In challenging a juvenile morals statute on the basis of 
overbreadth, the showing of mere opportunity for selec-
tive enforcement provides sufficient justification for 
invalidating the suspect statute. . . . It is not neces-
sary to proffer a factual showing of selective enforce-
ment. . . . It is enough that a vague or broad statute 
lends itself to selective enforcement (1971 :330). 
Riback's (1971:337) final constitutional challenge to juvenile 
status offense statutes is that of 11 impermissibly punishing a status." 
She feels that the juvenile morals laws are subject to challenge on 
the grounds that they do not punish an act; instead, they punish a 
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status. Therefore, she argues, the juvenile status laws are a viola-
tion of the Eighth Amendment's guarantees against cruel and unusual 
punishment. As an example, she cites the case of Robinson~· Cali-
fornia, in which the Supreme Court ruled that a law prohibiting drug 
addiction was unconstitutional because it punished a status rather 
than an act. Therefore, she says: 
A juvenile who is merely 'in danger of leading an idle, 
dissolute or immoral life,• is actually committing no 
•act,' and any effort to punish must be directed at 
his or her condition or status of immorality (1971:337). 
In the previously cited case of Gesicki ~· Oswald, the court applied 
the Robinson rationale. Therefore, since Gesicki was a juvenile sta-
tus offense case, the punishment of a status challenge does, accord-
ing to Riback, seem to have applicability. As she says about the 
Gesicki ruling: 
Thus, because punishment was contingent upon the status 
of the juvenile and not upon a specific act, the court 
held the statute to be violative of the eighty amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment 
(1971: 337). 
Yet, however many arguments Riback (1971) and others may make 
about the unconstitutionality of juvenile status offenses, the fact 
remains that the courts have generally ruled in favor of their con-
stitutionality. As Murphy (1974) points out, within 30 years of the 
original O'Connell decision against the constitutionality of juve-
nile status offense statutes, the court findings were eroded. In the 
case of People~· Presley, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1970 finally 
reversed its O'Connell decision formally. Riback (1971) also indicates 
the fact that courts have traditionally upheld the constitutionality 
of juvenile morals statutes; for example, in the cases of United 
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States'!...· Meyers and People'!...· Deibert. In the Deibert case, a Cali-
fornia statute was found to be constitutional despite a vagueness 
challenge. The court held that the term 11 immoral 11 was one which "de-
notes speci fie conduct to the ordinary person . . . 11 (Riback, 
1971: 320). Riback comments on the consequences of rulings such as 
these: 
The difficulty with [decisions such as Meyers, Deibert, 
etc.] which holds that these morality terms are capable 
of clear and objective interpretation, is that it in-
vites, if not requires, sexist as well as subjective in-
terpretations of morality. What may be against one 
person's good morals may be perfectly acceptable accord-
ing to another person's. Since it is commonly believed 
that female sexual morals should be more restricted than 
males', the vagueness of such statutes may contribute to 
a daub 1 e standard of enforcement (1971: 321). 
Aside from constitutional questions, there remain questions of 
behavior, social characteristics, system functioning, and others, 
best answered through research. Obviously, there is a good deal of 
literature concerning the status offense and the juvenile court, 
but there is not a great deal of research literature in the field. 
The final section of this literature review will deal with findings 
of researchers related to the topic of status offense~. 
Thomas (1976) says attacks on status offense laws tend to con-
tain three argum~nts: (1) though not charged with a criminal act, 
status offenders are frequently confined with juveniles committing 
more serious crimes, (2) the goal of parens patriae has not been 
attained, and (3) status offenders are different from those adjuci-
cated as delinquent. He believes that many assumptions about status 
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offenders are untested and dubious--they tend to be accepted uncriti-
cally, often due to a desire for reforming the juvenile court. His 
study consisted of examining the official records of offense histor-
ies over a five year period. The data were obtained from a sample of 
2,092 adjudications from January l, 1970, through December 31, 1974. 
He attempted to determine if status offenders were a homogeneous group 
and if they were significantly different from delinquents. The pur-
pose of his analysis was to compare the offense careers among three 
categories: (l) first appearance--felong, (2) first appearance--mis-
demeanor, and (3) first appearance--juvenille status offense. Gener-
ally, he found status offenders to be the highest recidivists, fol-
lowed by felony offenders, then by misdemeanants. But, he says, 
the more important point seems to revolve around the 
premise that status offenders do not pose a major threat 
to the larger society, that they have not been and are 
not likely to become involved in any serious delinquent 
misconduct. A careful examination of the data undermines 
this premise (1976:447). 
He also found no support for the idea that status offenders do not 
move into other types of delinquency; this, he feels, undermines much 
of the argument for the removal of status offenders from the juvenile 
court. Not only did he find that status offenders tended to later 
enter other delinquency, but also that there was some indication of 
previous delinquency among the status offenders: 
we find not only that a substantial number of status of-
fenders subsequently become involved in misconduct that 
is generally viewed as more serious (felonies and mis-
demeanors), but also that a significant number of those 
appearing before the court on status offenses have pre-
viously been charged with more serious types of delin-
quency. Thus, the premise that status offenders have 
not been and will not become involved in serious delin-
quent behavior finds no support in this analysis 
(1976:448). 
But, Thomas did find that most juveniles never reappeared in court 
again. The most obvious conclusion, according to him, is that the 
juvenile court has little influence on later offenses one way or the 
other. Also, he found that females were much less likely to be 
charged with felonies, and they were less likely to return to court 
for a second offense. Almost one-half of the status offenders were 
females, and this was not true for other offenses. Also, he found 
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that younger offenders were more likely to reappear in the court than 
were older offenders. Finally, his findings indicate that status of-
fenders were similar to delinquents. But, they were different in that 
they were brought to court for behavior that is legal for adults, 
which he thinks is significant. And, he says, there is no evidence 
of positive aspects of intervention for status offenders. 
Andrews and Cohn (1977), chose cases from 1972 for their research. 
They found that status offenders were more likely to be referred to 
court than were delinquent criminal violators. Based upon their data, 
they say that there appears to be "no consistent logical relationship 
between allegations and referral to court ... one cannot predict 
that a matter will be formally treated because of the severity of the 
charges placed" (1977:70-71). Their research indicates six factors to 
be important in referral decisions: 
A case is likely to be so treated if the youth does not 
live with both parents, if he is not charged with harass-
ment, if truancy is alleged, if there is parental ne-
glect, if the youth is older, and if there is no 
allegation of verbal abuse (1977:71). 
In tenns of detention, again their data do not indicate a logical re-
lationship between the court decision and the "severity" of the of-
fense. For example, of those who "refused to obey," 47%, and among 
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those who "have undesirable companions," 55% were detained (1977:71). 
However, among "long runaways," those youth who have run away for a 
long period of time, they observe a rate of detention of only 25%. 
And, in contrasting these rates with those of assaultists, generally 
considered far more serious than status offenses, their data indicate 
a detention rate of only 10%. They observe that, as with referrals, 
there are several factors most strongly associated with detention. 
According to them, "detention is statistically predictable if the 
youth's family is on welfare, if 'other' allegations are made, if 
there is a short runaway allegation, if larceny is alleged" (1977:71). 
In terms of the case's disposition, Andress and Cohn (1972:72) 
again feel that the disposition of the case is logically unrelated to 
the seriousness of the allegation: 11Late hours, assault, and long 
runaways are treated very leniently, in contrast to such allegations 
as truancy and vile language." According to them, the factors most 
related to a "regulating disposition" (one which involves a restric-
tion of some sort on 1 i berty) were found to be: 11 absence of 1 ong 
runaway or criminal allegations, nonmembership in the lowest income 
group, a history of truancy, and evidence of parental neglect" 
(1977:72). They conclude that the factors which predict the outcome 
of a particular case are likely to be different from what one would 
expect; in fact, they are often the opposite. 
Clarke (1975:53), in a study based on Wolfgang's Philadelphia 
data of 9,945 boys, attempted to measure the "serious of juvenile 
offenders" in order to examine "escalation theory." Escalation 
theory is "the theory that undesirable behavior in childrent tends to 
increase in dangerousness with age, 11 meaning from status offenses to 
violations of criminal law (1975:53). He concluded from the Phila-
delphia data that male status offenders tend to be less serious and 
less frequent offenders until the age of 18 than other male juvenile 
offenders. 
In fact, the majority of the first juvenile status of-
fenders do not have a single offense on their records 
involving actual injury, theft or property damage. 
Another well-supported conclusion is that first index 
offenders (boys whose first offense is an index offense) 
are far more dangerous until age eighteen--and presum-
ably beyond that age--than first juvenile status of-
fenders (1975:55}. 
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Wheeler and Nichols (1974), in examining what they call the "re-
volving door," used national data for their analysis. According to 
them, 
the 'revolving door• is defined as that situation in 
which a given state 1 s institutions routinely admit new 
and repeating offenders but release them within a sim-
ilar and predictable time frame extraneous to offender 
characteristics (1974:8). 
Their view is that "if each youth is treated individually, there should 
be little relationship between the length of his institutional stay 
with that of any other youth" (1974:10). In studying Ohio institutions, 
they found little difference in the length of stay of status offenders 
and serious delinquents, and also, the treatment of both· status of-
fenders and delinquents in terms of the 11 revolving door 11 is remarkably 
similar. As they say: 
the importance of this finding is that not only do we 
not keep a serious offender any longer than a status 
offender (equal parameters), but that the rate of 
'revolutions' of the 'revolving door• are nearly equal 
( 1974: 17). 
They also found that non-whites tended to have a slightly shorter 
length of stay than whites. 
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An important finding of Wheeler and Nichols (1974) was that age 
was significantly related to length of institutionalization. They ob-
served that younger offenders tended to be incarcerated for longer 
periods than o 1 der ones. According to them, "Overa 11 we observed that 
the average institutional stay for the age 10-14 group was over one 
and a half months (18 percent) longer than youth 15 and over 11 (1974:18). 
They felt that the most important factor in determining length of in-
stitutionalization was age. 
Interpreting their findings, Wheeler and Nichols (1974:20) explain 
these practices as a function of the "child welfare effect, 11 which in-
eludes a great deal of discretion on the part of the staff. According 
to them: 
that age appeared as the most significant client charac-
teristic related to institutional stay is interpreted 
as an unanticipated consequence of the juvenile courts' 
philosophy of parens patria and related indetenninate 
sentence, married and reinforced by social work's his-
torical and fervent commitment to providing 'treatment• 
programs (1974:20). 
Similarly, other researchers have found little, if any, differ-
ence in the incarceration rates, length of stay, and dispositions of 
status offenders and delinquents (Wheeler, 1974; Gibbons and Griswold, 
1957; and Lerman, 1978, among others). Clearly, the literature indi-
cates that the "individualization" of justice upon which the juvenile 
court was founded does not appear when one examines these variables. 
CHAPTER III 
THEORY 
Two Theories: Consensus and.Conflict 
Most sociologists of law agree that there are two dominant and 
competing perspectives associated with the study of crime, delinquency, 
and law: the consensus, or functionalist, approach and conflict, of-
ten Marxist, theory (Chambliss, 1976; Hills, 1971; Empey, 1978; and 
Quinney, 1970, 1975). These two views take differing routes to the 
examination of law in society. 
The traditional view in legal sociology is that of consensus 
(Pound, 1964; Houghteling, 1968, Durkheim, 1949; Timasheff, 1939), 
which is based in the concepts of the interrelationships among vari-
ous structural elements in society and the functions performed by 
these elements. According to this perspective, society tends toward 
stability; change is more likely to be gradual rather than abrupt. 
But rnost importantly, 11 the thing that makes societal integration and 
stability possible is the general agreement of its citizens on basic 
values and beliefs" (Empey, 1978:373). 
It is this notion of shared values and beliefs that is crucial 
to the functionalist argument. The consensus approach tests on the 
idea that criminal law is an expression of shared values within so-
ciety. Laws serve to maintain the interests of the entire society; 
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they 11 transcend the immediate, narrow interests of various individuals 
and groups, expressing the social consciousness of the whole society 11 
(Hills~ 1971:3). Timasheff (1939), for example, views ancient legal 
codes as reflecting values rather than creating them, and feels that 
those who make laws generally do so with the assent of the majority, 
and that most everyone in society supports the laws which are made. 
The state, then, is viewed as a means of value-neutral accommodation 
within a society beset by conflict (Chambliss and Seidman, 1971). 
Likewise, Houghteling (1968) believes that the law tends to reflect 
the consensus of society and to express the desires of most of its 
members. He does not feel that the legal system is either self-
serving or an expression of powerful interests. According to him: 
the legal system is not a machine that runs for its own 
sake. It exists to serve the purposes of the community. 
La\'/ is not a set of restrictions imposed on the community 
by some external power; it is a system of rules, insti-
tutions, and procedures that the community itself has 
established as a means of achieving its many and varying 
objectives (1968:222). 
According to Chambliss (1976), the consensus approach consists of 
the following ideas: (1) law is an expression of the consensus in 
values of society, (2) the values expressed in law are those which 
are fundamental to social order, (3) law expresses those values which 
protect the public interest, (4) the legal system, as a part of the 
state, is essentially value-neutral in practice, and (5) the law per-
forms a mediating function in heterogeneous societies among various 
interest groups. As a result, this value-consensus assumption leads 
to two basic principles: 
(1) that criminal behavior is to be understood by as-
certaining why some people in the society come to adopt 
a set of values, norms, and attitudes conducive to crim-
inal behavior while most of the members of society ac-
cept the 'prevailing value system' and abide by the law 
and (2) that criminal law is to be understood as a body 
of rules which reflect the general value consensus of 
society (Chambliss, 1976:3). 
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Therefore, the consensus view holds that delinquency is a rela-
tively easy phenomenon to define. The delinquent is the young per-
son who violates the shared values and rules of society. Thus, this 
model assumes that not only does society have a set of virtually uni-
versally held values, it implies that because of this, 11 anyone who 
becomes delinquent is a person who has somehow become different from 
law-abiding people 11 because his values are in opposition to those of 
society (Empey, 1978:373). 
In contrast, the conflict perspective (Chambliss, 1976; Chambliss 
and Seidman, 1971; Quinney, 1975, 1970) does not view law as reflect-
ing a consensus of values; instead, it holds that order results from 
the corecion and influence employed by powerful interests. Thus, 
11 society is held together, not by an overriding consensus on basic 
values and rules, but by force and constraint 11 (Empey, 1978:374). Ac-
cording to Chambliss (1976), conflict theory sees consensus as: 
( 1 ) a reflection of the fact that those who contra 1 the 
means of production also control the production of val-
ues in the society and (2) a false consciousness since 
the dominant value system (if indeed there is one) will 
be one which opporesses subordinate classes and serves 
the interests of the ruling class (1976:3). 
One of the foremost proponents of this approach is Quinney 
(1975:37), who has developed a conflict approach to law and crime, 
which he refers to as 11 the social reality of crime. 11 Rejecting the 
traditional perspective, he views crime as a legal definition made 
by those who have power. These legal definitions, according to him, 
are designed to protect the interests of the powerful, and law en-
forcement is also a means of interest-group protection, as exempli-
fied by differential enforcement. 
A recent extension of the conflict approach is what Empey (1978 
(1978:377) calls "radical theory. 11 According to him, radical theory 
is based in conflict theory because one of its primary tenets is the 
view that law functions to maintain the interests of the powerful. 
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As an example, he says the delinquency laws in the United States have 
served such a function. Empey maintains that radical theory has be-
come especially important recently because: 
it represents the culmination of a line of social thought 
which has progressively led away from the notion that 
delinquent tendencies are inherent in individuals toward 
the notion that they are inherent in the political and 
economic organization of society (1978:369). 
In the radical, conflict view, delinquency results from the fact that 
the ruling classes 
(1) define what delinquent behavior is, based on their 
particular self-interest, (2) create the social condi-
tions which make delinquents out of working-class people, 
and, then, (3) devise legal machinery by which to main-
tain control over these children (1978:369). 
Finally, according to Empey, one of the most important features of 
radical theory is its focus on power and the influence which the 
powerful have in creating law and defining delinquency. As he says~ 
radical theory 
correctly notes the persistence of exploitation, sexism, 
and racism. And it reminds us, as the 19th century 
child-savers needed reminding, that delinquency is not 
merely an expression of pathological individuals or de-
praved immigrant groups colliding with an always equit-
able and just legal system. Rather, that system and 
its underlying values must be taken into account and its 
contribution to creation of delinquents assessed 
(1978:388). 
78 
Therefore, based upon the conflict view, whether in its tradi-
tional or radical form, the means of understanding delinquency are to 
be found in examining the power behind law and the manifestations of 
power and law in defining both law and illegal behavior. 
In contrasting the consensus (functionalist) and conflict ap-
proaches, Chambliss (1976) provides the following comparison: first, 
each perspective has a differing view on the basis of law. Function-
alists, following Durkheim (1949), see law as resulting from society's 
customs, whereas conflict theorists view it as a result of the inter-
ests of those in power. Similarly, the consensus view holds that 
criminal acts are those which offend the morality of society. The 
conflict perspective sees criminal acts as those actions which are 
defined as such because it is advantageous to do so for thise in 
power. Also, those persons who are criminals, according to the func-
tionalists, are those whose behavior has exceeded the standards set 
by society. Conflict theory holds that persons are labeled as 11 crim-
inal11 because it is in the interests of those in power to do so, re-
gardless of the community's tolerance of the behavior (1976:7). And, 
the consensus view is that the reason more lower class persons are 
arrested is because they commit more crimes, while the conflict ap-
proach views differential arrest rates as a .reflection of the ability 
of the powerful to protect themselves. 
It seems, then, that these two differing perspectives hold dia-
metrically opposed views on the relationships among crime, delinquency, 
and law. However, La Beff (1978) suggests that the differences are 
not as great as it would at first seem, and that the differences may 
be more a matter of degree than of kind. She feels that the conflict 
and functional approaches 11 differ in matters of emphasis while each 
recognizes the emphasis of the other11 (1978:19). As such, Hills 
(1971) notes that the conflict approach does not presume that all 
laws simply reflect powerful interests; there are those which seem 
to be an expression of more widespread values. 
Direction of the Study: A 
Conflict Approach 
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Obviously, there is a great body of literature concerning atti-
tudes and perspectives toward the juvenile justice system and the 
juvenile court. But, it is also evident that there is a paucity of 
research on how the juvenile court handles various types of offenders, 
especially status offenders. Certainly the literature that is avail-
able (legal, theoretical, and empirical) indicates the issues which 
need to be dealt with in this project. Of course, many of these issues 
are beyond the scope of this present study (constitutional questions 
and the problem of diversion, for example), but many others are within 
its realm. This section presents a 11 modified 11 conflict approach to 
differential handling of offenders, along with the research questions 
and their resulting hypotheses. 
The major purpose of this study is to examine the differences in 
the handling and legal disposition of various offenders in the Tulsa 
County Juvenile Court. For heuristic purposes, a conflict approach 
is employed. Of the two major perspectives in the sociology of law, 
the literature strongly indicates that the conflict perspective is 
more appropriate for this particular study. Given Platt's (1969, 
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1977) excellent analysis of the rise of the juvenile court and its 
expression of vested interests, Empey's (1973, 1978), Tappan's (1949) 
criticisms of the court's legal philosophy, the analyses of both 
Kittrie (1971) and Murphy (1974), along with the questions of sex-
based discrimination raised by Riback (1971), Chesney-Lind (1972, 
1977), and Sussman (1977) among others, it seems obvious that the 
conflict perspective, with its assumptions of powerful interests 
vested in law, discriminatory applications of the law, and the view 
of law as protecting those in power, can be useful here. Thus, the 
research questions and hypotheses emerged from the literature and re-
flect the majority of previous analyses and interpretations using 
conflict theory. 
The first research question is the basis of this study. Is 
there a significant difference in the handling of various types of 
offenders in the juvenile court? From the literature and theory, 
it seems possible that there will be no significant differences in 
the disposition of different types of offenders. However, any dif-
ferences observed could be expected to be in the direction of harsher 
treatment for certain kinds of offenders: younger, female, non-
. white, and status. Therefore, the first hypotheses are: 
1. There is a significant difference in the disposition 
of younger and older offenders. 
2. There is a significant difference in the disposition 
of male and female offenders. 
3. There is a significant difference in the disposition 
of white and non-white offenders. 
4. There is a significant difference in the disposition 
of delinquents and status offenders. 
The second research question revolves around the relationships 
among offense type, length of supervision, and the extralegal vari-
able of sex. Based on the literature, which indicates a concern on 
the part of the court about female morality, the question emerges: 
are females treated differently than males by the juvenile court? 
From the conflict perspective, it seems likely there will be a dif-
ference. If the court is especially concerned with female morality, 
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it could be expected that female status offenders would be supervised 
for longer periods than males with the same adjudication. Similarly, 
male delinquents could be expected to be supervised longer than fe-
males delinquents. Also, due to the particular concern for female 
morality, it could be expected that, generally, females would be super-
vised longer than males. Finally, the literature suggests the possi-
bility that status offenders are a greater concern to the court than 
are delinquents. Certainly Platt's (1959, 1977) analysis of the rise 
of the juvenile court suggests this. Thus, the second group of hy-
potheses are: 
5. Status offenders are supervised by the court longer 
than are delinquent offenders. 
6. Females are supervised by the court longer than are 
males. 
The next research question concerns the variable of race. 
Though previous research in this context is somewhat scarce and con-
tradictory, from conflict theory an answer to the question of whether 
race is related to length of supervision can be surmised. The next 
hypothesis is: 
7. Non-whites are supervised by the court longer than are 
whites. 
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Based upon the historical foundations of the juvenile court and 
the conflict assumption that the less powerful receive harsher treat-
ment under the law than the more powerful, this hypothesis seems 
logical. 
Another research question centers on age. Does the age of the 
offender affect his or her treatment in the court? There are some 
indications in the literature that younger offenders tend to be 
treated more harshly than older ones. Considering the system's con-
cern with 11 predelinquency 11 and the prevention of future delinquency, 
coupled with the conflict assumption of power, this seems likely. 
Therefore, the last hypothesis is: 
8. Younger offenders are supervised by the court longer 
than are older ones. 
The final research question concerns the use of a number of 
variables, especially legal ones, to predict the actions of the ju-
venile court. Can length of supervision be predicted? What variables 
best explain the length of time various offenders are supervised by 
the court? 
Most of the research in this study and the preceeding hypotheses 
have centered on the use of extralegal variables, such as age, sex, and 
race. Therefore, to determine the relative usefulness of legal vari-
ables and in an attempt to explain and predict length of supervision, 
an endeavor is made to develop a 11 Criminal Maturity Index. 11 The Crim-
inal Maturity Index (CMI) is composed of the following legal variables: 
number of previous delinquent offenses, number of previous status of-
fenses, prior referrals--before 1977, prior referrals--1977, number of 
previous dispositions, number of previous probations, number of previous 
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institutionalizations, and the extralegal variable of age at first 
arrest or referral. Based upon conventional assumptions and consensus 
theory, the legal variables should explain and predict length of super-
vision. Nonetheless, the extralegal variable of age at first arrest 
is included to determine if it helps predict length of supervision. 
CHAPTER IV 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This chapter deals with the methodological techniques to be used 
in this study. First of all, the primary method employed is that of 
secondary analysis: the data come from the official records of the 
Tulsa County Juvenile Court. The subjects for this research include 
a sample of all juveniles who were referred to the Tulsa court during 
the year 1977 (N=202). This year was chosen because it was a year in 
which all subjects completed their periods of supervision and it was 
the last year truants came under court supervision. 
For the purposes of this study the major emphasis will be on the 
dependent variables of disposition and length of supervision (mea-
sured in months spent under court supervision). However, the first 
section of the analysis is a detailed description of the sample, in-
cluding demographic variables such as age, sex, and race, along with 
adjudicatory status (delinquent or status offender) for the present 
and past referrals. A description of the total sample of juveniles 
will be presented, then a description and comparison of sub-samples, 
according to disposition, sex, and offense category (delinquents and 
status offenders). 
The second section consists of testing the hypotheses and exam-
ining the relationships among variables. The hypotheses are tested 
through the use of the T-test (and the Mann-Whitney U when necessary), 
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the Pearson Correlation, and the Chi-Square test. All differences are 
tested at the .05 level of significance. For purposes of simplicity, 
a listing of the various analyses is provided: 
Comparisons: 
1. Age and Disposition for the entire sample 
2. Age and Disposition for delinquents 
3. Age and Disposition for status off enders 
4. Sex and Disposition for the entire sample 
5. Sex and Disposition for delinquents 
6. Sex and Disposition for status offenders 
7. Race and Disposition for the entire sample 
8. Race and Disposition for de.l i nquents 
9. Race and Disposition for status off enders 
1 0. Offense and Disposition for the entire sample 
11. Offense and Disposition for males 
12. Offense and Disposition for females 
13. Offense and Disposition for younger off enders 
14. Offense and Disposition for older offenders 
15. Offense and Disposition for whites 
16. Offense and Di spas iti on for non-whites 
T-Tests: 
1. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for the entire 
sample1 
2. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for males 
3. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for females 
4. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for younger 
off enders 
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5. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for older offenders 
6. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for whites 
7. Type of Offense and Length of Supervision for non-whites 
8. Sex and Length of Supervision for the entire sample 
9. Sex and Length of Supervision for delinquents 
10. Sex and Length of Supervision for status offenders 
11. Race and Length of Supervision for the entire sample 
12. Race and Length of Supervision for delinquents 
13. Race and Length of Supervision for status offenders 
14. Age and Length of Supervision for the entire sample 
15. Age and Length of Supervision for delinquents 
16. Age and Length of Supervision for status offenders 
Correlations: 
1. Age and Length of Supervision for the entire sample 
2. Age and Length of Supervision for delinquents 
3. Age and Length of Supervision for status offenders 
Criminal Maturity Index: Multiple Re9ressions for Len9th of 
Supervision: 
l. Regressions for the entire sample 
2. Regressions for delinquents 
3. Regressions for status off enders 
4. Regress ions for whites 
5. Regressions for non-whites 
6. Regress ions for younger off enders 
7. Regressions for older offenders 
8. Regressions for males 
9. Regressions for females 
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The method used in the CMI is that of multiple regression. 
Through this procedure, the overall contribution of the independent 
variables to an explanation of the dependent variable can be deter-
mined. Likewise, multiple regression can be used to examine the con-
tribution of any independent variable alone or in conjunction with 
others. Specifically, a multiple regression procedure is to be run 
on the total sample, followed by thesame procedure separately for 
delinquents, status offenders, whites, non-whites, younger offenders, 
older offenders, males, and females. It is hoped that the CMI can 
shed light on the important factors involved in length of supervision 
both for the total sample and for the various sub-samples. Also, the 
multiple regression can help determine if length of supervision can be 
better predicted for som~ categories of offenders than for othE·rs. Be-
cause this procedure is exploratory in nature, no specific hypotheses 
are tested. Nonetheless, it is apparent from consensus theory that 
these variables should explain a good deal of the variation in length 
of supervision in the sample. 
In summary, the methodology is designed to provide a description 
of the sample, and to examine the differences between disposition and 
the variables of offense, sex, age, and race. Also, differences be-
tween these variables and length of supervision are to be presented. 
Further, the correlations between age and length of supervision are 
examined. Finally, a CMI is developed, using multiple regression, in 
an exploratory attempt to predict and explain length of supervision 
primarily through the use of legal variables. 
There are a few variables which require operational definitions. 
For the purposes of this study, delinquents are defined as those 
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youngsters referred to the court for offenses which are illegal for 
adults, including: murder/non-negligent manslaughter, manslaughter 
by negligence, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, other 
assult, burglary, auto theft, shoplifing, larceny, sex offenses, 
narcotics, drunkenness, federal offenses, receiving stolen goods, 
glue-sniffing, forgery, violation of probation, and miscellaneous 
criminal offenses. Status offenders are defined as those persons 
referred to the court for offenses which are not illegal for adults: 
running away, truance, ungovernability, and miscellaneous status 
offenses. Younger offenders are those aged 15 and under, while older 
offenders are those aged 16 and over. 




The average age at referral for the entire sample was 15.564, 
with an age range from 10 to 19. The mode for age was 17, with over 
30%, followed by ages 15 and 16 (22.8%), then age 14 (11.9%). 
Almost 75% of the sample consisted of males (74.8%). The entire 
sample contained 151 males and 51 females. 
Over 80 percent (82.2%) of the sample was white. The remainder 
consisted of blacks (13.4%) and Indians (4.5%). 
The average length of time between referral and disposition for 
the sample was 1.873 months. Most of the sample was referred by law 
enforcement agencies (83.7%). The others were referred by: proba-
tion officer or parents or relatives (5.4%), school (l.5%), social 
agency (1.0%), and 11 other11 source (3.0%). 
Most of the sample (59.0%) had no previous referrals during the 
year 1977. Of those who had prior referrals during the year, the 
greatest number (24.3%) had only one referral. Also, 7.9% had two 
prior referrals; one person had the greatest number of 1977 referrals, 
six. The average number of 1977 prior referrals was 0.723. 
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In terms of previous referrals before 1977, almost half of the 
sample (48.0%) had none. Also, 13.9% had one, 10.9% had two, and 
10.4% had three previous referrals. The greatest number of prior 
referrals for the sample was 11, with one subject (0.5%) having that. 
The average number of prior referrals before 1977 was 1.554. 
More than half of the subjects (51.5%) experienced no detention 
or overnight care, while 47.0% were kept in overnight detention. Two 
subjects (l.0%) were detained overnight in a jail or police station; 
and one subject (0.5%) was detained elsewhere. 
The most common reason for referral was burglary (16.3%), fol-
lowed by larceny and ungovernability (11.4% each). Other reasons for 
referral with a relatively high percentage included running away 
(9.9%), auto theft (7.9%), and narcotics (6.4%). Very few subjects 
were referred for most of the violent offenses, with 1.5% referred 
.for murder or non-negligent manslaughter, 0.5% for manslaughter by 
negligence, forcible rape, .and other assaults, though both robbery 
and aggravated assault referrals were 5.4%. The other reasons for 
referral constituted very small percentages. 
The sample had an average of 8.581 years of schooling. The mini-
mum number of years was 1.0 and the maximum was 12.0. 
The data on living arrangement indicated that slightly over 
one-third of the sample lived with both of their natural parents 
(35.6%). Of those subjects who came from homes without both parents, 
almost one-third of the sample (29.2) lived with mother only, while 
17.8% lived with mother and step-father. Few of the subjects lived 
with father only (4.5%) or with father and step-mother (5.0%); 5.0% 
also lived in the home of relatives. Fewer still lived in an 
institution (1.5), had independent living arrangements (1.0%), or 
lived in 11 other11 arrangements (0.5%). 
Exactly one-half of the subjects came from homes where the par-
ents were divorced or separated. Over one-third had their parents 
together. The few remaining subjects came from situations in which 
the father was dead (5.4%), the mother was dead (2.0%), the parents 
were not married to each other (4.5%), or "other" (1.0%). 
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Because over one-fourth (27.7%) of the data on family income 
fell into the 11 unknown 11 category, it is difficult to make many gener-
alizations on this variable. However, based on the data which are 
available, the greatest number of subjects seem to come from families 
earning $10,000 or more (30.2%). A large number also fell into the 
$5,000 to $9,999 category. Also, 10.9% came from families on public 
assistance. A small number fell into the categories of under $3,000 
(4.5%) and $3,000 to $4,999 (2.0%). 
Again, with the data on father's occupation, because of the 
large number of subjects in the 11 unknown 11 category, it is difficult 
to genera-ize. But, the available data indicate that almost half 
(41.6%) of the subjects came from working-class homes. Certainly, 
the working-class category is the largest. Also, 16.3% came from 
homes where the father had a white-collar job, with 9.9% having 
fathers in professional capacities. 
With only 5.5% of the data on mother's occupation unknown, it 
is somewhat easier to interpret the findings. The largest category 
consisted of those whose mothers were housewives (31.2%), followed 
by working-class (26.7%) and white collar (21.8%). 
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The x age for first arrest or referral was 14.701 years. The 
greatest percentage of subjects was originally arrested or referred 
at age 16 (30.2%). Another 18.3% came to the court at age 15, fol-
lowed by age 17 (14.9%). Finally, 12.4% had their first arrest or 
referral at age 13 and 11.4% at age 14. The remaining age categories 
had very small percentages, with the youngest being age two (1.0%), 
and the oldest being age 18 (0.5%). 
About one-third of the sample (33.2%) had no previous disposi-
tions. The x number of prior dispositions was 2.594. Other than no 
previous dispositions, the categories with the highest number of sub-
jects were two (14.4%) and one (12.9%) previous dispositions. There 
was 9.9% of the sample who had three prior dispositions, 8.4% with 
four, and 7.9% with five. The remaining categories had small per-
centages, with the highest number of previous dispositions being 18 
(0.5%). 
The majority of subjects had no previous probation (74.3%). In 
fact, the x for previous probations was 0.332, with 19.3% having one, 
5.4% two, and 1.0% one prior probation. 
Likewise, the majority of subjects had no previous institutionali-
zations (74.8%). Only 17.3% had one, 5.4% two, 2.0% three, and 0.5% 
one prior institutionalization. The x for previous institutionaliza-
tions was 0.361. 
Also, the average length of court supervision for the entire 
sample was 4.556 months. 
The sample had an average of 0.767 previous status offenses. 
The majority had no prior status offenses (58.4%) and 20.8% had one. 
Only 9.9% had two, 8.4% three, 2.0% four, and 0.5% six previous sta-
tus offenses. 
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The x for previous delinquent offenses was 1.782. Almost half of 
the sample (47.5%) had no prior delinquent offenses, 15.3% had one, 
and 11.9% had two previous offenses. The remaining categories had 
relatively small percentages, with the highest number of previous de-
1 inquent offenses being 17 (0.5%). 
Finally, the sample had an average of 4. 735 months between their 
first and second offenses (see Table I for a presentation of the entire 
sample profile). 
Profile by Disposition 
For age at referral, the criminal court subjects had the oldest 
x age (16.944), followed, in order, by tho e institutionalized, dis-
missed, and placed on probation. The dismissed category had the 
youngest lower limit--age 10--and those institutionalized had the 
oldest--one person referred at age 19. 
In regard to sex, no females were referred to the criminal court 
for prosecution. Males were the majority for all disposition, with a 
relatively equal percentage for the dismissed, probation, and institu-
tionalized categories. 
The majority of subjects for all dispositions were white. The 
greatest percentage of blacks was among those going to the Criminal 
Court, while the lowest percentage was among those whose cases were 
dismissed. No Indians were referred to the criminal court; two of the 
nine had their cases dismissed or were placed on probation. The 
greatest number of Indians were placed in institutions, with five of 
the nine receiving that disposition. 
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TABLE I 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE OF ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Variable Total Sample 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable Total Sample 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 (Cont.) 
11 
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Murder/Non-negotiable Manslaughter 3 
1.5% 
Manslaughter by Negotiation 1 
0.5% 




Aggravated Assau1 t 11 
5.4% 









TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 




































Miscellaneous Status Offenses 1 
0.5% 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 





Living Arrangement of Child 
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Father Only 






































TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 
Marital Status of Natural Parents 
(Cont.) 
Other 
Parents Not Married to Each 
Other 
Fami 1 y Income 
Public Assistance 
Under $3,000 
$3,000 - $4,999 
$5,000 - $9,999 




















Unemployed/Unskilled . 20 
9.9% 
Working Class (plumber, carpenter, 84 
assembly line worker, etc.) 41.6% 
White Collar (sales, clerical 33 
personnel, etc.) 16.3% 
Professional (physician, attorney, 13 




TABLE I (Continued) 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 
















































TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable Total Sample 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 
Length of Supervision (Months) 
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TABLE I (Continued) 
Variable 




























The average time between referral and disposition varied from 
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the longest, 2.638 months for those with dismissed cases, to 1.336 
months for those institutionalized. The longer time associated with 
dismissed cases is likely due to the nature of the disposition. 
The great majority of all dispositions were referred by law en-
forcement agencies. Those who had their cases dismissed had the 
highest percentage of law enforcement referrals (90.4%), followed by 
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those sent to the criminal court (88.9%) and those cases placed on 
probation (85.7%). The lowest percentage of referrals from law en-
forcement agencies was for those institutionalized (75.0%). There 
was a generally small number of cases referred by the others, with 
the only exceptions being the referrals by probation officers for 
those institutionalized (11.8%) and by parents and relatives for the 
same group (7.9%). 
The data on prior 1977 referrals indicate that, with the excep-
tion of criminal court disposition, the majority had no prior refer-
rals during the year. Not surprisingly, the highest number of average 
referrals was for those institutionalized (0.945) and those sent to 
the criminal court (0.778). Similarly, the lowest average was for 
those whose cases were dismissed (0.534). 
For referrals before 1977, as expected, those referred to the 
criminal court for prosecution had the greatest number of average 
referrals (3.389). These were followed by those who were institu-
tionalized (1.764), dismissed (1. 137), and those placed on probation 
(0.629). 
Likewise, the two most serious dispositions were the only ones 
for which a minority had no referrals. Only 22.2% of those sent to 
criminal court and 30.3% of those institutionalized had no prior re-
ferrals before 1977. The greatest number of prior referrals (11) 
was for one individual sent to the criminal court. 
In terms of care pending disposition, only 22.2% of those later 
referred to the criminal court were not kept overnight, while 66.7% 
were detained at a jail or police station overnight, likely the re-
sult of the type of offense committed. Likewise, 64.5% of the 
institutionalized sample were held in detention and only 34.2% were 
not held overnight. The majority of those whose cases were dis-
missed (64.4%) and those placed on probation (77. 1%) were not de-
tained overnight. None of those dismissed, placed on probation, or 
institutionalized were detained in a jail or police station. 
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For the data on reason referred, as could be expected, those 
persons with a criminal court disposition were referred for the most 
serious crimes, with robbery and burglary having the highest percent-
ages each (27.8% each), followed by murder and non-negligent man-
slaughter (11. 1%). Nonetheless, a large number of the other 
dispositions included referrals for serious crimes. 
Among dismissed cases, 15.1% were referred for both burglary and 
larceny. However, 12.3% of the dismissed cases were referred for 
ungovernability. 
Burglary and larceny were also common referrals for those placed 
on probation, with 25.7% and 22.9%, respectively. Those persons in-
stitutionalized showed the greatest amount of disparity in reason for 
referral. The highest percentage was for running away (19.7%), fol-
lowed by ungovernability (13.2%), burglary (10.5%), and auto theft 
(9.2%). These data seem to indicate a tendency for the institutional-
ized sample to have been referred for less serious offenses, especially 
for status offenses. 
The data on years of schooling completed indicate that those sent 
to the criminal court had the highest average schooling (9.60 years), 
followed by dismissed cases (9.04), institutionalized (8.47), and pro-
bation (8.32 years). All in all, there does not seem to be much dif-
ference in years of schooling among the samples. 
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In terms of the living arrangement of the child, for those with 
dismissed, probation, and institutionalized dispositions, the greatest 
number lived with both parents, followed by living with the mother 
only. However, for those sent- to the criminal court for prosecution, 
the majority lived with mother only (61.1%) and the next greatest num-
ber lived with mother and stepfather (22.2%). This pattern certainly 
distinguishes the criminal court sample from the other three. 
As expected based upon the living arrangement data, the data on 
marital status of natural parents indicate that far fewer of the 
criminal court dispositions had their natural parents still married 
to each other (11. 1%), compared to the dismissed cases (42.5%), those 
on probation (42.9%), and those institutionalized (35.5%). 
Likewise, the highest percentage of divorced and separated par-
ents came from the criminal court dispositions (61. 1%), though all of 
the groups had high rates of divorce or separation--46.6% for dis-
missed cases, 45.7% for probationers, and 52.6% for institutionalized 
dispositions. Also, the cases sent to the criminal court had by far 
the highest percentage in the category of parents not married to each 
other (16.7%). 
Examining the data from both the living arrangement and marital 
status of natural parents categories indicates that those persons who 
were eventually referred to the criminal court came from markedly 
different parental backgrounds than did the others. Whether this is 
indicative of precipitating factors in their behavior or court dis-
position cannot be determined from these data, but certainly the dif-
ferences are evident. 
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Because of the large number of cases in all categories in which 
family income was unknown, it is difficult to make many generalizations 
about this variable. But the data do indicate that the criminal court 
dispositions may have had a tendency toward lower income levels than 
the others. The greatest percentage of those sent to the criminal 
court had incomes in the $5,000 - $9,999 range (38.9%), compared to 
23.3% for dismissed cases, 20.0% for probation cases, and 25.0% for 
institutionalized cases. The greatest percentage for other disposi-
tions was found in the $10,000 and over range with 42.5% for dismissed, 
40.0% for probation, and 18.4% for institutionalized, compared to only 
11. 1% of those sent to the criminal court. 
Both the criminal court and probation dispositions had relatively 
high rates of public assistance, with 16.7% and 20.0%, -respectively, 
compared to 9.6% and 6.6% for dismissed and institutionalized cases. 
The data on father's occupation indicate that the greatest per-
centage of cases in all four categories came from working class back-
grounds; there do not appear to be many differences among the groups 
on this variable, with the possible exception of professional occupa-
tions. None of those sent to the criminal court had fathers in pro-
fessional occupations, while 5.5% of dismissed cases, 11.4% of 
probation cases, and 6.6% of institutionalized cases did. Again, how-
ever, the large number of unknown cases makes it difficult to compare 
and generalize. 
For mother's occupation, all four groups had a high percentage of 
mothers in working class occupations, with the criminal court and in-
stitutional dispositions tending to come from the working class (44.4% 
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and 30.3%) and the probation cases more likely to come from white 
collar backgrounds (40.0%). The dismissed category was most likely 
to have mothers who were housewives (32.9%) and was about evenly 
divided between working class (24.7%) and white collar (23.3%). 
Considering the previous data on living arrangement and marital sta-
tus of natural parents, it is not surprising that the criminal court 
dispositions had the smallest percentage of mothers who were house-
wives (22.2%). 
There were virtually no differences among the four groups on the 
variable age at first arrest or referra1. All four dispositions had 
a mean age of slightly above 14-1/2 years of age at first arrest or 
referral. The range of ages was greatest for the institutionalized 
sample (2-18) and smallest for those sent to criminal court (12-17). 
As could be expected, the criminal court had the highest average 
number of previous dispositions (5.6111), followed by the institu-
tionalized sample (2.911). Those placed on probation had the lowest 
x with 1. 143, slightly below that of those dismissed (l.863). Those 
referred to the criminal court also had the greatest range of previous 
dispositions, from 0 to 18. 
The highest average number of previous probations was found with 
the institutionalized sample (0.436), with the criminal court sample 
following with ax of 0.389. The dismissed and probation categories 
had almost identical x previous probations, 0.219 and 0.229, respec-
tively. All four groups had few prior probations, with three the 
highest number, found in both the dismissed and institutionalized 
sample. 
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Not surprisingly, the highest average number of previous institu-
tionalizations was found in the two most serious dispositions. The 
criminal court sample had an average of 0.778 previous institution-
alizations and the institutionalized group had ax of 0.500. Like-
wise, the lowest average was within the dismissed category (0.110), 
with the probationers having ax of 0.229. 
Obviously, the shortest average length of supervision was found 
among those sent to the criminal court, since once they were referred 
to the adult court, the juvenile court 1 s supervision ended. The x 
time between arrest and referral to the criminal court was 1.683 months. 
Similarly, due to the nature of the disposition, the dismissed category 
had the next lowest average length of supervision (2.562 months). 
Those who were placed on probation and those who were institutionalized 
had similar lengths of supervision (averages of 5.431 and 5.273 months, 
respectively). 
The highest average number of status offenses was found in the in-
stitutiona 1 ized sample, with ax of 1.711. Those referred to the crim-
inal court were next (0.778), followed by those cases which were 
dismissed (0.452) and probationers (0. 143). 
Unlike the prior status offense category, those referred to the 
criminal court had a much higher average number of previous delin~ 
quent offenses (4.667) than did the other groups. The institution-
alized group had the next highest (1.818), followed by those 
dismissed (1.356) and those on probation (l.000). These data indicate 
that those eventually sent to the criminal court tended to have more 
serious criminal histories than the other dispositions. Compared with 
the data on previous status offenses, however, it is interesting that 
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the institutionalized sample had a much higher average of status of-
fenses than did any other group. 
Though they seem to have committed a far greater number of seri-
ous offenses, the criminal court sample had by far the longest average 
time between first and second offense (8.050 months). The proba-
tioners were next (4.520), followed closely by the institutionalized 
sample (4.507) and those whose cases were dismissed (3.766 months) 
(see Table II for a presentation of the Demographic Profile by 
Deposition). 
Profile by Sex 
For age at referral, there was a Jittle difference between the 
sexas; males had a slightly higher average age (15.682) than did fe-
males (15.216). The males also had a greater age range--from 10 to 
19, while the females ranged in age from 12 to 17. 
In terms of sex, the majority for both sexes were white, but 
there was a much higher percentage of white females (92.2%) than white 
males (78.8%). 
The data on average time between referral and disposition indi-
cated that the time for males was almost twice as long as for females 
(2.111 months and 1.169 months). The majority of both sexes were 
referred by law enforcement agencies. But a higher percentage of 
males (87.4%) were referred by law enforcement agencies than were 
females (72.5%). Further, there was a much greater percentage of 
females referred by parents or relatives (13.7%) than males (2.6%). 
Also, a greater percentage of females were referred by probation of-
ficers (7.8% to 4.6% for males). 
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TABLE II 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE BY DISPOSITION 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 





12 2 3 
2.7% 8.6% 
13 2 6 4 
2.7% 17. l % 5.2% 
14 5 5 14 
6.8% 14.3% 18.4% 
15 l 17 7 21 
5.6% 23.3% 20.0% 27.6% 
16 l 17 8 20 
5.6% 23.3% 22.9% 26.3% 
17 14 27 6 15 
77.8% 37.0% 17. l % 19. 7% 
18 2 l l 
11. l % 1. 4% 1.3% 
19 l 
0.9% 
-x 16.944 14.890 14.829 15.582 
Sex 
Male 18 53 29 51 
100% 72.6% 77 .1% 69.7% 
Female 0 20 8 23 
0.0% 27.4% 22.9% 30.3% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Race 
White 13 63 30 60 
72. 2% 86.3% 80.0% 81. 6% 
Black 5 8 5 9 
27 .8% 11.0% 14. 3% 11.8% 
Indian 2 2 5 
2.7% 2.7% 6.5% 
x Time Between Ref er-
ral and Di s~osit ion 
(Monthsi 2 .261 2.638 1.669 1. 336 
Referred b~ 
Law Enforcement 
Agency 16 66 30 57 
88.9% 90.4% 85.7% 75.0% 
School 1 2 
1.4% 5.7% 
Social Agency 2 
2.6% 
Probation Officer 1 l 9 
1.4% 2.9% 11.8% 
Parents/Relatives 4 l 6 
5.5% 2.9% 7.9% 
Other Sources 2 l 2 
11. 1 % 1.4% 2.9% 2.6% 
Prior Referrals ( 1977) 
0 8 50 26 37 
44.4% 68.5% 74.3% 48.7% 
1 7 16 8 18 
38.9% 21. 9% 22.9% 23.7% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Prior Referrals 
{1977) (Cont. ) 
2 2 2 1 11 
11. 1 % 2.7% 2.9% 14.5% 
3 1 2 3 
5.6% 2.7% 3.9% 
4 2 2 
2.7% 2.6% 




-x 0. 778 0.534 0.629 0.945 
Prior-Referrals -
Before 1977 
0 4 45 25 23 
22.2% 61. 6% 71.4% 30.3% 
1 2 8 5 13 
11. 1 % 11.0% 14.3% 17. 1 % 
2 2 5 14 
11. 1% 6.8% 2.9% 18.4% 
3 2 6 2 11 
11. 1 % 8.2% 5.7% 14.5% 
4 2 5 1 5 
11. 1 % 6.8% 2.9% 6.6% 
5 3 1 1 7 
16.7% 1.4% 2.9% 9.2% 
6 2 
1.4% 2.6% 
7 1 1 1 
5.6% 1.4% 1. 3% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Prior Referrals -












Overnight 4 47 27 26 
22.2% 64.4% 77. 1 % 34.2% 
Jail/Police Station 2 
11. 1 % 
Detention 12 26 8 49 
66.7% 35.6% 22.9% 64.5% 




Manslaughter 2 1 
11. 1 % 1.4% 1. 3% 




Robbery 5 6 
27.8% 7.9% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Reason Ref erred 
Aggravated Assault 1 6 4 
5.6% 8.2% 5.3% 
Other Assault 1 1 
2.9% 1. 3% 
Burglary 5 11 9 8 
27.8% 15.1% 25.7% 10.5% 
Auto Theft 1 6 2 7 
5.6% 8. 2% 5.7% 9.2% 
Shoplifting 4 1 0 
5.2% 2.9% 
Larceny 1 11 8 3 
5.6% 15. 1 % J 22.9% 3.4% 
Sex Offenses 1 
1.3% 
Narcotics 8 3 2 
11.0% 8.6% 2.6% 
Drunkenness 2 J 2 
2. n& 2.6% 
Federal Offenses 1 
5.6% 
Receiving Stolen 
Goods 1 2 3 
5.6% 2.7% 8.6% 
Glue Sniffing 
1.4% 
Forgery 1 3 1 2 
5.6% 4. 1% 2.9% 2.6% 
Violation of 
Probation 1 6 
1.4% 2.9% 7.9% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Reason Ref erred (Cont.) 
Miscellaneous 2 1 4 
2.7% 2.9% 5.3% 
Running Away 5 15 
6.8% 19.7% 
Truancy 1 2 1 
1.4% 5.7% 1. 3% 
Ungovernability 9 3 10 




Years of Schooling Com-
pleted 
-x 9.60 9.04 8.32 8.470 
Minimum 7.00 4.00 5.00 1.00 
Maximum 11.00 12.00 12.00 12. 00 
Living Arrngement of 
Child 
Both Parents 2 31 14 25 
11. 1 % 42.5% 40.0% 32.9% 
Mother and Stepfather 4 12 3 17 
22.2% 16. 4% 8.6% 22.4% 
Father and Stepmother 4 2 4 
5.5% 5.7% 5.3% 
Mother Only 11 17 13 18 
61. 1 % 23.3% 37. 1% 23.6% 
Father Only 4 5 
5.5% 6.6% 
119 
TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Living ArranJement of 
Child (Cont. 
Home of Relatives 1 4 1 4 
5.6% 5.5% 2.9% 5.2% 
In Institution 1 2 
2.9% 2.6% 




Marital Status of 
Natural Parents 
Parents Together 2 31 15 27 
11. 1 % 42.5% 42.9% 35.5% 
Father Dead 1 5 2 3 
5.6% 6.8% 5.7% 3.9% 
Mother Dead 3 
1. 4% 3.9% 
Divorced/Separated 11 34 16 40 
61. 1% 46.6% 45.7% 52. 6% 
Other 1 1 
5.6% 2.9% 
Parents Not Married 
to Each Other 3 2 1 3 
16.7% 2.7% 2.9% 3.9% 
Famil.}:'. Income 
Public Assistance 3 7 7 5 
16. 7% 9.6% 20.0% 6.6% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
Famill Income (Cont.) 
Under $3,000 1 1 7 
5.6% 1.4% 9.2% 
$3,000 - $4,999 l 2 1 
5.6% 2.7% 1. 3% 
$5,000 - $9,999 7 17 7 19 
38.9% 23.3% 20.0% 25.0% 
$10,ooo and Over 2 31 14 14 
11. 1 % 42.5% 40.0% 18.4% 
Unknown 4 15 7 30 
22.2% 20.5% 20.0% 39.5% 
Father's OccuEation 
Unemployed/Unskilled 1 6 3 10 
5.6% 8.2% 8.6% 13.2% 
Working Class (plumber, 9 32 12 31 
carpenter, assembly- 50.0% 43.8% 34.3% 40.7% 
line worker, etc.) 
White Collar (sales, 3 16 6 8 
clerical personnel, 16.7% 21.9% 17. 1 % 10.5% 
etc.) 
Professional (physician, 4 4 5 
attorney, manager, 5.5% 11.4% 6.6% 
etc.) 
Unknown 5 15 10 22 
27.8% 20.5% 28.6% 28.9% 
Mother's OccuEation 
Unemployed/Unskilled 2 7 3 13 
11. 1 % 9.6% 8.6% 17. 1 % 
Working Class (plumber, 8 18 5 23 
carpenter, assembly- 44.4% 24.7% 14.3% 30.3% 
line worker, etc.) 
White Collar (sales, 4 17 14 9 
clerical personnel, 22.2% 23.3% 40.0% 11. 8% 
etc.) 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable 




Professional (physician, 1 1 3 
attorney, etc.) 1. 4% 2.9% 3.9% 
Housewife 4 24 10 25 
22.2% 32.9% 28.6% 32. 9% 
Unknown 6 2 3 
8.2% 5.7% 3.9% 
Age at First Arrest/ 
Referral 
2 2 2 
2.7% 2.6% 
7 1 1 
1.4% 2.9% 
10 1 1 
1. 4% 2.9% 
11 2 3 
2.7% 3.9% 
12 4 4 3 2 
22.2% 5.5% 8.6% 2.6% 
13 3 1 5 16 
16.7% 1.4% 14.3% 21. l % 
14 1 5 4 13 
5.6% 6.8% 11.4% 17. 1 % 
15 2 16 6 13 
11. 1 % 21. 9% 17. 1 % 17. 1 % 
16 3 24 10 24 
16. 7% 32.9% 28.6% 31.6% 
17 5 17 5 3 




TABLE II (Continued) 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 






-x 5. 611 1. 863 1. 143 2. 991 
No. of Previous 
Probations 
0 12 60 28 50 
66.7% 82.2% 80.0% 65.7% 
5 11 6 17 
27.8% 15. 1 % 17. 1 % 22.4% 
2 1 1 8 
5.6% 1.4% 2.9% 1o.5% 
3 1 1 
1.4% 1. 3% 
-x 0.389 0.219 0.229 0.436 
No. of Previous Insti-
tutionalizations 
0 8 67 34 42 
44.4% 91.8% 97. 1% 55.3% 
7 4 1 23 
38.9% 5.5% 2.9% 30.3% 
2 2 2 7 
11. 1 % 2.7% 9.2% 





TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
No. of Previous Insti-
tutionalizations (Cont.) 
-x 0. 778 o. 110 0.229 0.500 
Len9th of Su~ervision 
(Months) 
-x 1.683 2.562 5.431 5.273 
No. of Previous Status 
Offenses 
0 12 67 30 9 
66.7% 91.8% 85.7% 11. 8% 
l 3 4 5 30 
16.7% 5.5% 14.3% 39.5% 
2 l 2 18 
5.6% 2.7% 23.7% 
3 l 16 





-x 0. 778 0.452 0.143 1. 711 
No. of Previous De-
linguenc~ Offenses 
0 2 42 24 28 
11. l % 57.5% 68.6% 36.8% 
3 10 6 12 
16.7% 13.7% 17. 1% 15. 7% 
2 2 10 12 
11. 1 % 13.7% 15. 7% 
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TABLE II (Continued) 
Variable Disposition 
Criminal Dismissed Probation Institution 
Court 
No. of Previous De-
linguenc~ Offenses (Cont.) 
3 1 3 1 10 
5.6% 4. 1 % 2.9% 13.2% 
4 3 1 5 
16.7% 2. 9% 6.6% 
5 2 1 2 2 
11. 1 % 1.4% 5.7% 2.6% 
6 1 4 
5.6% 5.2% 
7 1 3 2 
5.6% 4. 1% 2.6% 
8 1 3 1 









-x 4.667 1. 356 1. 000 1. 818 
Time Between First and 
Second Offense {Months) 
-x 8.050 3.766 4. 520 4.507 
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The majority of both sexes had no prior referrals during the 
year, with 60.3% of the males and 58.8% of the females in that cate-
gory. The average number of referrals during 1977 was similar for 
the sexes, with the females having a slightly higher average (0.863 
to 0.675 for males). 
Males had a higher number of average referrals before 1977 (1.722) 
and a much greater range of prior referrals (0-11) than did females 
(1.059 and 0-5), indicating a greater delinquent history for the males. 
Slightly less than half of both groups, however, had no prior refer-
rals (males 47.7% and females 49.0%). 
Slightly over half of the males (54.3%) and slightly less than 
half of the females (43.1%) experienced no detention or overnight care. 
Interestingly, only 1.3% of the males were kept in a jail or police 
station overnight, yet 54.9% of the females were detained there. No 
females were placed in detention, but 44.4% of the males were--indica-
tive of a major difference in handling. 
In examining the reasons for referral, some striking differences 
were observed. Males were far more likely to be referred for delin-
quent offenses, while females were far more likely to be referred for 
status offenses. The greatest percentage of males were referred for 
burglary (19.9%), followed by larceny (13 .. 2%). All of the referrals 
for murder and non-negligent manslaughter, forcible rape, sex offenses, 
drunkenness, federal offenses, and glue sniffing were males. The 
greatest number of females, on the other hand, were referred for un-
governable behavior (27.5%) and running away (21.6%), indicating either 
differential enforcement or a difference in the nature of offenses 
committed. A total of 13.3% of the males were referred to the court 
for status offenses, compared to 55.0% of the females. 
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For the category of years of schooling completed, there was very 
little difference between the sexes. The males had a mean of 8.689 
years compared to 8.333 years for the females. 
The data on living arrangement indicated that females were far 
more likely to live with both parents (51.0%) than were males (30.5%). 
A large percentage of both groups lived with mothers only (males, 
29.8% and females, 27.5%). Males were more likely to live with mother 
and stepfather (19.2%) than were females (13.7%). No females lived 
with father only or in the home of relatives. 
Similar to the findings on living arrangement, females were more 
likely to have their parents together (51.0%) than were males (32.5%). 
Both groups had high rates of divorce or separation, with the major-
ity of males (53.6% and 39.2% of the females) coming from homes of 
this type. Also, a greater percentage of males (60.0%) than females 
(2.0%) came from homes in which their parents were not married to 
each other. The data from both living arrangement and marital status 
of natural parents together indicated that males were far more likely 
to come from structurally disrupted homes than were the females. 
For family income, again, the large number of cases in which in-
come was unknown makes it difficult to generalize. However, it seems 
that the males and females were relatively similar in family income, 
with the males having a slight tendency to come from lower income homes. 
Both sexes were very similar on the variable of father's occupa-
tion. About 41% of themales and females had working-class fathers, 
with the other occupational categories being very similar. Regarding 
mother's occupation, males and females were again very similar, with 
only the minor exceptions of the unemployed/unskilled and white-collar 
categories. Females were a little more likely than males to have 
mothers in the unemployed/unskilled category, while males were 
slightly more likely to have mothers with white-collar occupations. 
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There was not much difference between the sexes on age at first 
arrest/referral. The mean ages were similar (14.780 for males and 
14.471 for females). Males had the greatest age range, from 2 to 18, 
while all the females except one were within the age range from 11 to 
17. 
Males had the highest number of previous dispositions (x=2.801), 
while females had an average of 1.980 dispositions each, though approx-
imately one-third of each sex had no previous dispositions. None of 
the females had more than seven previous dispositions, while 16 males 
had eight or more; the highest being 18 previous dispositions. 
The males had an average of 0.377 previous probations compared 
to 0. 196 for the females. A large majority of both sexes (72.2% of 
males and 80.4% of females) had no previous probations. One previous 
probation was the highest for females, while two males had three 
previous probations. 
There was virtually no difference in the number of previous in-
stitutionalizations, though females had a slightly higher average 
(0.932 compared to 0.351 for males). About three~fourths of both 
sexes had never been previously institutionalized, with no females 
having more than three, or males more than four, previous 
institutionalizations. 
Both sexes had virtually identical lengths of supervision, with 
females having a slightly longer average of 4.598 months compared to 
4.542 months for males. 
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Females had a mich higher number of status offenses than did 
males, with an average of 1.216 previous offenses compared to 0.616 
for males. The majority of males (63.6%) had no prior status of-
fenses, while less than half of the females (43.1%) had none. Ex-
cept for one subject, the greatest number of prior status offenses 
for males was three, while four females (7.8%) had previously com-
mitted four status offenses. The data for prior delinquent offenses 
indicated very different findings than those for prior status of-
fenses. Males had a much higher average for previous delinquent of-
fenses (2. 146) than did females (0.706). None of the females had a 
record of more than five prior delinquent offenses, while 20 of the 
males (13.4%) had six or more, the highest being 17 previous delin-
quent offenses. The majority of females (64.7%) had no prior delin-
quent offenses, while only 41.7% of the males did so. 
There was very little difference between the sexes in the time 
between the first and second offenses. The mean for males was 4.912 
months and for females it was 4.212 months (see Table III for a pre-
sentation of Demographic Profile by Sex). 
Profile by Offense 
The delinquent offenders had a higher mean age at referral (15.766) 
than the status offenders (14.922). The lowest age at referral was for 
a delinquent, age 10, and the highest was for one person referred as 
a delinquent at age 19. 
The vast majority of delinquents were males (85.1%), while the 
majority of status offenders were females (58.3%). In tenns of race, 
the majority of delinquents (81.2%) and status offenders (84.4%) were 
Variable 
TABLE III 
DEMOGRAPHIC PROFILE BY SEX 
Males 


















































TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
Time Between Referral 
and Dis~os1t1on 
x (Months) 2. 111 1.169 
Ref erred b,l'. 
Law Enforcement Agency 132 37 
87.4% 72.5% 
School 2 l 
1.3% 2.0% 
Social Agency 1 1 
0.7% 2.0% 
Probation Officer 7 4 
4.6% 7.8% 
Parents/Relatives 4 7 
2.6% 13.7% 
Other Source 5 1 
3.3% 2.0% 
Prior Referrals - 1977 
0 91 30 
60.3% 58.8% 
1 38 11 
25.2% 21.5% 
2 11 5 
7.3% 9.8% 
3 5 1 
3.3% 2.0% 
4 3 1 
2.0% 2.0% 




-x 0.675 0.863 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 
0 72 25 
47.7% 49.0% 
17 11 
11. 1 % 21.6% 
2 15 7 
9.9% 13.7% 
3 17 4 
11. 3% 7.8% 
4 10 3 
6.6% 5.9% 













x 1.722 1. 059 
Care Pending DisQosition 
No Detention/Overnight 82 22 
54.3% 43. 1% 
Jail/Police Station 2 28 




TABLE III (Continued) 




Other Place 1 
2.0% 




Neg. Manslaughter 1 
0.7% 
Forcible Rape 1 
0.7% 
Robbery 10 1 
6.6% 2.0% 
Aggravated Assault 10 1 
6.6% 2.0% 
Assault 1 1 
0. 7% 2.0% 
Burglary 30 3 
19. 9% 5.9% 
Auto Theft 15 1 
9.9% 2.0% 
Shoplifting 3 2 
2.0% 3.9% 
Larceny 20 3 
13.2% 5.9% 
Sex Offenses 1 
0.7% 





TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
Reason Ref erred (Cont.) 
Federal Offenses 1 
0.7% 
Receiving Stolen Goods 5 1 
3.3% 2.0% 
Glue Sniffing 1 
0.7% 
Forgery 4 3 
2.6% 5.9% 
Violation of Probation 5 3 
3.3% 5.9% 
Miscellaneous 6 1 
4.0% 2.0% 
Running Away 9 11 
6.0% 21.6% 
Truancy 2 2 
1. 3% 3.9% 





Years of Schooling Com~ 
~leted 
-x 8.689 8.333 
Living Arrangement of Child 
Parents Together 49 26 
32.5% 51.0% 
Father Dead 9 2 
6.0% 3.9% 
Mother Dead 2 2 
l.3% 3.9% 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
Living Arrangement of Child 
(Cont.) 




Parents Not Married to 
Each Other 9 1 
6. 0% . 2.0% 
Family Income 
Public Assistance 18 4 
11. 9% 7.8% 
Under $3,000 7 2 
4.6% 3.9% 
$3,000 - $4,999 2 2 
1. 3% 3.9% 
$5,000 - $9,999 41 9 
27.2% 17.6% 
$10,000 and Over 43 18 
28.5% 35.3% 
Unknown 40 16 
26.5% 31.4% 
Father's Occueation 
Unemployed/Unskilled 15 5 
9.9% 9.8% 
Working Class (plumber, 62 21 
carpenter, assembly- 41.7% 41.2% 
line worker, etc.) 
White Collar (sales, cler- 25 8 
ical personnel, etc. 16. 6% 15.7% 
Professional (physician, 10 3 
attorney, manager, etc.) 6.6¢ 5.9% 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Male Female 
Father's Occu~ation (Cont.) 
Unknown 38 14 
25.2% 27.5% 
Mother's Occu~ation 
Unemployed/Unskilled 17 8 
11. 3% 15.7% 
Working Class (plumber, 40 14 
carpenter, assembly-
line worker, etc.) 
26.5% 27.5% 
White Collar (sales, cler- 35 9 
ical personnel, etc.) 23.2% 17.6% 
Professional (physician, 3 2 
attorney, manager, etc.) 2.0% 3.9% 
Housewife 47 16 
31. 1% 31.4% 
Unknown 9 2 
Age at First Arrest/ 5.9% 3.9% 
Referral 






11 4 1 
2.6% 2.0% 
12 9 4 
6.0% 7.8% 
13 17 8 
11 . 3% 15. 7% 
14 16 7 
10.6% 13.7% 
15 26 11 
17.2% 21.6% 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
Age at First Arrest/ 
Referral (Cont.) 
16 48 13 
31.8% 25.5% 
17 24 6 





-x 14.780 14.471 
No. of Previous Dis-
positions 




2 22 7 
14.6% 13.7% 
3 13 7 
8.6% 13.7% 
4 14 3 
9.3% 5.9% 
5 11 5 
7.3% 9.8% 
6 5 2 
3.3% 3.9% 







TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 









0.7% -x 2. 801 l. 980 
No. of Previous Pro-
bat ions 
0 109 41 
72. 2% 80.4% 
1 29 10 





-x 0. 377 0. 196 
No. of Previous Institu-
tionalizations 
0 114 37 
75.5% 72.5% 
26 9 
17.2% 17. 6% 
2 7 4 
4.6% 7.8% 
3 3 l 
2.0% 2.0% 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Male Female 





x 0.351 0. 392 
Length of Sueervision 
(Months J 
-x· 4.542 4.598 
No. of Previous Status 
Offenses 
0 96 22 
63.6% 43. 1 % 
1 30 12 
19.9% 23.5% 
2 15 5 
9.9% 9.8% 







x 0.616 l.216 
No. of Previous Delinguent 
Off ens es 
0 63 33 
41.7% 64.7% 
l 22 9 
14. 6% 17.6% 
2 19 5 
12.6% 9.8% 
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TABLE III (Continued) 
Variable Males Females 
No. of Previous Delinguent 
Offenses (Cont.) 
3 14 1 
9.3% 2.0% 
4 8 1 
5.3% 2.0% 
















-x 2. 146 0.706 
Time Between First and 
Second Offense ~Months) 
-x 4.912 4.212 
white, with the majority of blacks and the vast majority of Indians 
being delinquent offenders. Only one Indian youth was referred as 
a status offender. 
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The delinquent offenders had a much greater mean length of time 
between referral and disposition than did the status offenders. The 
average time for delinquents was 2.177 months, compared to 0.943 
months for status offenders. 
The majority of both delinquents and status offenders were re-
ferred by law enforcement agencies. Of the delinquents, 90.3% were 
so referred, as were 62.5% of the status offenders. None of the de-
1 inquents were referred by parents or relatives, while 22.9% of 
the status offenders were. 
Most of the delinquents and status offenders had no prior re-
ferrals during 1977. Approximately the same percentage of both groups 
had one 1977 referral (23.4% of delinquents and 27.1% of the status 
offenders). Though one delinquent had the highest number of 1977 
referrals (six), the status offenders had a higher average number of 
referrals during the year (0.922 compared to 0.649 for the delinquents). 
Prior to 1977, slightly below a majority of the delinquents 
(47.4%) had no previous referrals, compared to exactly one-half of 
the status offenders. There were no status offenders with more than 
four referrals~ yet 21 of the delinquents had five prior referrals or 
more, the greatest number being 11. 
Interestingly, over half of the delinquents (55.8%) received no 
overnight detention, while only 37.5% of the status offenders did not. 
And, 60.4% of the status offenders were kept in juvenile detention 
while 42.9% of the delinquents were kept in juvenile detention. 
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For status offenders, the mode for disposition was to a public 
agency (35.3%), while delinquents were fairly evenly divided among 
dismissed: not proved (20.1%), public agency (20.1%), and probation 
(19.5%). Not surprisingly, no status offenders were sent to the 
criminal court, while 11.7% of the delinquents were. Also, as ex-
pected, a lower percentage of the status offenders were placed on 
probation (10.4%) and a higher percentage were sent to a private 
agency (14.6%) compared to the delinquents (19.5% and 1.9%). 
There was virtually no difference in the average number of years 
in school, with the delinquents having a slightly higher mean of 8.772 
compared to 8.079 for the status offenders. 
Approximately the same percentage of delinquents (35.1%) and 
status offenders (37.5%) lived with both parents and with mother only 
(29.2% of both groups}. There seems to be no major difference in liv-
ing arrangements between the two groups, though both subjects who had 
"independent living" were delinquents. 
For marital status of natural parents there were, again, very 
similar findings between the two groups. For the delinquents, 37.0% 
had both natural parents together compared to 37.5% of the status of-
fenders. Likewise, 48.7% of the delinquents had parents who were 
divorced or separated, while 54.2% of the status offenders did so. 
As before, it is difficult to generalize from the data on family 
income because so many were unknown. But the data tend to indicate 
little difference between the delinquents and the status offenders 
on this variable. A small percentage of both groups were on public 
assistance and approximately one-third (29.9% of delinquents and 
31.3% of status offenders) came from families earning $10,000 or 
more a year. 
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Again, because of the large number of unknown cases, generaliz-
ing about father's occupation is somewhat difficult, but the data 
indicate that the greatest percentage from both groups came from 
working class homes. For the delinquents, 40.3% had fathers with 
working class occupations while 45.8% of the status offenders did so. 
A small percentage of both groups (6.5% of delinquents and 6.3% of 
status offenders) had fathers with professional occupations. A rela-
tively small percentage (9.7% of delinquents and 10.4% of status of-
fenders) had fathers who were unemployed or unskilled. 
For mother's occupation, the greatest number of subjects had 
mothers who were housewives (30.5% of delinquents and 33.3% of status 
offenders). A large percentage also had mothers with working class 
(24.7% of delinquents and 33.3% of status offenders) or white collar 
jobs (23.4% of delinquents and 16.7% of status offenders). Inter-
estingly, a greater percentage of delinquents had white collar mothers, 
while a greater percentage of status offenders had mothers in working 
class occupations. 
The average age at first arrest or referral for the delinquents 
was 14.824 compared to a similar age of 14.353 for status offenders. 
The range was similar for both groups, and both had most referrals be-
tween the ages of 15 to 17. 
The delinquents had a higher average number of previous disposi-
tions (2.747) than did the status offenders (2.000) and a much greater 
range (0 to 18 for delinquents and 0 to 8 for the status offenders). 
Only one status offender had more than five previous dispositions. 
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The mode for both groups was no previous dispositions (35.1% of delin-
quents and 27.1% of status offenders). 
The delinquents had a higher average number of previous probations 
(0.377) than the status offenders (0.176). But the great majority of 
both groups (72.1% of delinquents and 81.2% of status offenders) had 
no previous probations. 
Also, most of the subjects had no previous institutionalizations 
(76.6% of delinquents and 72.9% of status offenders). The status 
offenders did have a slightly higher average number of previous insti-
tutionalizations (0.412) than did the delinquents (0.344). It is 
evident, though, that there is no real difference between the groups--
most have no previous institutionalization experience. 
The length of supervision for both groups was virtually identical 
with a x of 4.557 for delinquents and 4.684 months for status offenders. 
The data do indicate something of a consistency in the type of 
offense committed. The status offenders had a higher average number 
of previous status offenses (l.373) than did the delinquents (0.552). 
The majority of delinquents (66.9%) had no previous status offenses, 
while only 31.3% of the status offenders had none. 
As with prior status offenses, the data on previous delinquent 
offenses indicate a tendency for the subjects to commit the same type 
of offense. The majority of status offenders (6617%) had no previous 
delinquent offenses compared to 41.6% of the delinquents. The delin-
quents had a much higher average number of delinquent offenses (2.130) 
than did the status offenders (0.647). Likewise, the range of pre-
vious delinquent offenses for the delinquents (0 to 17) was much 
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greater than that for the status offenders (0 to 6). Only one status 
offender had more than three previous delinquent offenses. 
Taken together, the data on previous offenses indicate that the 
offenders tended to repeat the same types of offenses. The delin-
quents were far more likely to have committed previous delinquent 
offenses and with greater frequency than were the status offenders. 
On the other hand, the status offenders were far more likely to have 
committed previous and more frequent status offenses. 
Finally, the delinquents had a longer average period of time 
(5.164 months) between the first and second offenses than did the 
status offenders (3.278 months) (see Table IV for a presentation of 
Demographic Profile by Offense). 
Hypothesis-Testing 
Hypothesis 1 
The first hypothesis stated that there is a significant difference 
in the disposition of younger and older offenders. Based on the data 
in Table V, there is a significant difference in the disposition of of-
fenders according to age. Aside from criminal court dispositions, the 
data indicate that younger offenders tend to receive a harsher descrip-
tion than do older ones. Only one person under age 15 was sent to 
the criminal court for prosecution compared to 17 age 16 and over. 
Older offenders were more likely to have their cases dismissed than 
were younger ones, while younger offenders were far more likely to be 
placed on probation and to be institutionalized. Generally, then, the 
data from Table V indicate that, except for criminal court referrals, 
Variable 
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l. 9% 2.0% 
0.6% 
15.766 14. 922 
131 20 




81. 2% 85.4% 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Offenders 
Prior Referrals - 1977 
(Cont.) 
4 3 
1. 9% 2.0% 
5 2 3 
l. 3% 6.0% 
6 
0.6% 
-x 0.649 0.922 
Prior Referrals - Before 
1977 




2 16 6 
10.4% 12.5% 
3 15 6 
9.7% 12.5% 












TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable 









Di spas it ion 
Criminal Court 






















































TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Off enders 
Years of Schooling Com-
pleted 
-x 8.772 8.079 
Living Arrangement of Child 
Both Parents 54 18 
35. 1 % 37.5% 
Mother and Stepfather 25 11 
16. 2% 22.9% 
Father and Stepmother 9 1 
5.8% 2.0% 
Mother Only 45 14 
29.2% 29.2% 
Father Only 7 2 
4.5% 4.0% 
Home of Relatives 9 1 
5.8% 2.0% 
In Institution 2 
1. 3% 2.0% 




Marital Status of Natural 
Parents 
Parents Together 57 18 
37.0% 37.5% 
Father Dead 11 
7. 1% 
Mother Dead 2 2 
1. 3% 4.0% 
Divorced/Separated 75 26 
48. 7% 54.2% 
151 
TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Off enders 




Parents Not Married to 
Each Other 7 2 
4.5% 4.0% 
Famil,l'. Income 
Public Assistancw 18 4 
11.7% 8.0% 
Under $3,000 7 2 
4.5% 4.0% 
$3,000 - $4,999 1 3 
0.6% 6.3% 
$5,000 - $9,999 40 10 
26.0% . 20.8% 
$10,000 and Over 46 15 
29.9% 31.3% 
Unknown 42 14 
27.3% 29.2% 
Father's Occupation 
Unemplo¥ed/Unskilled 15 5 
9.7% 10.4% 
Working Class 62 22 
40.3% 45.8% 
White Collar 28 5 
18.2% 10. 4% 
Professional 10 3 
6.5% 
Unknown 39 13 
25.3% 27. 1% 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Offenders 
Mother's Occupation 
Unemployed/Unskilled 19 6 
12.3% 12.5% 
Working Class 38 16 
24.7% 33.3% 
White Collar 36 8 
23.4% 16. 7% 
Professional 3 2 
l. 9% 4.2% 




Age at First Arrest/ 
Referral 




10 1 1 
0.6% 2.0% 
11 4 1 
2.6% 2.0% 
12 11 2 
7. 1 % 4.2% 
13 16 9 
10.4% 18.8% 
14 18 5 
11.7% 10.4% 
15 24 13 
15. 6% 27. 1 % 
16 47 14 
30.5% 29. 2% 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Offenders 
Age at First Arrest/ 
Referral (Cont. ) 
16 47 14 
30.5% 29.2% 






-x 14.824 14.353 
No. of Previous Dis-
positions 
0 54 13 
35. l % 27. 1 % 
19 7 
12.3% 16.0% 
2 20 9 
13. 0% 18.8% 
3 11 9 
7. l % 18. 8% 
4 13 4 
8.4% 8.3% 
5 11 5 










TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Off enders 










-x 2.747 2.000 
No. of Previous Probations 
0 111 39 
72. 1 % 81.2% 
30 9 
19. 5% 18.8% 
2 11 
7. 1 % 
3 2 
1. 3% 
-x 0.377 0. 176 
No. of Previous Institu-
t ion a 1 i zat ions 
0 118 35 
76.6% 72.9% 
l 24 12 
15. 6% 25.0% 
2 8 3 
5.2% 6.3% 
3 3 1 
1. 9% 2.0% 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Offenders 




-x 0.344 0.412 
Length of SuEervision 
(MonthsJ 
-x 4.457 4.684 
No. of Previous Status 
Offenses 




2 8 12 
5.2% 25.0% 
3 9 8 
5.8% 16. 7% 




-x 0.552 l. 373 
No. of Previous Del in-
guent Offenses 
0 64 32 
41.6% 66.7% 
1 23 8 
14. 9% 16.7% 
2 21 3 
13. 6% 6.3% 
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TABLE IV (Continued) 
Variable Delinquents Status Offenders 
No. of Previous Delin-
Quent Offenses \Cont.) 
3 11 4 



















-x 2.130 0.647 
Time Between First and 
Second Offense {Months) 
-x 5. 164 3.278 
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younger offenders appear to receive a more severe disposition than 
do older offenders. 
TABLE V 
AGE AND DISPOSITION FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
Younger l 28 23 37 89 
(Under 16) l.1% 31.5% 25.8% 41.6% 
Older (16 17 45 14 37 113 
and Over) 15.0% 39.8% 12.4% 32.7% 
18 73 37 74 
x2=17.7697; 3df; P=0.0005 
When examining the data on age and disposition for delinquents 
only (Table VI), again there is a significant difference. Again, 
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only one person under age 16 was referred to the criminal court. Also, 
as in the data for the total sample, a higher percentage of older of-
fenders had their cases dismissed and a higher percentage of younger 
offenders were placed on probation. However, for the delinquents, a 
slightly higher percentage of older offenders were institutionalized 
in comparison to younger offenders. 
The data in Table VII indicate no significant difference in 
dispositions for status offenders according to age. A much higher 
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TABLE VI 
AGE ANO DISPOSITION FOR DELINQUENTS 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
Younger 1 28 20 16 56 
(Under 16) 1.8% 33.9% 35.7% 28.6% 
Older (16 17 39 12 30 98 
and Over) 17.3% 39.8% 12.2% 30.6% 
18 58 32 46 154 
x2=17.2048; 3df; P=0.0006 
TABLE VII 
AGE AND DISPOSITION FOR STATUS OFFENDERS 
Dismissed Probation Institution 
Younger 9 3 21 
(Under 16) 27.3% 9. 1 % 63.6% 
Older (16 6 2 7 
and Over) 40.0% 13.3% 46.7% 
15 5 28 
x2=1.22182; 2df; P=0.54 






percentage of older offenders had their cases dismissed; also, a 
slightly higher percentage of older offenders were placed on proba-
tion. However, a higher percentage of younger offenders were insti-
tutiona1ized. None of the status offenders were referred to the 
criminal court. The data on these variables may be misleading; 50% 
of the cells in the table have an expected frequency below five. 
By further collapsing the data on age and disposition of status 
offenders into the categories of other dispositions and institution-
alizations, there again is no significant difference (Table VIII). 
Though a higher percentage of older offenders received other disposi-
tions and a higher percentage of younger offenders were institution-
alized, the difference is not statistically significant. Therefore, 
the conclusion must be that, for status offenders, there is no sig-






AGE AND DISPOSITION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 











Generally, these results support the hypothesis of a difference 
in dispositions according to age. Likewise, they tend to support the 
conflict assumption that the less powerful (younger offenders) tend 
to receive harsher treatment under the law, and are consistent with 
the findings of Wheeler and Nichols (1977). However, the findings 
also indicate that much of the statistical significance stems from the 
delinquent sample. To a great extent, the statistically significant 
difference in dispositions between younger and older offenders is for 
delinquents. However, for both groups, a substantive difference 
appears to exist. 
Hypothesis 2 
The second hypothesis tested was that there is a significant dif-
ference in the disposition of male and female offenders. The findings 
for this hypothesis are presented in Table IX. 
TABLE IX 
SEX AND DISPOSITION OF ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
18 53 29 51 151 
Male 11. 9% 35. l 19. 2% 33.8% 
20 8 23 51 
Female 39.2% 15. 7% 45.1% 
18 73 37 74 202 
x2=7.8503; 3df; P=0.05 
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The data indicate a significant difference in the disposition 
of cases based upon sex. All of the cases referred to the criminal 
court were males and a slightly higher percentage of females had 
their cases dismissed than did males. A higher percentage of males 
were placed on probation than were females. However, a much higher 
percentage of females were institutionalized. 
When the data on sex and disposition are examined for delinquents 
only (Table X), there is no significant difference. A higher per-
centage of female delinquents had their cases dismissed. Slightly 
more females were placed on probation and nearly identical percent-
ages of male and female delinquents were institutionalized. How-
ever, 25% of the cells in Table X have an expected frequency below 
five. 
TABLE X 
SEX AND DISPOSITION OF DELINQUENTS 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
18 48 26 39 131 
Male 13. 7% 36.6% 19. 8% 29.8% 
10 6 7 23 
Female 43.5% 26. 1 % 30.4% 
18 58 32 46 154 
x2=3.77260; 3df; P=0.29 
Note: More than 20% of the cells have an expected frequency be-
low five. 
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As indicated in Table XI, after the data on sex and disposition 
have been collapsed, no significant difference is indicated. A higher 
percentage of females were referred to other dispositions~ while the 
institutionalizations remain virtually identical. 
TABLE XI 
SEX AND DISPOSITION OF DELINQUENTS 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 
Criminal Court Other Dispositions Institution 
18 74 39 
Male 13.7% 56.5% 29.8% 
16 7 
Female 59.6% 30.4% 
18 90 46 




For status offenders, there appears to be no significant differ-
ence in dispositions by sex. As Table XII indicates, among males, 
25% had their cases dismissed, 15% were placed on probation, and 60% 
were institutionalized. For females, 36% had their cases dismissed, 
7% were placed on probation, and 52% were sent to institutions. 
Again, though, a large number of cells (33.3%) had an expected fre-
quency below five. 
TABLE XII 
SEX AND DISPOSITION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 
Dismissed Probation Institution 
5 3 12 
Male 25.0% 15. 0% 60.0% 
Male 
10 2 16 
Female 35.7% 7. l % 57. l % 
15 5 28 
x2=1.1363; 2df; P=0.57 
Note: More than 20% of the cells have an expected frequency 
below five. 
When the data on sex and disposition for status offenders are 





Male and female status offenders appear to receive similar dispositions. 
One finding which is evident, however, is that there appears to be a 
tendency to institutionalize status offenders generally. 
Though there was a significant difference in dispositions accord-
: ing to sex for the· total sample, when the data are examined carefully, 
they do not seem to substantiate the hypothesis. What seems to have 
occurred is that the difference observed in the tota 1 sample is pri-
marily a function of the relationship between sex and offense. The 
males were far more likely to be referred as delinquents while the fe-
males were far more likely to be referred as status offenders. So, the 
difference in dispositions is due to a difference in the referral rates 
of males and females to the two offense categories. These findings are 
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in agreement with those of Sussman (1977), Calaf (1974), Riback (1971), 
and Chesney-Line (1973, 1978). The results are also consistent with 
the conflict theory assumption of differential treatment for certain 
groups: there is a tendency for males and females to be referred for 
different reasons. 
TABLE XIII 
SEX AND DISPOSITION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 
Other Dispositions Institution 
8 12 
Male 40.0% 60.0% 
12 16 
Female 42.9% 57. 1 % 
20 28 





Hypothesis number three stated that there is a significant differ-
ence in the dispositions of white and non-white offenders. Based upon 
the data in Table XIV, there seems to be no significant difference in 
the disposition referrals of whites and non-whites. A higher percent-
age of non-whites were sent to the criminal court and a higher 
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percentage of whites had their cases dismissed. Also, non-whites had 
a slightly higher percentage of cases placed on probation and institu-
tionalized. But, the differences were not significant. 
TABLE XIV 
RACE AND DISPOSITION OF ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
13 63 30 60 166 
Hhite 7.8% 38.0% 18. 1% 36. l % 
5 10 7 14 36 
Non-White 13.9% 27.8% 19.4% 38.9% 
18 73 37 74 202 
x2=2.1s6s; 3df; P=0.54 
For delinquent offenders only, there is not a significant differ-
ence in dispositions according to race. Non-whites received slightly 
higher referral rates to criminal court ~nd to institutions, while 
whites had a much higher dismissal rate and an almost equal rate of 
probation referrals. Again, however, the differences were not statis-
tically significant (Table XV). 
Ament status offenders, as indicated in Table XVI, there is again 
no significant difference in dispositions by race. Whites had a 
slightly higher dismissal rate, non-whites had a higher rate of 
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probations, and both groups had almost equal rates of institutional-
ization. However, 66.6% of the cells had an expected frequency of 
1 ess than five. 
TABLE XV 
RACE AND DISPOSITION OF DELINQUENTS 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
13 50 26 36 
Hhite 10. 4% 40.0% 20.8% 28.8% 
5 8 6 10 
Non-White 17.2% 27.6% 20.7% 34.5% 
18 28 32 46 
x2=2. 1604; 3df; P=0.54 
TABLE XVI 
RACE ANO DISPOSITION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 
Dismissed Probation Institution 
13 4 24 
White 31.7% .• 9 .. 8% 58.5% 
2 1 4 
Non-White 28.6% 14.3% 57. 1 % 
15 28 
x2=o. 1386; 2df; P=0.93 









After further collapsing the data on race and disposition (Table 
XVII), there is still no significant difference. Non-white and white 
status offenders appear to receive very similar dispositions. Again, 
though, even after the data have been collapsed, 50% of the cells 
have an expected frequency below five, due to the small number of 




RACE AND DISPOSITION OF STATUS OFFENDERS 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 






x2=0.0048; ldf; P=0.94 





The results, then, did not support the hypothesis of differential 
dispositions according to race. These findings are inconsistent with 
the results of Reiss (1970) and Wheeler and Nichols (1974). They gen-
erally support consensus theory in that race does not seem to be an 
important variable in explaining different dispositions. 
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Hypothesis 4 
A major objective of this research project is the examination 
of treatment in the court according to offense category. Specifically, 
it is important to see if those persons referred to the juvenile court 
for violations of criminal law (delinquents) are treated differently 
than those referred to the court for violations of juvenile-only laws 
(status offenders). Table XVIII presents the findings for the fourth 
hypothesis that there is a significant difference in the dispositions 
of delinquents and status offenders. The data indicate a significant 
difference. 
TABLE XVIII 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
18 58 32 46 154 
Delinquents 11.7% 37.7% 20.8% 29.9% 
Status 15 5 28 48 
Off enders 31.3% 10.4% 58.3% 
18 73 37 74 202 
x2=16.2649; 3df; P=0.001 
169 
Aside from criminal court referrals, status offenders had a much 
greater tendency to receive harsher referrals than did delinquents. 
Similar percentages of both groups had their cases dismissed, but the 
status offenders were far less likely to receive a probation disposi-
tion and were far more likely to be institutionalized. Therefore, the 
evidence suggests significant differential treatment according to of-
fense, with criminal law violators receiving more lenient dispositions 
than those persons who violated juvenile-only laws. 
The question, however, is whether this difference remains when 
controlled by other important variables. Table XIX presents the find-
ings on offense and disposition for males only. As evidence by these 
data, there remains a significant difference in dispositions between 
male delinquents and status offenders. Again, aside from criminal 
court dispositions, there is a tendency for male status offenders to 
receive more severe dispositions than male delinquents. The delin-
quents had a higher rate of dismissed and probation dispositions while 
the status offenders had a higher percentage of institutionalizations. 
But, greater than 20% of the cells in Table XIX had an expected fre-
quency below five. Therefore, for proper interpretation, the data 
must be further collapsed. 
After collapsing the data on offense and disposition for males 
(Table XX), there remains a significant difference in dispositions 
between delinquents and status offenders. All criminal court disposi-
tions were delinquent and the delinquents had a higher percentage in 
the category of other dispositions. The status offenders, on the other 
hand, had a much higher percentage of institutionalizations. There-
fore, it seems that the original difference in dispositions between 
TABLE XIX 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF MALES 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
18 48 26 39 
Delinquents 13.7% 36.6% 19. 8% 29.8% 
Status 5 3 12 
Off enders 25.0% 15.0% 60.0% 
18 53 29 51 
X2=8.3247; 3df; P=0.04 
Note: More than 20% of the cells have an expected frequency 
below five. 
TABLE XX 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF MALES 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 
Criminal Court Other Dispositions 
18 74 
Delinquents 13.7% 56.5% 
Status 8 
Off enders 40.0% 
18 82 















delinquents and status offenders in the total sample holds true for 
males. 
The data in Table XX! indicate that there is not quite a signifi-
cant difference in dispositions for female delinquents and status of-
fenders (P=.08). The relative differences in dispositions, however, 
remain: a greater percentage of delinquents had their cases dismissed 
and a much greater percentage were placed on probation. On the other 
hand, a much higher percentage of status offenders were institutional-
ized. But, again, greater than 20% of the cells had an expected fre-
quency less than five. 
TABLE XX! 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF FEMALES 
Dismissed Probation Institution 
10 6 7 
Delinquents 43.5% 26.1% 30.4% 
Status 10 2 16 
Off enders 35.7% 7. 1% 57. 1 % 
20 8 23 
x2=5.0804; 2df; P=0.08 






When the data on offense and disposition are further collapsed 
(Table XXII), they indicate a significant difference in dispositions 
between female delinquents and status offenders. The majority of 
female delinquents received other dispositions, while the majority 
of female status offenders were institutionalized. Therefore, it 
seems that sex is not an important variable in determining the dis-
positions of delinquents and status offenders. 
TABLE XXII 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF FEMALES 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 
Other Dispositions Institution 
16 7 
Delinquents 69.6% 30.4% 
Status 12 16 
Off enders 42.9% 57 .1 % 
28 23 




For younger offenders, the data in Table XXIII again indicate a 
significant difference in dispositions between delinquents and status 
offenders. Only one younger delinquent was referred to the criminal 
court. Delinquents had a slightly higher percentage of dismissed 
cases and a much higher percentage of probations. Younger status 
offenders had a much higher percentage of dispositions to institu-
tions. However, again, more than 20% of the cells had an expected 





OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF YOUNGER OFFENDERS 
(UNDER 16) 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
1 19 20 16 
1.8% 33.9% 35.7% 28.6% 
9 3 21 
27.3% 9.1% 63.6% 
1 28 23 37 
x2=12. 7179; 3df; P=0.005 
Note: More than 20% of the cells have an expected frequency 





After collapsing the data on offense and disposition for younger 
offenders, Table XXIV indicates that a significant difference remains. 
Aside from the criminal court, the younger delinquent offenders were 
far more likely to receive other dispositions, while the younger 
status offenders were far more likely to be institutionalized. There-
fore, the significant difference in dispositions between delinquents 
and status offenders observed in the total sample seems to also be 






OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF YOUNGER OFFENDERS 
(UNDER 16) (COLLAPSED DATA) 
Criminal Court Other Dispositions Institution 
1 39 16 
1.8% 69.6% 28.6% 
12 21 
36.4% 63.6% 
1 51 37 




Table XXV presents the findings on offense and disposition for 
older offenders. As the data indicate, there is no significant differ-
ence in dispositions between older dlinquents and status offenders. 
Again, no status offenders were referred to the criminal court and 
there was virtually no difference in the dismissed and probation cat-
egories of delinquents and status offenders. Once again the status 
offenders had a greater tendency to be institutionalized. But, more 
than 20% of the cells had an expected frequency of less than five. 
When these data are collapsed, as indicated in Table XXVI, the 
difference remains non-significant. Criminal court referrals remain 
the same, and the difference for other dispositions is virtually non-
existent. Still, the status offenders had higher rates of institu-
tionalization. It appears, though, that the difference in dispositions 
between delinquents and status offenders found in the total sample 





OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF OLDER OFFENDERS 
(16 AND OVER) 
Crimina 1 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
17 39 12 30 
17.3% 39.8% 12.2% 30.6% 
6 2 7 
40.0% 13.3% 46.7% 
17 45 14 37 
x2=3.6386; 3df; P=0.30 






OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF OLDER OFFENDERS 
(16 AND OVER) (COLLAPSED DATA) 
Criminal Court Other Dispositions Institution 
17 51 30 
17.3% 52.0% 30.6% 
8 7 
53.3% 46.7% 
17 59 37 
x2=3.6302; 2df; P=0.16 










For white offenders (Table XXVII), there is a significant differ-
ence in dispositions according to offense. M1 re than 10% of white 
delinquents were referred to the criminal court and a higher perccent-
age of white delinquents had their cases dismissed in comparison to 
white status offenders. Also, a greater percentage of white delin-
quents were placed on probation. But, a much higher percentage of 
white status offenders were institutionalized than were white delin-
quents. These data indicate that the total sample difference in dis-
positions between offense categories remains for whites: status 
offenders tended to receive more severe dispositions than did 
delinquents. 
TABLE XXVII 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF WHITE OFFENDERS 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
13 50 26 36 125 
Delinquents 10.4% 40.0% 20.8% 28.8% 
Status 13 4 24 41 
Offenders 31. 7% 9.8% 58.5% 
13 63 30 60 166 
x2=14.4601; 3df; P=0.002 
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Table XXVIII presents the data on offense and dispositions for 
non-white offenders. As the data indicate, there appears to be no 
significant difference in dispositions for non-white delinquents and 
status offenders. Very similar percentages were observed in dis-
missed cases, the delinquents had a slightly higher percentage of 
probations, and status offenders had a higher percentage of institu-
tional dispositions. However, more than 20% of the cells had an ex-
pected frequency below five. 
TABLE XXVII I 
OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF NON-WHITE OFFENDERS 
Criminal 
Court Dismissed Probation Institution 
5 8 6 10 
Delinquents 17.2% 27.6% 20.7% 34.5% 
Status 2 1 4 
Offenders 28.6% 14. 3% 57. 1 % 
5 10 7 14 
x2=2.0723; 3df; P=0.56 






After collapsing these data (Table XXIX), there remains a non-
significant difference in dispositions. There is very little differ-
ence in the dispositions of non-white delinquents and status 
offenders other than for the criminal court. A higher percentage of 
non-white status offenders were institutionalized. Even after the 
categories are combined, there are still more than 20% of the cells 
with an expected frequency of less than five, yet it is obvious there 





OFFENSE AND DISPOSITION OF NON-WHITE OFFENDERS 
(COLLAPSED DATA) 
Criminal Court Other Dispositions Institution 
5 14 10 
17.2% 48.3% 34.5% 
3 4 
42.9% 57.1% 
5 17 14 
x2=l.9865; 2df; P=0.37 






Though not true for older offenders and for the small number of 
non-whites in the sample, the results tend to generally substantiate 
the hypothesis. Delinquents and status offenders tended to receive 
significantly different dispositions. These findings are consistent 
with the conflict approach as expressed by Platt (1969, 1977) and 
Andrews and Cohn (1977), among others: those who violated 11middle-
cl ass mora lity 11 generally received harsher treatment than those who 
violated the criminal law. The findings are inconsistent, however, 
with those of Gibbons and Griswold (1957), Wheeler (1974), and Lerman 
(1978), who all found little difference in the treatment of delinquents 
and status offenders. 
Hypothesis 5 
The fifth hypothesis states that status offenders are ·supervised 
longer than delinquent offenders. Table XXX presents T-test data for 
this hypothesis. Based upon these data, there appears to be no signif-
icant difference in the length of court supervision of delinquents and 
status offenders. Though the status offenders had a longer average 
length of supervision, the F-value for this test was below .05; there-
fore, the heterogeneity of variance makes interpretation rather dif-
ficult. To aid in interpreting these data, Table XXXI presents the 
results of the Mann-Whitney U test of ranks using the same variables. 
These findings are consistent with the T-test, indicating again no 
significant difference between delinquents and status offenders in 
length of supervision. 
When examining the data for males only (Table XXXII), it seems 






T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH 
OF SUPERVISION 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
154 4.4571 3.3350 -0. 71 
48 4.8750 4.230 




MANN-WHITNEY U FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND 
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Mean Rank 
















offenders tended to have a slightly longer length of supervision than 
did the male delinquents. For females, similar findings are observed. 
According to Table XXXIII, there is no significant difference in the 
length of supervision between female delinquents and status offenders. 
The status offenders did, again, have a longer period of supervision 
than did the delinquents. 
N 
TABLE XXXII 
T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR MALES 
-x s. D. T-Value df 







20 4.9350 4.059 
TABLE XXXI II 
T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR FEMALES 
-
N x S.D. T-Value df 
23 4.3130 3.044 
-0.48 49 






Next, the data are controlled for age. Table XXXIV presents 
findings for younger offenders. Based upon these data, it appears 
that there is no significant difference in the length of supervision 
between younger delinquents and status offenders. Again, the status 
offenders had a longer average length of supervision than did the 
delinquents. For older offenders, Table XXXV indicates a difference 
that is not quite statistically significant (P=.08). However, the 
older delinquents had an average length of supervision more than a 





T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR YOUNGER 
(UNDER 16) OFFENDERS 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
56 5. 1161 3. 660 
-0.75 
33 5.7697 4.405 
df Prob. 
87 0.226 
In terms of race, the data in Table XXXVI indicate no significant 
difference for whites. The average length of supervision for white 
delinquents and status offenders was very similar. For non-whites, 
Table XXXVII shows no significant difference again. However, the 
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non-white status offenders had almost two months longer average super-
vision than did the delinquents. But, the data on race generally in-
dicate no significant differences in the length of supervision of 








T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR OLDER ( 16 AND 
OVER) OFFENDERS 
-
N x S.D. T-Value df 
98 4. 0806 3. 117 
l. 36 111 
15 2.9067 3. 109 
TABLE XXXVI 
T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR WHITES 
-
N x S.D. T-Value df 
125 4.4000 3.273 
-0.28 164 









T-TEST FOR TYPE OF OFFENSE AND LENGTH OF 
SUPERVISION FOR NON-WHITES 
-N x S.D. T-Value 
29 4. 7034 3. 717 
-1.08 
7 6.6429 6.138 
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df Prob. 
34 0. 143 
The data do not support the hypothesis. It appears that there is 
no significant difference in the length uf supervision of delinquents 
and status offenders, even though the status offenders tended to have 
a slightly longer average length of supervision. These findings sup-
port those of Wheeler (1974), Gibbons and Griswold (1957), and Lerman 
(1978), who found little difference in the treatment of delinquents 
and status offenders. They also provide some support (though small) 
for conflict theory in that the more serious offenders (delinquents) 
did not receive longer supervisions; in fact, the less serious of-
fenders (status offenders) tended to have a slightly longer period of 
court supervision. 
Hypothesis 6 
The sixth hypothesis states that females are supervised by the 
court longer than are males. The T-test data on sex and length of 
supervision for the entire sample are presented in Table XXXVIII. 
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These data indicate that there is no significant difference between 
the average length of supervision of males and females in the sample. 
The averages for males and females are almost identical. When con-
trolled for offense, similar findings are observed among delinquents 
(Table XXXIX). Likewise, among status offenders (Table XL), there 
is no significant difference in supervision time between males and 
females. So, sex does not appear to be an important variable in ex-




T-TEST FOR SEX AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
151 4.52424 3.492 
-0.10 
51 4.5980 3.834 
df Prob. 
200 0.462 
Again, this hypothesis is not supported, though females had a 
slightly longer period of supervision than did males. The findings 
provide little support for the conflict theory assumption of fe-
males receiving harsher treatment than males. And, the findings are 
inconsistent with the ideas of Reiss (1970), Lerman (1971), Riback 
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(1971), Murphy (1979), and Chesney-Lind (1973, 1978), who asserted 







T-TEST FOR SEX AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR DELINQUENTS 
-N x s.o. T-Value df 
131 4.4824 3. 412 
0.22 152 
23 4. 3130 3.044 
TABLE XL 
T-TEST FOR SEX AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR STATUS OFFENDERS 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
23 4.5043 3.969 
-0.28 









The seventh hypothesis states that non-whites are supervised by 
the court longer than are whites. For race and length of supervision 
in the entire sample, Table XLI indicates, from the T-test data, that 
there is no significant differences. Though non-whites had an average 
length of supervision more than one-half month longer than whites, the 
difference is not statistically significant. Controlling the variables 
of race and length of supervision for offense, Table XLII shows that, 
for delinquents, there is again no difference. Non-white delinquents 
had a slightly longer length of supervision, but that difference is 
not statistically significant. However, for status offenders, there 
does seem to be a significant difference. As Table XLIII shows, non-
white status offenders had an average length of supervision over two 
months longer than whites. This difference is statistically signifi-
cant; non-white status offenders appear to spend a good deal more time 




T-TEST FOR RACE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
~ 
N x S.D. T-Value 
166 4.4428 3.410 
df 
-0.97 200 







TABLE XLI I 
T-TEST FOR RACE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR DELINQUENTS 
-N x S.D. T-Value df 
125 4.4000 3.273 
-0.44 152 
29 4.7034 3.717 
TABLE XLI II 
T-TEST FOR RACE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR STATUS OFFENDERS 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
44 4.3727 3.793 
-1.34 








The hypothesis, though, is not generally substantiated. Though 
non-whites had a longer length of supervision than did whites, the 
differences are all non-significant except for status offenders. 
These findings do not generally confirm the conflict assumptions that 
non-whites are treated more harshly than are whites and they are in-
consistent with the perspective of Reiss (1970). Likewise, they 
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contradict Wheeler and Nichols (1974), who found that non-whites 
tended to be treated more leniently by the court. 
Hypothesis 8 
Hypothesis number eight states that younger offenders are super-
vised by the court longer than are older offenders. Table XLIV pre-
sents the data on age and length of supervision for the total sample. 
According to this T-test, there is a significant difference in the 
average length of supervision of younger and older offenders. Essen-
tially, older offenders have an average length of supervision almost 
one and one-half months shorter than do younger offenders. However, 
the F-value is below .05, indicating heterogeneity of variance. There-
fore, the data are subjected to a Mann-Whitney U test of mean ranks 
(Table XLV). The Mann-Whitney test confirms the original findings: 





(16 and Over) 
TABLE XLIV 
T-TEST FOR AGE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR THE TOTAL SAMPLE 
-
N x S.D. T-Value 
89 5.3584 3.941 
df 
2.88 200 
113 3.9248 3. 128 
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The data on age and length of supervision are next controlled for 
offense. Table XLVI presents data for delinquents in the sample. Based 
upon these data, the difference in length of supervision between 
younger and older offenders seems to hold true for delinquents. The 
younger delinquents had an average length of supervision more than one-
half month longer than that of the older delinquents. The difference 
is statistically significant. Also, this difference seems to hold 
true for status offenders (Table XLVII). Among status offenders, those 
aged 15 and under had an average length of supervision more than three 
months longer than those aged 16 and over. Again, the difference is 
statistically significant. 
These data, then, substantiate the hypothesis on age and length of 
supervision. Younger offenders were supervised longer than older 
offenders. The findings are similar to those of Wheeler and Nichols 
(1974), who found younger offenders tended to have longer institution-
alizations than did older offenders. Likewise, they are consistent 
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with the conflict assumption that younger offenders receive more 








(16 and Over) 
TABLE XLVI 
T-TEST FOR AGE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR DELINQUENTS 
-N x S.D. T-Value df 
56 5. 1161 3.660 
1.86 152 
98 4.0806 3. 117 
TABLE XLVII 
T-TEST FOR AGE AND LENGTH OF SUPERVISION 
FOR STATUS OFFENDERS 
-N x S. D. T-Value 
34 5.7029 4.356 
2.60 








Explaining Length of Supervision 
Correlations 
For further anaiysis, the data on age at referral and length of 
supervision were correlated, using the Pearson Product-Moment Correla-
tion. For age and length of supervision in the total sample, r=-0.1691, 
indicating a small negative correlation. Thus, for the entire sample, 
there was a small tendency for younger offenders to be supervised 
longer than older offenders. Though the correlation is statistically 
significant (P=0.008), the r value is too low to be of much substan-
tive significance. 
The correlation for the delinquent sample is -0.1239, again indi-
cating a small tendency for younger offenders to be supervised longer. 
This correlation is not quite satistically significant (P=0.063), there 
is little substantive significance in the small correlation. 
Among status offenders, there is again a small, though higher, cor-
relation (r=-.02766) between age at referral and length of supervision. 
So, for status offenders there was a tendency for younger persons to 
be supervised longer, and the correlation is again statistically sig-
nificant (P=0.03). But the r value is still quite low, and, as in the 
other correlations, it explains very little of the variation in length 
of supervision. 
Criminal Maturity Index: Multiple Re-
gressions for Length of Supervision 
The last analysis consists of the use of multiple regression analy-
sis to develop a Criminal Maturity Index (CMI) for the purpose of 
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predicting and explaining length of supervision. From Table XLVIII it 
can be observed that, in conjunction with the other independent vari-
ables, number of previous status offenses explains the greatest amount 
of variation in length of supervision (3.7%) for the entire sample. 
Interestingly, the second best explanatory variable is number of pre-
vious delinquent offenses which has a negative correlation with length 
of supervision. Therefore, the greater the number of status offenses, 
the longer the period of supervision, and the greater the number of 
delinquent offenses, the shorter the length of supervision. Generally, 
the legal variables are the best predictors, with the extralegal vari-
able of age at first arrest or referral explaining only .5% of the 
variation. However, all of the variables account for only 10% of the 
variation in length of supervision; therefore, the vast majority of 
the variation for the total sample is unaccounted for by these variables. 
Table XLIX presents the findings of the CM! for delinquents only. 
Compared to the results for the total sample, the independent variables 
account for less of the variation for delinquents. For delinquents, 
however, the best predictor is that of previous delinquent offenses, 
again a negative correlation. Prior status offenses is the next best 
predictor, again a positive correlation. Still, the variables do not 
explain much of the variation in length of supervision and all the var-
iables except prior delinquent and status offenses account for less 
than 1% of variation each. 
When the multiple regression findings for status offenders are 
examined, it seems that the independent variables have greater explan-
atory value. From Table L, it can be observed that 49.95% of the vari-
ation in the length of supervision of status offenders can be explained 
TABLE XLVIII 
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR ENTIRE SAMPLE 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 R2 Change 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.19393 0.03761 0.03761 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.24894 0.06197 0.02436 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.27405 0.07510 0.01313 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.29169 0.08508 0.00998 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.30060 0.09036 0.00528 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.30806 0.09490 0.00454 
No. of Previous Probations 0.31845 0.10141 0.00651 























MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR DELINQUENTS 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 R2 Change 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.15518 0.02408 0.02408 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.21044 0.04428 0.02020 
Number of Previous Probations 0.23153 0.05360 0.00932 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0. 24901 0.06200 0.00840 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.26363 0.06950 0.00750 
No. of Previous Dispositions 0.26767 0. 07165 0.00215 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.26988 0.07284 0.00119 























MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR STATUS OFFENDERS 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 R2 Change 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.49054 0.24063 0.24063 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.50797 0.25803 0.01740 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.51571 0.26596 0.00793 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.52084 0.27128 0.00532 
No. of Previous Dispositions 0.65178 0.42481 0.15354 
Age at First Arrest or Referral o. 68117 0.46399 0.03918 
No. of Previous Probations 0. 70651 0.49915 0.03516 






















by the regression variables. For status offenders, number of previous 
institutionalizations is the best predictor of length of supervision 
(24%), followed by number of previous dispositions (15% when the preceed-
ing variable is added). All of the variables except age at first 
referral are positively correlated with length of supervision. Gener-
ally, then, it appears that the independent variables in the CMI ac-
count for virtually 50% of the variation in length of supervision for 
status offenders. 
Table LI presents the multiple regression findings for whites. 
As it shows, the independent variables account for only 11% of the 
variation in length of supervision. The greatest amount of variation 
is explained by number of previous status offenses, prior referrals -
1977, and number of previous institutionalizations. These three vari-
ables account for slightly over 8% of the variation. Of these three, 
only prior referals - before 1977, is negatively correlated; the 
higher the number of referrals before 1977, the shorter the length of 
supervision. Also, though it explains the least amount of variation 
(0.2%), number of previous delinquent offenses again has a negative 
correlation with length of supervision. However, the variables to-
gether account for little of the variation and do little to explain 
length of supervision for whites. 
For non-whites (Table LII), the CMI explains more of the variation 
in length of supervision. The independent variables account for 39.8% 
of the variation, with number of previous status offenses accounting 
for almost 16%, followed by number of previous delinquent offenses 
(9.6%). Another 10% of variation is also explained by the variables 
of prior referrals - 1977, and the number of previous dispositions 
TABLE LI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR WHITES 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0. 14915 0.02225 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.22737 0.05170 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.28679 0.08225 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.29905 0.08943 
No. of Previous Dispositions 0.30593 0.09359 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.32126 0. 10321 
No. of .Previous Probations 0.33004 0. 10893 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.33436 0.11179 







0. 00572 0.05372 














MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR NON-WHITES 
Independent Variable~ Multiple R R2 R2 Change 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.39744 o. 15796 0.15796 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.50441 0.25443 0.09647 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.55107 0.30368 0.04925 
Number of Previous Dispositions 0. 59411 0.35296 0.04928 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.60793 0.36958 0.01662 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.62284 0.38793 0.01835 
No. of Previous Probations 0. 63117 0.39837 0. 01044 























together. Of these, number of previous delinquent offenses and num-
ber of previous dispositions are negatively correlated with length of 
supervision. Thus, the CMI variables explain about 40% of the varia-
tion in length of supervision. 
The findings for younger offenders (Table LIII), indicate that 
the regression variables explain almost 25% of length of supervision 
variation. The greatest amount of variation is accounted for by num-
ber of previous status offenses (13%), with number of previous proba-
tions next (5%). Interestingly, for younger offenders, number of 
previous delinquent offenses has a very slight positive correlation 
with length of supervision. In fact, all of the variables have posi-
tive correlations. Other than those mentioned, along with the variable 
of number of previous institutionalizations (2.5%), all of the other 
variables account for less than 1% of the variation each. But, the 
variables together account for 24.76% of the variation in length of 
supervision. 
Table LIV presents the regression findings for older offenders. 
As it indicates, only 6.58% of the variation in length of supervision 
is explained by the independent variables. Almost 5% is accounted for 
by number of previous delinquent offenses, and it is negatively cor-
related to supervision time. Therefore, for older offenders, length 
of supervision cannot be adequately explained by the CM!. 
For males, as indicated in Table LV, the CMI explains only 8.69% 
of length of supervision variation. The greatest amount of variation 
is accounted for by prior referrals - before 1977 (2.96%), which is 
negatively correlated with length of supervision. Number of previous 
probations explains another 2.4%. But, for males, the independent 
TABLE LI II 
MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR YOUNGER 
{UNDER 16) OFFENDERS 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.36702 0. 13471 
No. of Previous Probations 0.43531 0.18950 
No. of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.45723 0.20906 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.48443 0.23467 
No. of Previous Dispositions 0.49224 0.24230 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.49714 0. 23715 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.49760 0.24761 
R2 Change Simple R 
0. 13471 0.36702 
0.05479 0.33873 
















MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR OLDER (16 AND 
OVER) OFFENDERS 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 R2 Change 
Number of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0. 21726 0. 04720 o. 04720 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.23216 0.05390 0.00670 
No. of Previous Institutionalizations 0.23936 0.05730 0.00340 
Number of Previous Probations 0. 24986 0.06243 0.00514 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.25408 0.06456 0.00213 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.25459 0.06482 0.00026 





















MULTIPLE REGRESSIONS FOR MALES 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0. 17208 0.02961 
Number of Previous Probations 0.23165 0.05366 
No. of Previous Status Offenses 0.25576 0.06542 
Number of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.27072 0.07329 
Age at First Arrest or Referral o. 27706 0.07676 
Number of Previous Institutionalizations o. 28338 0.08030 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.29260 0.08562 
Number of Previous Dispositions 0.29488 0.08695 
R2 Change Simple R 





















variables in the CMI account for very little variation in length of 
supervision. 
The findings for females (Table LVI) indicate that the CMI ex-
plains 46% of the variation in length of supervision. Over 30% 
. (31.6%) of the variation is accounted for by number of previous status 
offenses. Another 8.9% is explained by prior referrals - before 1977. 
So, most of the explained variation is a function of these two vari-
ables. All the variables except age at first arrest or referral are 
positively correlated. Therefore, the variables in the CMI explain 
almost one-half of the variation in length of supervision for females. 
TABLE LVI 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION FOR FEMALES 
Independent Variables Multiple R R2 
Number of Previous Status Offenses 0. 56191 0.31575 
Prior Referrals - Before 1977 0.63623 0.40479 
Age at First Arrest or Referral 0.64956 0.42193 
Number of Previous Dispositions 0.66204 0.43830 
Number of Previous Delinquent Offenses 0.66895 0.44750 
Number of Previous Probations 0. 67631 0.45739 
Number of Previous Institutionalizations 0. 67755 0.45908 
Prior Referrals - 1977 0.67846 0.46030 






















SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Summary 
The purpose of this study was to examine the treatment of differ-
ent types of offenders in the juvenile court, primarily through the 
use of conflict theory. The conflict perspective holds that law is a 
reflection of the influence of powerful interests. Law is viewed as 
a means of protecting those in power and as a means of enforcing their 
interests on the less powerful (Quinney, 1975, 1970; Chambliss, 1976; 
and Empey, 1978). Thus, the legal system (including the juvenile 
court), is seen as a means of exerting influence by those in power 
and as a means of maintaining control over the less powerful. This 
view is in contrast to that of the consenses or functional model which 
views law as reflecting the general values of society (Pound, 1964; 
Durkheim, 1949; and Timasheff, 1939). Though consenses theory is the 
dominant theoretical view in legal sociology, conflict theory was 
viewed as more appropriate in this case, due to various features of 
the juvenile court. 
From the review of literature, it was found that much of the con-
troversy surrounding the juvenile court stemmed from its origin as a 
means of enforcing middle-class morality (Platt, 1969, 1977) and its 
wide discretionary jurisdiction over differing types of offenders 
(Murphy, 1974; Platt, 1969, 1977; Chesney-Lind, 1973, 1978; and Lerman, 
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1971). Much of the literature focused on the special case of status 
offender treatment and jurisdiction in the court (Platt, 1969, 1977; 
Chesney-Lind, 1973, 1978; Riback, 1971; Lerman, 1971; Rubin, 1971; 
and Kittrie, 1971). 
Therefore, the theory review and previous literature indicated 
that the juvenile court has jurisdiction over many offenders, including 
those who do not violate the criminal law. Because of its wide dis-
cretionary power, its legal jurisdiction over a variety of offenders, 
and its origin as a "child-saving" measure (Platt, 1969, 1977), con~ 
f1ict theory was viewed as the better approach for explaining the work-
ings of the court. 
The research design consisted of examining the treatment of 202 
offenders referred to the court during 1977. These persons consisted 
of both delinquents and status offenders, and included those referred 
to all four major dispositions: criminal court, dismissed, probation, 
and institutionalization. The sample was examined in terms of descrip-
tive characteristics, differences in disposition, and differences in 
length of supervision using the chi-square test, the T-test, and the 
Mann-Whitney U test. Finally, an attempt was made to explain length 




The sample had ax age of approximately 15-1/2 years, with ages 
ranging from 10 to 19. They were predominantly male and white. Most 
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of the persons had no previous referrals during the year 1977; almost 
half had no previous referrals whatsoever, and the majority were re-
ferred to the court for violations of criminal law. Over 1/3 of the 
sample lived with both parents and 1/2 came from homes with their 
parents divorced or separated. 
The average age for first arrest or referral was 14.701 years, 
with the mode being age 16. Approximately 1/3 of the subjects had 
no previous dispositions and the majority had no previous probations 
or institutionalizations. Most subjects had no previous status of-
fenses; almost half had no previous delinquent offenses, and the aver-
age length of court supervision was approximately 4-1/2 months. 
Profile by Disposition 
In terms of disposition, those referred to the criminal court 
tended to be the oldest, while those on probation tended to be the 
youngest. Males were the majority for all dispositions, with no 
females referred to the criminal court. Likewise, the majority of 
persons in all dispositions were white; the highest percentage of 
blacks went to the criminal court, the lowest percentage of blacks 
had their cases dismissed. Also, the greatest percentage of Indians 
were sent to institutions. 
The vast majority of all offenders were referred by law enforce-
ment agencies. Except for those sent to criminal court, the majority 
in all other dispositions had no prior referrals during 1977. Those 
persons referred to the criminal court and those institutionalized 
were the only dispositions for which a majority had prior referrals 
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before 1977. Likewise, criminal court and institutional dispositions 
were the only ones who received overnight care prior to disposition. 
Those referred to the criminal court were referred for the most 
serious offenses, yet a large percentage of other dispositions were 
referred for serious offenses. Surprisingly, the greatest variation 
in offenses was observed in the institutional sample. In fact, the 
data indicate that the institutionalized category tended to be re-
ferred for less serious offenses, including status offenses. The most 
common reasons for referral, among those institutionalized, were (in 
descending order), running away, ungovernability, burglary, and auto 
theft. 
The greatest number for all dispositions except criminal court 
lived with both parents; the majority of those sent to the criminal 
court lived with mothers only. On terms of living arrangement, the 
criminal court sample was certainly different from the others. Sim-
ilarly, the criminal court sample tended to not have their natural 
parents still married and also had the highest rates of divorce and 
separation. The other dispositions had more similar rates of par-
ental marriage, divorce, and separation, with far higher rates of 
parents still married to one another and somewhat lower rates of 
divorce and separation. A large percentage of all dispositions had 
high rates of divorce and separation. The data seem to indicate that 
those persons sent to the criminal court have very different home 
backgrounds than the others. 
The data on socioeconomic background, though limited, indicate 
that criminal court dispositions tended to come from more disad-
vantaged homes than the other dispositions. They had the greatest 
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percentages in low-income categories and the smallest percentages in 
higher-income groups. Likewise, the criminal court sample had fewer 
fathers in high status occupations and fewer mothers as housewives. 
All four dispositions had similar data on age at first arrest or 
referral. In terms of previous dispositions, the criminal court 
sample was much higher than the others, followed by the institution-
alized sample. Those institutionalized had the highest average num-
. ber of previous probations, with the criminal court sample following. 
For previous institutionalizations, the criminal court was highest, 
followed by those institutionalized, those placed on probation, and 
those dismissed. For length of supervision, probationers and those 
institutionalized had the longest times. 
Surprisingly, the institutionalized category had the highest num-
ber of previous status offenses, followed by those referred to the 
criminal court. However, in terms of previous delinquent referrals, 
the criminal court sample was highest, followed by those who were 
institutionalized, dismissed, and placed on probation. Comparing the 
data on previous offenses, it appears that the criminal court sample 
had a tendency to commit (or be referred for) delinquent offenses, 
while the institutionalized sample tended to have a history of status 
offenses. 
Profile by Sex 
Males and females in the sample had similar ages at referral and 
racial composition; the majority for both being white. A higher per-
centage of males were referred by law enforcement agencies, while a 
higher percentage of females were referred by parents or relatives. 
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The majority of both sexes had no prior referrals during the year, 
but the males showed a greater offense history prior to 1977. The 
data on detention indicate a major difference in the handling of 
offenders according to sex. Less than 2% of the males were kept in 
. jail or a police station overnight, compared to 55% of the females. 
Likewise, no females were placed in detention, but over 44% of the 
males were. Certainly these data indicate a tendency to treat fe-
males more harshly than males in terms of care pending disposition. 
There appear to be major differences between the sexes on 
offenses. In terms of reasons for referral, males were far more 
likely to be referred for delinquent offenses, while females were far 
more likely to be referred for status offenses. Either males and 
females differ greatly on the offenses which bring them under court 
supervision, or there is a pattern of differential enforcement. 
For living arrangement, the data indicate that females were more 
likely to live with both parents and to have their parents together. 
Males were far more likely to come from homes in which their parents 
were not married to each other. Both sexes had high rates of di-
vorce and separation, and both sexes appeared similar in terms of 
parents' income, father's occupation, and mother's occupation. 
Males and females had similar ages at first arrest or referral. 
The males had a higher number of previous dispositions and previous 
probations. Both sexes were similar on previous institutionaliza-
tions and length of supervision. 
As indicated by the data on reason for referral, females tended 
to have a much higher number of status offenses than did males. 
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Likewise, the males had a much higher number of previous delinquent 
offenses. 
Profile by Offense 
Delinquents tended to be older than status offenders at the time 
of referral. Most of the delinquents were males, while most of the 
status offenders were female. The majority of both groups were white, 
but the majority of non-whites were referred as delinquents. 
The delinquents had a longer length of time between referral and 
disposition. Though the majority of both groups were referred by 
law enforcement agencies, a much higher percentage of the delinquents 
were so referred than were status offenders. Likewise, all those re-
ferred by parents or relatives were status offenders. Though most of 
both groups had no prior referrals during 1977, the status offenders 
had a higher number of average referrals. For referrals prior to 
1977, the two groups were similar. In terms of care pending disposi-
tion, the status offenders were more likely to be detained overnight, 
and were more likely to be kept in juvenile detention. 
In terms of disposition, the greatest number of status offenders 
were referred to a public agency. The delinquents were evenly di-
vided among dismissed, public agency, and probation categories. For 
years in school, living arrangement, and marital status of natural 
parents, both groups were similar, with about half of the two groups 
having parents who were divorced or separated. 
For socioeconomic variables, the delinquents and status offenders 
appeared similar. Though the data are rather limited, the two groups 
show similarity in income, father's occupation, and mother 1 s occupation. 
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The data indicate that, for the most part, both groups tended to come 
from working-class homes. 
The two groups had similar ages at first arrest. The delin-
quents had a higher average number of previous dispositions and proba-
tions. Though most offenders had no previous institutionalizations, 
the status offenders had a slightly higher average. Also, the two 
groups had similar lengths of supervision. 
In terms of previous offenses, it appears that the offenders 
tended to be consistent. The status offenders had a high average 
number of prior status offenses and the delinquents had a higher num-
ber of previous delinquent offenses. It seems, then, that the of-
fenders tended to repeat the same type of offenses. Finally, the 
delinquents had a longer average time between first and second offenses. 
Comparisons 
Age and Disposition 
There was a significant difference in disposition in the sample 
according to age. Generally, other than criminal court referrals, 
younger offenders tended to receive harsher dispositions. For the 
delinquent sample, the difference remains, though there were no sig-
nificant differences in disposition by age for status offenders. The 
sample difference, then, was primarily a function of the handling of 
delinqunts. 
Sex and Disposition 
Again, a significant difference in disposition was observed, in 
this instance, according to sex. Aside from the criminal court (all 
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were ma1es), there was a tendency for the females to receive stricter 
dispositions. They were less likely to be dismissed or put on proba-
tion, but were more likely to be institutionalized. When these data 
were examined with offense category held constant, there was no sig-
nificant difference, indicating that the intervening variable of of-
fense category is the mechanism through which the original difference 
occurred. Among the delinquents, sex does not affect disposition; 
the same is true among status offenders. Therefore, it is the rela-
tionship between sex and offense which produced the original differ-
ences in dispositions: females tended to be referred for status 
offenses and ma1es tended to be referred for delinquent offenses. 
Race and Disposition 
For race, there was no significant difference in disposition. 
Both whites and non-whites had similar rates of referral into the 
juvenile cateogires, though non-whites had higher rates of referral 
to the criminal court. When controlled for offense category, the 
findings were similar. It seems that race was not a major factor 
in the disposition of these offenders. 
Offense and Disposition 
One of the major pruposes of this study was the examination of 
the handling of delinquents and status offenders. The data clearly 
indicate a pattern of differential handling according to offense 
category. For those dispositions other than the criminal court, 
status offenders tended to be treated more harshly. They were less 
likely to have their cases dismissed or to be placed on probation. 
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They were likewise far more likely to be institutionalized than were 
the delinquents. When controlled for sex, the same differences were 
observed. The difference in disposition was also found for younger 
offenders, but not for older ones. Likewise, the difference was ob-
. served for white offenders but not for non-whites. Therefore, it 
appears that there was a significant difference in the disposition 
of offenders, and that the difference is not affected by sex. It 
is also primarily a difference in the handling of younger and white 
offenders. 
Length of Supervision 
Another aspect of this study consisted of an examination of the 
variable of length of supervision to determine if differences could 
be observed. Differences in length of supervision were examined 
using the T-test and, where necessary, the Mann-Whitney U. 
First, the difference in length of supervision between delin-
quents and status offenders was tested. The data indicated no sig-
nificant difference in the average length of supervision between 
delinquents and status offenders. This finding did not change when 
the data were controlled for sex, age, and race. 
Next, length of supervision was examined in regard to sex. The 
data indicated no significant difference in the average length of 
supervision of males and females. No change was observed when the 
data were controlled for offense, sex, and race. Race and length of 
supervision for the total sample yielded similar results. No sig-
nificant difference was found between whites and non-whites in length 
of supervision. Likewise, for the delinquent sample, no difference 
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was observed. However, a significant difference was observed in the 
length of supervision between white and non-white status offenders. 
The data indicated that non-white status offenders tended to have a 
significantly longer period of supervision than did white status 
. off enders. 
Finally, length of supervision was examined in relation to age. 
The data indicated that younger offenders were supervised significantly 
longer than were older ones. That difference remained after control-
1 ing the data for offense. It appears that younger offenders received 
a significantly longer period of supervision than did older ones. It 
is likely that this difference is partly due to the fact that older 
offenders had less time before they became too old for juvenile court 
supervision; but, considering that only 33% of the sample was within 
a year of majority age, this fact cannot wholly account for the 
difference. 
Correlation 
The next analysis consisted of correlating age at referral and 
length of supervision. For the total sample, age had a small nega-
tive (though statistically significant) correlation with length of 
supervision. Generally, there was a slight tendency for younger 
offenders to be supervised longer. For delinquents only, similar 
findings were observed, with a slightly higher negative correlation 
found for status offenders only. The correlation coefficients, how-
ever~ were very low, indicating little substantive significance in 
the relationship. 
Criminal Maturity Index and Length 
of Supervision 
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To predict and explain length of supervision, a criminal ma-
turity index was developed, using the variables of number of previous 
delinquent offenses, number of previous status offenses, prior re-
ferrals - before 1977, prior referrals - 1977, number of previous 
dispositions, number of previous probations, number of previous in-
stitutionalizations, and age at first arrest or referral. Through 
the use of multiple regressions analysis the variables were examined 
in terms of their abilities to explain length of supervision. 
For the total sample, the criminal maturity index explained 
only 10% of the variation in length of supervision. For delinquents, 
the index explained only 7% of the variation, but for status offend-
ers, 49.95%. The index accounted for 11% of length of supervision 
variation for whites but 39.8% for non-whites. Also, the regression 
procedure explained almost 25% of the variation for younger offenders 
and only 6.58% for older ones. Finally, in terms of sex, only 8.69% 
of length of supervision variation was accounted for by the criminal 
maturity index, but the index accounted for 46% of the variation in 
length of supervision for females. 
In summary, the criminal maturity index provided insight into 
explaining length of supervision for status offenders, non-whites, 
younger offenders, and females. It did not account for much of the 
variation in length of supervision for the total sample, delinquents, 
whites, older offenders, and males. 
218 
Limitations and Problems 
Every study has its problems and limitations, and this one is 
certainly no exception. Most of the limitations stemmed from the use 
of available data. Though using court records can provide insight 
into the workings of the institution, their use also presents prob-
lems. The major problem results from the fact that the data were de-
veloped for use by the court and not for the purpose of sociological 
research. As such, some of the variables that sociologists consider 
important are not viewed as such by court personnel and are not col-
lected as precisely as possible. In this research project, that was 
especially true of socioeconomic variables. Most any attempt to 
utilize socioeconomic data for anything other than descriptive pur-
poses would have been futile; the data for income were available only 
in rough, ordinal form. The highest income category was $10,000 and 
up, with a large number, of course, exceeding that limit. There were 
also a large number of 11 unknown 11 incomes, further limiting the use-
fulness of the data. Likewise, for the occupation of parents, the 
data were only available in rough categories and, again, there were 
a large number of "unknowns." 
This study also suffers from the same problem as many studies on 
crime and delinquency. Regardless of the availability of data on 
variables such as reason referred, previous offenses, and prior dis-
positions, there is no way to know the exact nature of an offender's 
criminal history. Do females tend to commit more status offenses 
than delinquent ones? Or, are females simply more likely to be re-
ferred for certain offenses and not others? Questions such as these 
cannot be answered in this study. 
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Another limitation is the small number of offenders in certain 
categories, especially the small number of non-white status offenders. 
Not only does this limit statistical analysis, it presents a question 
similar to the preceeding one. Do non-whites tend to primarily com-
. mit criminal offenses, or do they just not get referred for status 
offenses? Again, in this project, there is no way to know. 
Finally, an important variable could not be examined using these 
data. At the Tulsa County Juvenile Court, what is its "agency climate?" 
What attitudes do the caseworkers and others bring to the job? How 
do the approaches of a variety of workers affect the treatment of 
offenders? What subtle, underlying workings of the court affect dis-
position and length of supervision? In this case~ the answers remain 
unknown. 
Conclusions 
This study showed that certain offenders tended to receive 
harsher dispositions than did other offenders. Specifivally, younger 
offenders, female offenders, and status offenders received more se-
vere treatment than did older, male, and delinquent offenders. These 
findings are consistent with the conflict theory approach used as 
the basis for this study. One of the major tenets of conflict 
theory is the idea that the law tends to be applied in a discrimin-
atory fashion; those persons who are less powerful tend to be dealt 
with more harshly under the law. Certainly younger persons, females, 
and violaters of 11 moraliti1 statutes fall into the category of less 
powerful. The results of this study provide important conformation 
of the utility of the conflict approach in understanding law and the 
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workings of the court. The only category of di spos iti ons in which the 
conflict approach proved less useful was that of race. It seems im-
portant that, in this case, race was shown to be of little importance 
in the dispositions that juvenile offenders received. There simply 
were no important differences in the dispositions of whites and 
non-whites. 
Also, it is clear from the data that, of the various dispositions, 
those persons referred to the criminal court were significantly dif-
ferent from the others. The criminal court sample was older, all 
male, had the highest percentage of non-whites, had a greater number 
of previous referrals, committed more serious offenses, and came from 
less conventional home environments. Likewise, an important finding 
concerned the relationship between sex and offense. Females were far 
more likely to be referred for status offenses, while males were more 
likely to be referred for delinquent offenses. This finding is also 
consistent with conflict theory. The conflict approach used in this 
study assumed that society (including the court) has a special inter-
est in female morality, based upon the traditional double standard. 
If, in fact, the court is most interested in the irrmorality of fe-
males and the illegality (criminality) of males, then the expected 
findings would be consistent with the results of this study. Gener-
ally, the greatest difference in dispositions was found for younger 
and white offenders. For the most part, little difference was ob-
served in regard to length of supervision. No difference in length 
of supervision was observed between delinquents and status offenders 
or between males and females. However, significant differences were 
found between white and non-white status offenders and between younger 
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and older offenders. The non-white status offenders tended to be 
supervised longer, as did younger offenders. Whether the longer 
period for younger offenders was due to the fact that they had a 
longer time before they were no longer under court jurisdiction or 
whether it was due to differential treatment could not be determined. 
It may well be that length of supervision is a "controlled" variable, 
in that the court system functions informally or formally to end a 
juvenile's supervision within a particular range of time. This 
could explain the general lack of difference among offenders in 
length of supervision. 
The results indicated also that a good deal of length of super-
vision could be explained for certain types of offenders. Through 
the use of a Criminal Maturity Index based in multiple regressions 
of primarily legal variables, much of the variation in length of 
supervision for status offenders, non-whites, younger offenders, 
and females was explained. These results provide some support for 
consensus theory in that the treatment of these offenders can be 
partially explained by legal variables. Also, though, this proced-
ure may be viewed as providing support for conflict theory in that 
these are exactly the categories conflict theory sees as most impor-
tant to the court. Therefore, due to the fact that length of super-
vision can be somewhat explained only for these categories, the 
conflict assumption that these offenders obtain differential treat-
ment receives support. 
As in any study of this sort, conclusions must be made cautiously. 
It seems evident, however, that explaining the treatment received by 
offenders in the juvenile court is a very complex issue. Aside from 
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the problems and the limitations of the resesrch, it can be suggested 
that this study has made several contributions. First of all, some 
knowledge of the complex nature of the workings of the court has been 
provided. There seems to be no one explanation or approach that com-
pletely accounts for the ways in which various offenders are handled. 
However, this study provides evidence that conflict theory can be a 
useful explanatory approach in the Sociology of Law, and can be 
especially useful in explaining the workings of the juvenile court. 
Also, some understanding is offered regarding the ways in which various 
offenders are treated differently, along with some potential explana-
tions. Finally, this research helped clarify many of the issues which 
need to be examined in further research on various juvenile offenders. 
Hopefully, further studies can examine more carefully such variables 
as offense history, socioeconomic status, and agency climate. One 
suggestion for further research based in this study is the elimina-
tion of the criminal court sample from comparisons; there seems no 
doubt that those persons sent to the criminal court are very differ-
ent from typical juvenile offenders. 
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